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I Chapter 1
PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
This report tries to present some useful and interesting images
rela[ed to the potential long-term future in space. One of its purposesis to encourage and facilitate the use of such images by NASA in its
studies_ planning, and public information programs. Although NASA I
alre&dy uses various scenarious in its planning, t,e deliberate form-ulation of long-term ri s or "realistic images of th long-term
future" is usually left to others. It may now be timely_ perhaps
important, for NASA to participate in this process--to encourage andfacilitate it. The public's interest in space programs undoubtedly
will be related to their perceptions about how glorious and exciting
space development can be. ![ ,C_early, television shows, movies, the news media, science fiction
and other popular literature have already introduced much of the public t,
here and abroad to a variety of space concepts. However, existingliterature on space technology as interpreted by these media is seldom
well disciplined, although it is often imaginative. Also, with some
important exceptions, it is relatively unrelated to serious socio- [
p_litical issues. A goal of this is to help fill this last !reportgap, particularly in relating social issues to potential space programs.
In several fields the historical record suggests that carefully-developed
images of the future have often helped to place current priorities, *issues_ or controversies into _ more realistic context_ and have provided
perspectives useful for understanding them. For Americans long-term
space-development scenarios which give rise to shared images of space _futures can contribute to their sense of community, to institutional ,-
meaning and purpose_ to morale_ and even--to use somewhat extravagant
terms--to perceptions oF their manifest destiny or "religious" mission.[ -It will be important to focus on goals which are feasible and practical.Thus appearances of fanaticism, unwarranted risks or unduly utopi3n
outcomes in the near-term should be avoided by responsible instit.,tions.
Such images, it expressed by NASA officials at inappropriate timesand occ sions9 could create counter-productive res onses.
This report presents its scenarios from the vantage point of a U.S.space historian who is living in the year 2076 and looking back over "history."
This is partly e dramatic device but it also is convenient es it provides
a stimulating perspective. For example, the "historian" also attempts
to project developments for the "next I00 years in space" and observesthat it is not possible to offer much more than interesting conjectures.
In this report are ingredients which could interest almost anyone 1interested in writing or outlining long-term space scenarios. Not only l
are there suggestions for other scenarios_ but also contexts, orientation
!
i
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and information which might be helpful. The chosen scenarios are developed !
at some length to illustrate in detail how they can be created. The "_
Moderate scenario is intended to be the most likely and persuasive; however _
_" the others, represent less-limiting cases of pessimism and optimism (from
the perspective of a space professional) might be more appealing because .I
they are more dramatic. Still all of them appear to be possible, and
nor,e implausible. -_
i
The huge number of possible future changes permit an almost endless
I variety of scenarios to be constructed. The key ingredients for success -T
; in space over the long-term are listed and discussed in Chapter II
.I where it is shown that these prospects depend upon several factors -'
ranging from highly technological developments to the soft matters
of future social dynamics. Indeed_ the major variable which influences -'
the outcome of the scenarios in Chapters III, IV, V are the assumptions '._ ;
about the new values which successful industrialized societies adopt ;
_i over the long-term. In the most pessimistic scenario (pessimistic -:
;I as seen by space buffs) the emerging new values emphasize safety, security, ._t
• welfare, health, and environmental purity. Science, technology and
_i new industrial developments are viewed as dangerous--as creators of __
potential threats to society that must therefore be increasingly and
-t carefully regulated. That emerging ideology induces social forces "_ =
which restrain technological progress, as it is currently understood .°
i and measured, in favor of a simpler, slower, but more secure existence• ' !
Indeed, that kind of outcome reflects many of the values which emerged ._ ,
_ in the U.S. between the mid 1960s and the late 1970s and which have '
i been strongly associated with the rise of the public-interest movement _ I
whose activists were inclined toward political liberalism as defined _
during those years. These activists and their supporters have been
called "the New Class," a term which is also used in the scenarios.L Tl
_,, A description of the New Class phenomeon is given in Appendix A. _ <.
, In the context of _he Optimistic Scenario it is important to observe
that a successful affluent world does not necessarily lead to an emphasis _ .
of New Class values, at least not to the extent that it would stif]e most ._
new technc'ogical developments Consequently the New Class phenomeon i• 1
does not become an important constraining Factor. But much more is "T
needed to make the Optimistic Scenario a vibrant possibility.
First, it is necessary for the people of nearly every nation to
acquire a basic confidence in their future security, economic and political• "_
Up to now that kind of security has been rare in the world and incomplete .i
within any nation. Because of widespread insecurity during every era
of human experience9 history itself does not provide much hope or guidanc_ "_
for future long-term optimism in space development. A search for historical .I
lessons is given in Appendix B. However, the results of that search_
a|one, would suggest that the only solid hope for optimism in space .,
would rest upon its potential for returning sufficient amounts of wealth, _1
knowledge or power to those who invest in space.
T]
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• Although it is indeed _ossible that the resources to be found in
• space coupled _,ith improving technology would, over time, pr "_e many
investment opportunities with large payoffs in "crass co_.... ' _m" or
N in military advantages, such outcomes cannot be expected o lea_ the
J complex socio-political changes which are required for t_ 0p_imi= _c
Scenario. Something more is needed, a vital "ingredient" which reflects
the long-term needs and desires of the human spirit and which will
I encourage a blossoming of mankind's potential. But at the sa,x- time it
I must be so practical that, once understood_ its emergence cannot be denied.
• It is probably correct to surmise that preconditions for the widespread
I emergence of that new spirit include (I) a spreading confidence among
nations that the threat of larae scale international warfare will diminish
_ over time and before long become utterly obsolete, (2) an institutionalization
i of minimum standards of economic security, rising over time, and available
w to the citizens of essentially every nation, and (3) a growing belief
that improving worldwiJe education and training coupled with expanding
I_ opportunities for utilizing it, will lead to an endless series of social,
• economic and technological "miracles" which will be the milestones
.along the future path of mankind's inevitable accent, literally and
i figuratively, to the heavens.
_ Indeed the above paragraph defines a set of preconditions which
should not be too difficult to achieve. Many of the "forces" are already
I in place--_or example, growing wealth, improving technology, diminishing ,
u utility of war, expanding communications, and a burgeoning interest
in assisting disadvantaged cultures of countries. But is this enough? 8
If not what other ingredient might be crucial? Might it not be a new
It quasi-spiritual idea which in a modern form reflects the ultimate potential .
of the human spirit? Might it not take the form of a belief in mankinds'
• destiny that sees the human race as emerging triumphantly over all
natural obstacles and establishing its presence on a large scale throughout _
" the solar system, from which it could then choose to move out, when q '
ready, toward the rest of the awesome universe?
I A general surge toward that kind of perceived destiny would certainly "' i
require a similar appropriate spirit to arise and spread throughout
B the world. It would almost certainly have to become the focus of a ,
I changing orientation of people toward each other and their institutions. .
This spreading image of mankind's destiny would require a new humanism, :
I and a growing humanitarianism, on earth which would help to mobilize
the world's potential for accomplishing the great missions ahead.
m To best reach out toward that goal all of the earth's billions of people 'i
should be potential contributors. Opportunities must then be created '_
I to help the presently disadvantaged to modernize and participate with i
the advantaged. As in other humanitarian efforts, the effective assistance i!
given will provide a more promising world for everyone.
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Might not the world's present effort in space provide the above
kind of inspiration to the rest uF humanity? Certainly not! But it
could have a key symbolic role to play. As a reflection of mankind's
tangible progress in science and technology it may be ideal• As a
symbolic spearhead of mankind's announced intention to conquer the
technical, economic, political and social impediments to mankind's
ascendance it may be nearly perfect. As an onging measure of human
progess toward an evolving perception of its destim' it is excellent.
It is clearly evident that successes in space exploration are
. profoundly influencing a growing, and largely youthful, segment of
world society that is now becoming organized into active groups to
support further space exploration. It is mainly from the youth (the
young in heart) that an appropriate spirit can be expected to grow. If
that sp!rit becomes nurtured in an expanding humanistic context, as!
indicated above_ it should greatly increase the likelihood that some
form of the Optimistic Scenario, depicted in Chapter III, will become
: a part of the world's future.
B. Watersheds of History
Perhaps the two great technological watersheds of human his_ v
prior to the 20th century were the agricultural revolution, w_ tarted " '
in the Middle East some I0,000 years ago, and the industria' ution, .I
which began in Holland and England _bout 200 years ago. Of _, t
many historians and futurists now are claiming that the seer Jlf -,
of the twentieth century is witnessing the beginning of anoth., watershed.
Some would emphasize tl,e computer-based electronics_ some the introduction ""
of nuclear energy and explosives; some would emphasize the ability
of man to leave and return to the earth; some would emphasize the peaking
of growth rates in world population and gross world product; some would .}
emphasize the universalization of the industrial revolution; while
finally some would emphasize almost the opposite--the emergence of "' ,"
physical or social "limits to growth."
In any case, in much the same way that the agricultural revolution
was destined spread around the world, the industrial revolution is
still spreading and causing a permanent change in the quality of human
life. However, instead of taking I0,000 years, this second diffusion
process is likely to be largely completed within a total span of about
400 years_ or roughly by the mid or late 22nd century. Indeed, what
has been t_rmed the su]per-industrial and post-industrial economies
are even now emerging, to be followed eventually by corresponding changes
° I
• I
i i
;- _ I_-I "l_ i.- r = - = - "_ - - ---r'_'_Jl_: I
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in society and culture as a whole. The last part of this period may be
accompanied and followed by an era of space exploration and exploitation
,.,h;chmay introduce an equally startling change i_Ihuman history.
In fact, one of the purposes of this report is to use the scenario
technique to explore, dramatize, and illustrate some of the possible
interactions of a developino "outward-bound" culture with cultures
and events on earth--and, - particular, to illustrate how such developments
in space might affect the "post-industrial culture" on earth, and be
-- affected by it.
- In order to characterize the nature of some changes that will
occur, it is useful to distinguish four kinds of activities: primary,
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary.
I Primary are extractive, principally agriculture, mining,
activities
forestry, and fishirg. They would be similar to the major occupational
activities pre-industrial society, one mo'_ly organized to "play games
I
Various authors have developed and expanded notions of "post-
E industrial" society, and culture. Preeminent among these
economy,
in the depth and sophistication of their analysis are Daniel Bell_
The Comin_ of Post-lndustrial Society; A Venture !n Social Forecasting
r N-_ York: Basic Books, 1973), and, _ith a very different manner and
r L emphasis, Peter Drucker, The__e of Discontinuity (New York: Harper
& Row, 1969).
_J
We should distinguish here among:
Economy: economic and teLhnological activity
Institutions: laws and organizations
r. Culture: style, values, national character and attitudesSociety: the whole
Super-lndustrial Economy refers to large size and scale of modern _"enterprise and he importance of its impact on th external s cial
and physical environment.
_. Economy to a very economy
Post-lndustrial refers future affluent
which meets its industrial and material needs with a small percent
of its work force and economic e_fort. The term is deliberately chosen
to be neutral; it does not describe the corresponding society.
Presumably the economy emerg_:s firsti then the institutions and
_. the culture change; finally (hopefully), a harmonious society evolves. 'i
Post-lndustrial is often at the same time Super-lndustrial. Thus, ;i
the United States is a post-agricultural society (since less tha_ five
percent of its inhabitants are engaged seriously in agriculture) but "it is also a super-agricultural society in terms of the variety of i
its products and the scale of its activities.
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twith and against nature."* !n those days for each city dweller there
i were generally about twenty living in rural areas and following some
primary activity,
} -"
Secondary activities mainly involve construction and manufacturing.
l That portion of society and its culture is mostly organized to "play "
_f
i with and against :,laterials." It is primarily an urban culture which _.
has been characterized in recent history by a _,ation_state political
system with its well-known character tics. -,
Initially, an emerg!,._ post-industrial economy will be characterized ""
i by a service economy, emphasizing what we call tertiary activities. ..
These are services which assist primary and se_ondary actfvities as
'I
_! well as the functions of the nation-stat2. Conventionally they include ..
4 transportation, insurance, finance, management, governmental activities, 0
: education and training. This trend is toward society and culture whose "_ ,
4 major activity is "games with and against organizaticls." Such a society -.
is increasingly characterized by organizational and professional pluralism i
in the distribution of power, wealth and prestrge. It will probably
become more suburban than urban, and will tend to move toward a larger
fraction of corporate activities. ""
-t
1 By early in the 21st century, a partial transition (in the richer
-} OECD countries at least) to a different kind of service econom_ should 71;t
have occurred that can be called a "quanternary" or truly post-,ndustria, _j
economy. In such a society the primary, secondary, and tertiary activities ,
will constitute only a _-'all part of human endeavor_ more and more
• will people do things for their own sake, and ends will become more
• important than means. Such a society can be characterized as playing ._
games with and against people, with and against communities; and perhap_
even with and against oneself. These quaternary act Tries could include
many "mundane" activities such as:
.I
• Reading, wr;Ling, painting, actir_ composing, musicianship, arts
and crafts--particularly if done for their own sake. "" i
.J
,J Tourism, games, contests, rituals, exhibitions_ and performances.
tm
The term "playing games with or against nature" and other uses
of game metaphors refer to the extensive literature of gaming_ simulation
and role playing and should be thought of partly in a literal sense and ..
partly metaphorically. The idea simply is that the major roles and
activities of the individual in a primary society are preoccupied with -"
activities which can be characterized as "playing games with and against ._
nature" rather than as in the other cases "with and against materials_"
"with and against organizations" or "with and against communities."
"I
The basic inspiration for this terminology comes from Daniel Bell. _i
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I Gourmet cooking and eating, an aristocratic and formal style oflife, epicurean and family values (including visiting, entertaining
and "togetherness").
I Hunting, fishing, hiking, camping,
boating.
Acquisition of non-vocational skills.
I Improving property (if caused by some non-economic motives), such
as gardening, upkeep, interior decorating, and the use of home-
i made artifacts.
Convelsation_ discussion, debating, and politicking.
Many other cultural and social activities.
I Most welfare and social security.
But also such significant activities as:
Many public works and public projects done more for cultural
interest than for economic or research reasons (e.g., space
activities, under-seas explorat!on_ much environmental protection_
nonumental architecture). , IRitualistic and aesthetic activities (perhaps creating special
structures and environments) including the evoking of images or _feelings of spl do , pride, pomp, awe, and c mmunal, ethnic, ireligious, or national unity or identity; oneness with nature _and the universe,and various explorations in "inner space."The creation of taboos, totems, demanding religions, traditions,
and customs; arbitrary pressures, constraints and demands; moral
and social equivalents of war; some other pressures and risks, "including those involved with some of the more bizarre forms
of "discretionary behavior."
I Finally, the concept includes non-tertiary services to these
and other quaternary activities.
If a transition occurs to a societv principally engaged in these '
activities--a transition which could largely be completed some two
hundred years hence--it would probably mark the third great watershed
of human history. Future society would look back at what happened ,.
in these centuries of industrialization and describe it as mankind's
most effective and pervasive transformation--a journey from a world
i basically inhospitable to its relatively few dwellers to one fullycommanded and enjoyed by its expanded mult udes.
!
!
ii .... I r
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8C. The Difference that Space May Make
s
Nevertheless, many readers may he at least 'e uneasy with
the above images. It ends too soon. Would mank choose to
"stagnate" in a totally quaternary society? Woul_ it permanently give
up its games wiCh and against nature, materials and organizations?
One gues_ !s that in the futur6 mankind will reply, "not completely."
Still, it is clearly possible for most people to become content within
this post-industrial culture. In other words, most people could be
quite happy living in this postulated quaternary culture, but there _.
are likely to be many who would become restless within it. These people
might find the culture lacking in excitement, challenges, and opportunities.
Ambitious people would undoubtedly want to contribute to larger goals,
rather than merely accepting and reinforcing the even tenor of a rich_
comfortable and even, within its own terms, interesting ltfe. Indeed_ the ..
development of space could become a major Focus For many of these people.
Th_ existence of such a frontier with an endless scope for activity and --
of such a locus of dynamism, initiative, and entrepreneurship should
be very healthy for the quaternary society that prefers to remain earth-
bound as well as For those who may attempt to faster progress--either as ..
a society, a family, or individual, or as an industr;al or professional
group. In such a manner the endless challenge of space could_ first -'
psychologically and culturally, and then materially, play a central role i
I
in making the future a much more interesting experience _this potential i ,
is developed most strongly in the Optimistic Scenario, Chapter III). ,;
At least three possible space perspectives seem to be interesting: T_(l) Not important: that is, space doesn't make crucial or dramatic
differences within the next 200 years; (2) Crucial: Space has an ""
essential role in changing the world from a stagn_'t neD-Malthusian
orientation to a hopeful outward-bound post-indust al one. (3) Useful:
Space activity complements and enlarges post-indust, ial development .;
but is not essential to it. However, it improves the context for developing ..
a superior post-industrial society on earth and may create a .nuch different "" !
society living in ....
.J
Thus, post-industrial society need not end mankind's future but .o
can provide a base from which to move deep into the solar system and
then, possibly, into interstellar space. Whether or not the latter -'
occurs, the openness, the opportunities, and the challenge of outer
space can cast a sustained and profound influence upon an otherwise
excessively static or introspective earth society. ..
This study will emphasize the possibilities that income and resources -_
from space can be important, that space activities can generate _any
economically and technologically profitable enterprises, and tha_ the
exploitation of space can have a major and positive influence on the ,,
world's economic, technological and ideological future. Such outcomes are
'1
!
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consistent with both the second and third perspectives above. However •s
the first t_ perspectives •re In conflict one of them may have basic flaws. '1
D. The Basic Surprise-Free Earth-Centered Scenario
It Is useful to begin any projection of the future with •
reasonable-.or not unreasonable--surprise-free scenario which unfolds
time •t least of the "data" that can measure
over some simplest or
set limits to econom!c, demographlc_ and technological trends. It
may not be possible, of course, to get futurologlsts to agree that
any particular set of data should be preferred t because • strong- divergence of views usu lly exists--a div rgence wt_ich, In part, reflects
a genuine uncertainty. But it is usually possible to get • falr amount
r of agreement that • particular choice Is not stupid, ridiculous9 wildly
L optimistic or pessimlstlc, etc.
However, even achieving ag;'eement might be Irrelevant. For example,
the economic growth rate for today's most developedaverage per capita
countries has, over the last 200 years, been roughly 2.0 percent. Over ,t
the 200 years this Increase In Income Is about a factor of 50, from
about $150 to _bout $7,500 per capita. However if a serious 200-yearec ,_,ic projection had been m_de In 1776 for the nehIy-b rn United States, i
using the 2 percent figure, almost all Intelligent and knowledgeable _ ![ :people probably would have sneered at or ridiculed it. After all, at that _ ;date the world had scarcely changed in average per-capita Income since the _ :
beginning of recorded history. Indeed, had such projections then been !
based upon a 1 percent or a 3 percent growth rate (neither of which, in _t"
| retrospect, appears any less plausible than 2 percent)the actual outcome
over the two centuries would have changed radically--by •bout a factor
of 7--that is, to $1,000 per capita or $50,000 per capita, respectively. _ :
Even with the recognition of the powerful effect of small changes
In average growth rates upon the long-term outcome, and therefore of
r the low probability of making valid estimates over extended periods, It
L is still necessary to begin scx_ewhere. The choice here is • surprise-
free projection adapted (_nd slightly modified) from the Hudson Institute
book, The Next 200 Years. The chosen population and economic projections
I are shown in Table I. They were arrived at after due deliberation
but are, of course, arbitrary to some degree. They were chosen almost as
much for convenience and general acceptability as for a serious prediction,r and are based on • smooth curve (I.e., no attempt is made to Include
I_ short term effects of business cycles). Thls choice may be called
• 10/20/200 world as It asymptotically approaches the values: 10 billion
*The modifications are partly due to recent data and events. The
princlpa| change is the 200-year projection to a 10-billion world population,
rather than 15 billion. The GNP/capita over elme Is •bout the same.
I .
I :
1985022650-017
,, p.w. _:L" . _ "• "-" "'_ "_ (+.B'
_ 10 •
i Table I
, , SURPRISE-FREE PROJECTION OF WORLDPOPULATION AND GVP* 1FOR THE BASIC 10/207200 SCENARIO •
.i r "1POPULATION G_tT, (AVTRAGE) G_/P/CAPITA (AVERAGE) l
! YEAR .(B ILL I ONS) ($ TRILL I ON) ( $ THOUSANDS)
m_' 1975 4.0 (2.0) 6.6 (5.1)** !.75 (2.8) .i
t: 2000 6.0 (1.3) 20 (3.6) 3.3 (2.3)
' 2025 7.7 (.7) 43 (2.61 5.6 (W.B)
'_ 2050 8.8 (.4) 74 (!.8) 8.5 (I.4) "'
2075 9.4 (.2) 106 (!.2) I1.0 (.97) :
i,'''_ 21oo 9.7 (.i) 155 (.75) i_,.0 (.66) 4' i t! .l .
_T 2125 9.9 (.04) 156 (.1'7) 16.0 (.h3) ..:!
'_ 2150 9.9 (.02) 172 (.29) 17.0 (.27) -'_ ,
2175 10.0 (.01) 182 (.18} 18.0 (.17)
*GROSS ',,/ORLD PRODUCTAND GVP/CAPITA IN 1975 DOLLARS. THE FIGURES ,_|
IN PARENTHESES GIVE PERCENT CHANGE PER ANNUM DURING THE FOLLOWING -" _:.
25 YEARS. 1
• *THE 1')75 _lP IS USUALLY ESTII"ATED AT $6.3 BILLION AND THE GROVI"H
RATE WAS MUCH SMALLER THAN 5-1 FOR THAT YEAR. E/HAT APPEARS ABOVE
. IS THE CALCULATED RESULT OF A SMOOTHEDOUT PROJECTION _/HICH CORRECTS f
ii fOR THE 1974-5 RECESSION. ._
,l
i
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_oculation, $20,000 GI_Pper capita and $200 trillion GWP(1975 _ollars
[_ are assumed throughout this report unless otherwise specified).
The population projections are reasonably consistent with those
made by the United Nations. They assume that the world populationstabilizes after about a century (If It doesn't, some serious social
problems could arise). Hare controversial, however, is the assumed
growth in G_/Pwhich, after 200 years, Increases the world's average per
_. capita income about a factor of 10. That Is, this surprise-free worldbecomes rich, even by current U.S. standards. Still the factor of 10
represents an average projected growth rate over 200 years of only 1.2
[: percent in per capita lncome--a rate which would be a great disappoint-m nt currently in any growth-oriented nation. Ind ed, the estimates
in Table 1 show a conservative (in the light of present trends and
the ongoing technological revolution) per capita growth rate of only
2.3 percent for 50 years to 2025. For the last 100 years, 2075-2175,
it is substantially less than 1 percent. In this light the end result
can hardl_ be termed optimistic--yet it has often been so labeled (by
critics of The Next 200 Years).
Probably the principal reason for the "optimistic" label is the
legacy of the pessimistic belief, which became widespread in the mid-70s before it faded, that the world simply has insufficient resources
to sustain nations with growing populations and growing economies much
i beyond their present sizes. It should not be surprising if presentadherents of that view are taken aback by a claim that the population |}
could more than double and the gross world income increasd almost 30-fold f
without unduly straining the physical capacity of our "small" world.
[" Yet, according to the analysis of the The Next 200 Years, this economic| projection appears to be only a very moderate one, well within the i
capacity of the world's resources, i
. The scenarios in the later chapters of this report start from this
(
surprise-free context. Only the most pessimistic one is unable to
rise above it. The Optimistic Scenario does much more. It accomplishes
the 200-year outcome within I00 years, and proceeds on a rapid growth
path to some remarkable accomplishments.
, - ---.----__
Although few people are likely to object to a population limit
many might object that a limit to GWPis not reasonable, even in an
.- earth-centered context. The assumption of a GWPlimit merely reflects
|; a mathematical convenience In which at the end of the year 200-year
a. period the world economies are still growing, but slowly, at about
•25 percent annually.
l i
- ............. '_ .,_._,_'._ ............ , ........
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I Chapter II
POTENTIAL 21ST CENTURY SPACE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Scme Early 21st Century Technologies
In the future it is possible, as a result of past successes, formost of he developed world to become relatively hostile to innovation in f
science and technology. By blaming it, for example, for the dangers that
: I' it has unleashed (nuclear weapons, pollutants, hazardous chemicals, e_c.)
& it can be claimed that technology is likely to create more harm than
good and should either be stopped or severly constrained. Whatever the
,,, outcome may be as such restrictions are attempted, it appears that enough j
I momentum exists in current technological efforts that a surorise-free
I projection into the early 21st century would very likely include the
developments shown ir Table 2. Some remarks about this table are in order.
1. Recent international interest ap _ continuing expenditures
to develop many alternative energy sources will provide assurance of
the availability of relatively inexpensive and clearly inexhaustiblesupplies well before the middle of the 21st century. The first oil i
crisis associated with the Arab embargo of 1973 and its price surge,
followed by the second oil crisis in 1979-80 will be long remembered i
as a particular vulnerability that gradually must be eliminated to !
assure a secure long term future. Energy may not become as cheap as
it was in 1970 but it certainly does not need to be expensive. Indeed,
the world's technological community can be expected to strive diligently iuntil this assertion becomes valid. Because no fundamental reason
requires clean energy from relatively long term or ipexhaustible sourcesto i
be expensive, and because a large number of alternatives are now being _:pursued around the world, to knowledgeable observers only a very pessimistic
conservative or a neo-Malthusian advocate would be apt to dispute this
conclusion. Moreover, by coupling new energy supply alternatives with
r the potential of efficient utilization practices it may even be possible _ i
I. that the effective cost of energy may become quite inexpensive--possibly i
even cheap--once again. The effective cost, of course means the total I
economic cost to perform the required task--heat a building, drive100 iles, make a ton of steel, illuminate an office, provide a megawatt-
hour of electricity, etc.
[ 2. "Pollution-free" industries and improved recycling are obviously
=" symbiotic. A major trend in industrial research today is to convert
: pollutants into resources. Sulfur is being recovered more and more in
IT the form of useful by-products rather than emitted in noxious fumes.
Low levels of metallic compounds in liquid wastes are now being recovered.
thereby reducing pollution and recycTing the valuable minerals. Urban
_ _ wastes are being transformed into fu_l and mineral resources. These fewexamples illustrate the technologicai trends which are likely over time
to eliminate current doubts about the ability of science and technology to i _
....... , ._:T.::,.,, _ i"7 "!'_ p.l_G ,,a |NTENIION_I.L¥_
_),) ,_r';'I _ ]" "' , A _ '_ .... BLAII_
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Table 2
SOME FARLY 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES
"i
}
I. INEXPENSIVE AI_D INEXHAUSTIBLE ENERGY SOURCES
"l
2. "POLLUTION-FREE" INDUSTRIES PLUS IMPROVED RECYCLING { ,
I
3. LARGE ADVANCES IN DRILLING AND MINERAL EXTRACTION
4. LARGE-SCALE UNCONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE AND ARTIFICIAL -;
FOODS ,_
5. SUBSTANTIAL MATERIALS PROGRESS IN FIBERS, FOAMS, ._
COMPOSITES, CERAMICS, CRYSTALS, POLYMERS, ADHESIVES !
6. ULTRASENSITIVE SENSORS (SEE TABLE 3)
7. HUMAN-MACHINE COMMUNICATIONS ,:
LARGE IMPROVEMENT FACTORS IN HARDWARE BY YEAR 2000 ., C
!
OPERATING SPEED 10--103. 0
• .Jaoot,e _ (
• STORAGE CAPACITY ........ In5--I01
• RELIABILITY .......... 10__.?v_ J
• INFORMATION TRANSFER RATE . . . I03--I05 --!!
SOFTWARE IMPROVEMENTS _ '"
ILl
• DATA COMPRESSION ........ 2--1000
• PROGRAMMER PRODUCTIVITY . . . I0--I00
• VOICE COMMUNICATION ...... ? ._
• AUTOMATIC PROGRAMMING ..... ? "'
8. AUTOMATION: IMPROVED MACHINES "_
TELEOPERATORS ._
ADVANCED ROBOTS
INTELLIGENT ROBOTS -_
9- IMPRESSIVE ADVANCES IN GENETICS AND MEDICINE "_
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II reduce and recycle pollutants effectively. By any reasonable historical
measure the recent response to society's demands for an improved environment
has been rapid and effective. Clearly as long as society demands it
_ (and is willing to pay the costs involved) this trend will continue.
3. Within the last ten years at least twelve novel or revolutionary
• design concepts fo r new drill bits have been announced. Yet the bit
is not the only part of the drilling process that is be_n,j improv-e-d-_.Other improvements in exploration and extraction industries are being
i made through the use of processed LANDSAT data, new downhole sensors,
the application of computers to analysing the raw data from seismicsensors and mapping the geological structures_ nd the development
of new technologies for recovering various minerals from the oceans.
Currently there is little doubt that progress in the extractive
industries will soon make petroleum exploration possible at almost
any ocean depth on the continental rises, as well as the gathering
of mineral bearing nodules on the deep sea floor. The concerns ofthe 1970s about adeouate long term supplies of both energy and minerals
from secure sources has been coupled with powerful advancing technologies
i
r to ef_ely guarantee extraordinary progress in extractive industriesL over the next few decades and probably for much longer.1
4. In discussing future world food requirements it should bet-
• I. noticed that many avenues to unconventional agriculture and artificial
foods have already been opened and are now commercial, although some i
are not yet producing on a large scale. But the trend seems clear. _
Single-cell protein is being widely used as a supplementary animal food
L and is now manufactured on a large scale. The industry has predicted
that within a decade the purity of the product will meet e_isting standards
for human consumption and at not more than ha,f the cost of competing
protein rich foods (e.g., soybeans). Scientifically controlled growth _chambers now exist on a commercial scale with yields in vegetable crops
from I0 to I00 times greater than that from conventional agricultural
land. These chambers are capital intensive 24-hour
year-round operations.
Their principal competitive determinant appears to be related to a
single technical problem: how efficiently can energy be converted
i r into the light frequencies which produce photosynthesis. This is the
L kind of problem in which a major breakthrough can occur in any year.
It would be surprising if one hasn't happened before the year 2000.
r Also, the nutrient film technique developed in England by the GlasshouseL Crops RescUe is used to grow vegetables commercially in
thin polyethylene troughs, without soil. This technique has been spreading
rapidly and its application to cereals is currently under investigation.
i [ Scientists have found a way to increase soybean yields from 30 ._
i [ to 60 percent by a carefully controlled application of foliar spraying. !
Companies are now commercially producing tortula yeast, a food made
from pet oleum th t has twice the protein value f beef. A chemical
i [ found in alfalfa has increased the yield of several greenhouse crops
from 10 to 40 percent and may be applicable to conventional farming.
iiii IIIIII I .... I m _
1985022650-022
J\ 1
ThJre are but a few examples of a very long list of promising
° new approaches to food production. These innovative and unconventional ..
approaches to food production could become a major factor in food supplies
within the next two decades.
5. Partly in response to the requirements of the aerospace and
other high technology industries and partly because of recent rapid
advances in diagnostic instruments and computer aided analysis and design, -"
unusually rapid advances have been announced in a wide variety of ._
materials--some of which are indicated in Table 2. Fibers of graphite,
plastics and glass are now stronger than high tensile steel. An "endless" --
parade of new foams are being used to provide greater rigidity and/or
insulation (against heat, electricity, or shock) with a minimum of
; material. New ceramics are offering both extreme hardness and tolerance _.
" of extremely high temperatures. Crystals of very high purity and uniformity
in structure provide unusual properties which have already made possible such --
_,_ devices as microcomputers, lasers, and most recently light "pipes" for
communications. Production of polymers has become a huge growth industry-- -_
especially in plastics--and is expected to continue growing for a long _,
time. Lastly, a remarkable array of adhesives have effectively been
_ challenging the techniques of bonding with welds, rivets and other fasteners. --
_s
The progress in materials has been so remarkable that in some
:= instances the theoretical limit to such material properties as strength_
hardness, and bonding may be attained by the end of the century. However, -_
the potential for new composites, new geometric designs, and new materials
: with unusual properties appears to be almost endless. Scientific progress
in understanding the properties of materials is occurring ever more
rapidly with the aid of new analytical instruments combined with high ,_
speed computers. These improved materials have already contributed
immensely to the development of space vehicles and satellites and are -|
expected to make possible not only lower propulsion costs but greater
performance within a given payload weight.
G. The astonishing improvements which have been made and which are
expected to be made in sensors (see Table 3) will have a tremendous impact -_
on science and technology. In some cases, as can be seen, sensors have
approached or reached the theoretical limit (reduced noise levels, for ":
example). In most cases, however, the potential for improvement is either _i
open ended or very far from any such limits. Thus the kind of progress
shown in Table 3 can continue well into the 21st century, or beyond.
These kinds of improvements hold an immense potential for serving mankind "_,
• in general and space development in particular. ""
7. Progress in computers, already awesome, will continue throughout
t this century, at the very least. Table 2 shows some current projections
.! for hardware as well as for software which is more difficult to project.
! The degree to which computer technology will change society during the 21st i
_ century can only be immense. Very likely its potential impact on the world .t
is far from being understood as there has not been sufficient time even to
1985022650-023
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i experience the fu!! impact of the current capability--a process which wouldundoubtedly take at least several decades if new developments were to be
stopped. However, after a few decades computers should be from a thousand
I to a million times more effective than they are today--depending on theapplications. It is probably not possible to foresee, even in general
terms, the major ways in which the social structure of the world's societies
will be changed by the application of computers over a century or more.! ,8. Some of the potential applications of computers to automation can
be understood- to a degree. Microprocessors are destined more-and-more
I to control our motor vehicles, appliances, communications, and laboratories,as well as our factories, offices and homes. For remote maintenance (such
as in outer space) teleoperators will undoubtedly become common.
I The Viking landers on Mars were probably the world's most advanced robots
in the mid-70s. That only represented an early milestone in the beginning
t
of robotry. That future robots can become much more "intelligent" than
I current ones is not doubted even when we restrict our conceptions to machinesof limited learning capabilities. But can they eventually become intelligept
in the human sense? That is an ongoing, unresolved debate among scientists
I specializing in the field of artificial intelligence. ';
9. Perhaps the most spectacular scientific and technological advances
have and, in the near term, will continue to occur in microbiology. The !I .implications of increasing knowledge in this field and its applicatio _ !
to genetic control, and to the prevention and cure of diseases--physical, _ i
emotional, and mental (if these are proper categories)--is truly exciting. _ t
I Certainly, there is a reasonable chance that essentially all bacterialand v ral dis ases c n be prevented or rapidly cured before too long--many
perhaps, even by this century's end. Progress in this field has been _ i
I intimately associated with progress in the sciences of physics, chemistry, _ _and biology, and in the techologies of computers, analytical instruments, !
sensors, and pharmacology. A remarkable integration among these disciplines !has led to astonishing advances which appear to be only the beginning . ,
i of much greater discoveries and applications to come. iI
I0. For future progress in space development--especially for manned
I operations in space which are currently visualized as space laboratories,permanent space bases, space industries, coloni s in orbit or n planetary
bodier., and space explorers--all of the technological developments
described above will be very important. They will be crucial in determining
I long growth space, example space i
the term in For industrialization
at the end of the next century will be vastly different depending upon
whether the annual growth rate is 2, 5 or lO percent (Figure 1). The
I 2 percent figure is barely interesting in less than 100 years: the i10 percent growth rate, however, would soon spawn results similar to
those of far-out science fiction. To mention expnnential 9rowth alone
without specifying the quantitative rate leaves obscure the critical
factor--the doubling rate. That will, of course, depend on social _
and politiccl developments as well as new technologies. Some of these
I
I
i I RLJ _" I RI m t
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Table 3
=
SOME FORECASTS FOR ULTRA SENSITIVE SENSORS
1970 1980 1990 2000 __
MICROWAVE RADIOMETERS ":
NOISE TEMP. ( K) 2000 300 30 30
_ APERTURE (METERS) I 2 10 40 "'
RADIO TELESCOPE _.
SENSITIVITY AT I-GHZ l .02 .01-.001
RADAR RESOLUTION_ FROM EARTH -'
ORBIT (METERS) 5 3½ 2 l ¢
SPACE TELESCOPE: _"
APERTURE (CM.) 50 200 350-450 _,
_! LASER ABSORPTION SPECTROMETER_
' ABS_ COEFF. 4 10 12-100 102-104
?i MULTI-SPECTRAL IMAGERS,
RESOLUTION (MICRO-RAD.) 100 25 10 7 '
SOLID STATE CAMERA (CCD) ..
._ RESOLUTION (NO. OF ELEMENTS,
_ MILLIONS) -- I,I 5-7 11-3o '' !
-i PHOTON SENSITIVIT_
_ (M,CRO-JOULESIM'I 02 01 008 _
X-RAY TELESCOPE (20-300 K.E.V.) .i
SENSITIVITY I .2 .03 .006
_. X-RAY SPECTROMETER (20-300 K.E.V.) --
SENSITIVITY 4 .2 .0I .001
SUPERCONDUCTINGMAGNETIC ")
SPECTRO.ETER.,ND X '5 7-S 25-5090-250 ,.
MAGNETS(_G.PER_,LOGAUSS_,._ .5 ., .00, _)GRAV,TYG_O,OMET_R , .0, .00, .00, -_ ,
SOURCE: NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, A FORECAST OF
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1980-2000, SP-387 (WASHINGT_, D.C.:
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION OFFICE, JANUARY 1976). "
• THIS TABLE IS AN ADAPTATION AND PARTIAL SUMMARY OF SOME
OF THE DATA AND FORECASTS PRESENTED.
- i
.!
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)
] 985022650-025
i ilk • ,"¢_,,+:_+,:-_,._ ..... - -' '_ ' L,:_,.mPr
I +
't
I ,9
I developments will be incorporated in the subsequent scenarios and, bytheir impact on the doubling rated lead to vastly differ t worlds.
I The progress which has already occurred in space technology and thatwhich might be expected to occur over the rest of this century under reasonably
optimistic conditions (adequate funding and/or good luck) are illustrated
in Table 4. The data for this table have been taken from NASA sources,
principally from its 1975 Outlook for Space study. Those projectionsgenerally were based upon careful evaluations by ernminent scientists and
technologists and are as likely to be understated as overstated. Where
a range is given in the projected progress the principal considerationis the available funding. For example, to achieve the major reductions
in launch costs would probably require at least $10 billion (in 1975 dollars)
for the development of a large capacity reusable unmanned vehicle. The
principal implication to be drawn from the table is that some astonishing
space developments are likely to occur within the next 20 years--developments
that might even surprise technological optimists who are not specialists
in space technology, i
Ii B. Space Industrialization (Sl) '_'I.
A decade ago it was a somewhat bizarre idea. However it is now
generally assumed that the industrialization of space, in the sense {
- of manufacturing operations conducted in or beyond low-earth orbit_ Iis certain to happen. Because of its embryonic nature its early growth
rate is highly uncertain. Research and development on processes for
future SI installations have been pursued in space as well as in earth +*
1
laboratories for several years. The three Skylab launches were the !
first extensive manned R&D operations conducted in space that focused
+ upon the SI concept. The results of these and subsequent efforts ledscience writer G. H_rry Stine to claim that a "third industrial revolution" i
was about to start, t
I Why industrialize space? The answer must be essentially economic. " iClearly there must be some important commercial operations which can
be done only in space and others which can be done better in space.
t That is, the space environment has exploitable advantages or resourcest at are unavailable or relatively costly on earth. Some f the principal
ones now known are listed in Table 5.
I advantages impressive. They could make feasible
Such could become
a large array of new products and processes with great commercial value.
Designs already exist 9 for example, for Sola,- Satellite Power Systems
/
G. Harry Stine. The Third Industrial Revolut;on (New York: G.P.
Putnam & Sons, 1975). Also, for an early NASA study on the SI potential
• see Rockwell International, Space Division, Space Industrialization, ]
Final_ Part I: Technical Report, SD 77-AP-0076 (Rockwell International, l
' July 15, 1977).
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Table 4
I PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY, PAST AND PROJECTED
P
SYSTEM 1960 1975 1990 2000
I I. LAUNCH VEHICLE: PAYLOAD
CAPAC!TY (LBS) 25 250,000 80,000 500,000
(REUSABLE) (REUSABLE)2. COMMUNICATION
SATELLITE (CHANNELS) 15 15,000 IOO,0OO 107
(LEO) (GEO) (GEO' (GEO)3. COMM. (MARS TO EARTH)
BITS/SEC 8 :O5 IO7 iO9
4. M,N DAYS/MISSION .I 250 lO5 5 x 105
5. RESOLUTION 5 .I .05 .O2
(KM) (LEO) (LEO) (GEO) (GEO)
6. DATA STORAGE 15 PAGES 2,000 BOOKS I/2 LIBRARY I0 LIB. OF
ABOARD SPACECRAFT (20 GIGABITS) OF CONGRESS CONGRESS(8,000 GIGA- i
BITS) _ i
7- ENERGY STORAGE(KW HRS/LBS) .02 40 800 1200 Ij i
8. ACTIVE CIRCU:TS/IN. 3 4 120,0OO 5 x IO8 IOI0 - IO12 :
" 6 " i '
9. SPACE-BORNE COMPUTER
SPEED (OPERATIONS/SEC.) .002 x IOb .5 x IO6 30 x IO IO0-1000 x IOb
i0. COST OF LAUNCHING(1975 $/LB TO LEO) lO,OOO 1,500 500 200-300 " }
I1. POSITION ERROR(METERS) l,OOO 50 .i .02
12. FAILURES/HR/M. BITS/SEC IO-2 IO-4 lO-6 I0"7-I0 -8
THIS DATA IS ADAPTED FROM VARIOUS NASA SOURCES--PRIMARILY FROM THE REFERENCEGIVEN ON TABLE 3.
[
i x,
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(SSPS) which could beam microwave power to earth in essentially unlimited
_J
quantities from the inexhaustible and constant sun. The microwaves are .,
readily converted to electric power without polluting either air or
water• At present the cost of power from an SSPS would not be competitive -"
: but it is possible that this could change during the next century.
*_ The use of high vacuum in industries is rapidly growing, a trend
.i which is almost certain to continue as high vacuum is required in nearly
all electronics as well as many other high-tech enterprises. On earth "'
providing and maintaining an adequate vacuum in industrial processes
is expensive. In space, however, even very high vacuums unattainable -"
on earth are trivially easy to arrange and can be "permanent." ..
;; Weightlessness may be the most interesting, and perhaps the most --
,_ commercially important advantage available in space• It is the one
i continual property of every space orbit for which no parallel exists ''
}J in daily human experience (beyond free fall which generally lasts less
_i than one second). Space technologists Ire attempt;ng to visualize the
I implications of the weightless environment and design processes which "'
_ can exploit that advantage. Still this science and technology are
presently at best embryonic, and likely to remain so throughout most "'
, of this century_ even as they develop rapidly Accordingly technology
.t has a great potential in this field. Indeed there already exist some
promises of exciting products and processes from orbiting industries. -,
Many materials behave differently when placed into a weightless
environment. Liquids form perfect spheres which can be solidified,
maintaining sphericity. Surface tension, usually a minor force compared
to gravity can become the dominant one in space, making the contactzone _
between liquids and solids act in "peculiar" manners. Gases also behave
differently. Hot air does not rise in zero-G, making it difficult
to start a fire. A lit candle quickly s_uffs itself out. Weightlessness
means that structures a mile long can be made of thin metal foil without
threatening to break or even to bend significantly. Tiny bearings -_
can control massive rotors. !
These and many other novel properties found only in space have
-?
spawned a large array of potential applications for SI, some of which
can be expected to begin soon--perhaps by the early 1990s. The early ._
i efforts, naturally, will concentrate upo_ R&D. However, there are
already some indications that production of high pu, ity pharmaceuticals ""
and of silicon wafers for electronic circuits are likely to be among D6
the earliest commercial developments. A list of some of the nore promising
early SI technologies is given in Table 6. ,:
Perhaps the key point in Table 5 is the tenth one--that the ""
transportation costs to space and back have dropped rapidly and can
" | be expected to decline further in the future. Indeed, as suggested "l
in Table 4, about a factor of 2 to 10 in reduced transport costs may
'i
_ °
t
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I Tab1 e 5I
TEN ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING IN SPACE
".|
I. _OLAR POWER (I0 x RATE ON EARTH) PLUS U-V, X-RAYS, ETC.
_ [ 2. UNLIMITED HIGH VACUUM, (10-8 to I0-14 MM. SPACE HG. IN 300 MILE ORBIT)
3. AVOIDS MANY EARTH HAZARDS
I STORMS (HURRICANES, TORNADOES, DUST, SNOW, HAIL, ICE, RAIN, WIND,...)
SPORADIC DANGERS (EARTHQUAKES, FLOODS, DROUGHTS, VOLCANOES,
I LIGHTNING,... ) .UNPREDICTABLE TEMPERATURES _,HUMIDITY (DALLY, SEASONAL...) '
INTRUDERS (HUMAN, RODENTS, INSECTS, MICROBES,...)
[ ACCIDENTS (AUTO, DROWNING, FALLS,...) -i
A. SPECIAL MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES ,
_"
, B. CONSTRUCTION OF VERY LARGE DELICATE STRUCTURES _.i=,L 4.
C. RELIABILITY OF OPERATIONS :,:,
• [ 5. POTENT,AL RAW MATERIALS ON MOON AND ASTEROIDS I_
6. GOOD '5/IEWS" OF EARTH AND OUTER SPACE FOR COMMUNICATION, OBSERVATION,
POWER TRANSMISSION, AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
7. INFINITE HEAT SINK NEAR ABSOLUTE ZERO
[ 8. LITTLE OR NO ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL OR "LOCALISM" ISSUES
9- MAY BE ENJOYABLE, HEALTHFUL, STIMULATING OR OTHERWISE DESIRABLE
.[* 10. RAPIDLY IMPROV,JG TRANSPORTATION AND INCREASINGLY USEABLE AND AVAILABLE
INFRASTRUCTURE
! [ IN ANY CASE A TRUE FRONTIER
i
I
1
_ '[
[
[
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be possible soon after the end of the century. ";}e more optimistic
proJection is based upon a rapid continued worldw'de expansion in spa,:e
activities, represented by expanding budgets and cuoperative efforts.
As transportation costs drop the number of viable SI products can inrr_ se --
rapidly--at least while t-ansportation remains a dominant economic ¢1
factor. With the Space Shuttle the cost of transportation to LEO in tK_
early 1990s is expected to be about $500 per pound (1975 dollars). Tha;
cost represents substantial progress but is still high enough to pr_v'.nt
the commercialization of many products. Also it will restrict mar_y ;;nds _J
of R&D, at least until a more advanced transportation system arrives.
For the long term future space transportation costs have been .;
projected along three modes: optimistic, moderate and pessimistic.
These projections are given in Figure 2. After 200 years the optimistic --
view projects a cost of $.90/lb. to low-earth orbit, about 4 or 5 *imes
the cost of the theoretical minimum energy requirement--based on current "'
prices for electric power. The most conservative projection suggests o_
_, about $6/ib., only a factor of three better than what is believed to •
be technically feasible during the next 25 years. The actual path -.
that space transportation costs follow may be the most impcrtant single
technical factor affecting future space developments. -"
The number of human beings employed in SI facilities w:li, in turn,
be strongly affected by transportation costs. The utilization of people -. i
: in orbit requires the transport of housing facilities, food, air, water, _ ,i
and various paraphernalia for maintenance, communication, etc. As long
as transportation remains relatively expensive the SI effort must depend i
upon a very high degree of automation, including the u_e of compact T_ ,
; tel eoperators for operations, maintenance and/or process changes. The •
paucity of human attendants will reduce operating flexibility substantiaily_
but it will be a necessary phase of the evolving SI process.
I
_4
C. Other Commercial Opportunities
An interesting study produced in the mid '70s by Bekey, Mayer_ ""
and Wolfe o£fered a large number of conceptual designs for new space
concepts that might be commercially feasible during this century. A I
summary of thJir potential non m!!itary applications is given in Table 7. --
These concepts have been examined sufficiently to sketch out the -.
engineering designs and to permit rough cost estimates to be made. ee
Each concept was assigned a risk rating from I to IV (low to high) and
a time frame for its first potential installation. Of the 42 initiatives
given in their report, four have been selected for illustration and "?
are presented below as Figures 3_4,5, and 6. The list of potentially -"
practical s_ace projects can be expected to grow steadily, perhaps
even exponentially_ if future funding of space develop-ment in the "_
U.S. at least keeps pace with the G.N.P. If future space budgets are ._sufficient to p rmit th construction of an advanced transportation
1985022650-031
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" I Table 6
I
._ A SUGGESTIVE, BUT HARDLY EXHAUSTIVE_ LIST OF
' I - SPACE MANUFACTURINGAi_TIVITIES
1. VACUUM CAST ALLOYS AND VACUUM WELDS
I 2. HIGH-PURITY BIOLOGICALS AND NOVEL PHARMACEUTICALS
_, 3. OPTICAL SYSTEY,F. - P_,RTICULARLY FOR LOW G - AND THIN FILM SUR.ACES
I 4. LARGE ORBITING STRUCTURES (ANTENNA_ FNFPGY SYSTEMF. (;PACE STATIONS,ETC).
1 5. LARGE-SCALE VACUUM BASED SYSTEMS (E.G., CRYOGENIC, SUPER-CONDUCTING)
I 6. SFECIAL ELECTRONIC MATERIALS, INCLUDING PURl: CRYSTALS
7. PROPULSION FUELS (AND SPACE CRAFT COMPONENTS) FOR FURTHER SPACE
DEVELOPMENT
I 8. ULTRA HIGH STRENGTH FIBERS
I 9. PRODUCTS UTILIZING SPECIAL HINERAL FINDS; (E.G., WATER, TITANIdM,ALUMINUM)
|0. POWERSTATIONS FOR SOLAR ENERGY CONVERSION"
il. 3-DIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED-CIRCUIT CHIPS FORMEDFROM ZERO VACUUM
PELTSIP
I 12. DELICATE INSTRUMENTS FOR ZERO-G USE (WHICH COULD NOT STAND HIGH
STRESSES OF EARTH FABRICATION AND/OR LAUNCH)
• !
[ i
!
!
I
- .lir,_..,_,. ' II I
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" f system which can deliver payloads to orbit at, say, $50/!b. or less, I
L then SI could develop dramatically. In such circumstances commercial
space-based services and products are likely to look attractive enough
: to private investors to create a new "gold rush" of space initiatives
I not the least of which would be the space-tourism industry. _i
_ D. Future Space Proram: Near Term
Any national space program must reconcile its many specific options
with the available budget. NASA, which has been enduring a gradual
budgetary squeeze for several years, has had to cut back and stretch
out a number of its space programs despite an enviable record of successful
launches and reasonably accurate cost projections. Nevertheless every
r space enthusiast hopes for a logical long-term space development program
_ .- with at least a gradually, if not rapidly_ increasing budget. One -_
well-conceived and well-presented perspective on NASA's future program,
for example, appeared s_veral years ago in the Journal of the BritishInterplanetary Soci ty. This paper describes an evolving program in
considerable conceptual detail, a program which gradually expands Man's
occupancy of space from near-earth orbit to th¢ outer planets, developingthe required transport, communication manufacturing systems9 and space
t colonies as they are needed. Many of the costs of associated 20thcentury subsystems were estimated, although the full required annual
space budgets were not projected. However the concepts and schedulesare roughly compatible with the early developments of the Optimistic
Scenario and in part with the Moderate Scenario; these scenarios appear
in subsequent sections.
Perhaps the most prolific des=_er of potential space industrial
systems has been Dr. Krafft Ehricke of Rockwell International. An
extensive review of Ehricke's contributions made available
was a d_ade
ago in Congressional Hearings entitled Future Space Programs 1975.
Ehricke offered a "complete package" with philosophical justifications_
original space-based concepts, transportation system requirements_en ineering designs_ and co t estimates. Many of his conc pts have
since affected NASA's programs. Many of them are explicitly or implicitly
included in the developments indicated in the Optimistic Scenario.Many other excellent contributions by other space scientists can be
found in the above reference that have provided considerable guidance
to this study.[
i Jesco yon Puttkamer_ "Developing Space Occupancy= Perspectiveson NASA Future Space _ogramme Planning," Journal of the British
Interplanetary Societ_ 29 (1976)= 147-173.
_[ **US
•., Congress_ House, Committee on Science and Technology_ Future
r; Space Prorams 1975, A Compilation of Papers prepared for the Subco_----Tttee
on Space Science and Applications. 94th Cong., Ist sess._ September
1975, Committee Print, 2= 59-65. (See, also, footnote on p. 74.)
, ,-, i,, -- - 1/111 I i"I_ ' _j, . _ ._._q=#_=_- .._ ._ -- I
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"_' Table 7
OF pC._:,:, ". .....
_NEARTERHPOTENTIAL SPACE APPLICATIONS
-.. (SUMfIARY AND RISK ESTIMATION) -- -_
.I
RISK . IRISK -'c
i
: ._ .l_JlS_ APIPLICAIIONS GO_Rk_NI APIq.ICATIGNS -'_
CAmmuniciff_lWrid Jlmllo I COMMUIMICATICNS )
- _wmt kme I
- PfuMI Nl_Jlliln Wrllt 54t II Volils_llltng WrHI541 I
- _Wrld Sd I rlednmKMill Irmmhslm I
I_ Surwlll_nw I I _,
- I_luJm'_mou_al_s WdstIt_o I Lilnrykta 5_nq I ,*
- AII'AlfO'IIIITrlIIII Cl_Ind l _ATI_
" : - Urlmdl_wWgtlllldl I
_i - CJ'SNI_.LlndlCenll_ I 14(ghIlesM_m _1# COlIfNio_ II "T! - WN_rL_ andlaJR_ I_ I (• MmolplulrlcTmpmltu_PmflleSm_e, III -.
' - _m_l_m_m i I - Ocean_i I
VIIdIII I Pllllqo _ II SUPPOJI' '_-t
.II.V. _ I - PossdwCIslll _lJs_ _ I Ii
• _ En_i_O_k_rymdO_d_lmG¢_1_ IV
_ J It[IRITICNAL A41q_LI ',_,ATI_N$ [n_ _sumMim Mo_Nor I _
! _'_t_' I A_rcr_I_ teemPmer*_ IV
_,; _ TM'mindIM_ISll_ I SCINTIFICAPPLICATIOIS|_ Ii_w_mOmS_I I
I'; [q DtslrlMdkmRMly IV - Aslnmomlcaf_-r_ IV
_ Tr_m_ If. i Inlm_lamdaryT.V. Link II ,l_
- _ Tmptf_lumPrufdeSou_ I I I :!
- OmmkwumM md05Nm1¢5 Sensor i
*l-IV ARE LOW TO HIGH, RESPECTIVELY. ' ' ' _I
SOURCE: I. BEKEY, H.L. HAYER AND H.G. WOLFE, ADVANCED 3PACE SYSTEH _ ,.
CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000)',
VOLUHE I: EXECUTIVE SUHHARY, A'TR-76'('7_65)-], VOL. I (EL
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL -_. '.
1976), P. 27. .!
;I
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I Probably one of the most useful guides to the fuji're U.S. Spaceprogram w s given in NASA's Outlook for Space report. This thorough
1975 study examined the technological options and the socio-political
I milieu in which NASA expected to operate over the balance of this century.
i Thus over the last decade NASA's program has been oriented heavily
toward the space Shuttle, earth applications satellites and R&D for
future space industrializat;on, a trend which will probably continue
I for several years. This do _ not imply that space science and explorationwi]] be ignored, but that their share of the budget h s b en
and may remain under some stress--an experience which can be quite
I disturbing to their advocates when NASA's budget is not expanding.
Over the longer term, however, there appear to be a few major
important Factors which are likely to determine the nature and sizeI
I of the worldwide space development effort. These are considered next.
l E. Future Space Program: Long Term t
The 5 major factors which appear likely to determine the pace
f of future space developments are listed in Tab]e 8.
The first factor or "key" is that future space technology needs "
to be successful. The main specific item within that category is a _ !
[ sharp transporting * I
• reduction in the costs of humans and materiels ii_to _ i
orbit. As mentioned earlier many design engineers b_lieve that straight- i
forward R&D could reduce transport costs by as much as a factor of -_ i
10 soon after the end of this century. This outcome requires no greatbreakthroughs in basic propulsion systems. It is based upon the us
• of hydrogen-oxygen engines, larger reusable vehicles, and evolving _ .
designs optimized through computer-aided analysis. The estimate of
a Factor of I0 would probably apply only to automated "freighters" _whose acceleration would not be limited by the presence of human beings.
During the balance of this century manned operations in space projects .,
r will probably be minimized. In any event for several decades the bulk
of payloads sent into space probably will not be human ones.
, _ The transport costs estimated above c_,ild be greatly reduced if
° _ and when a fuel such as metallic hydrogen becomes available or if practical
techniques are developed to transmit high levels of power to ascending
i vehicles either from the ground or from space satellites. All of thesedevelopments are conjectural at present, but are at least hepeful.i
Without going into detail about the other specific items on the
technologies listed in Table 8 it is possible with considerable confidenceto assert that the indicated developments are likely to be successful.
*National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Outlook for Space,SP-386 (Washington, D.C.: Sc;entific and Technical Information Office_ _'
January, 1976). i_
,l|
r
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Recent history of space :echnology, indeed of high technology generally, -I
supports this conclusion in addition to the fact that the path toward .i
such solutions is now reasonably well unde stood. Space technologists
are confident that the near-term goals can be met, but they cannot i tknow whether the national desire to attain _hese technological goals ._
will be sufficient to provide the fur.Jing. The space "freighter" or
a VTOVL-SSTO-HLLV (translated= Vertical Take gff and Vertical Landing, __
,_ Single Stage To Orbit, Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle) as indicated earlier, i
might require about $10 billion just For the RSD. Such a large project '_ '
• requires a very large-scale launching program to be contemplated, else
the capital invested could not be amortized without making launch costs -T
prohibitive. Moreover the Full array of vehicles required for an advanced .,
_ space transportation system would need to include var:Jus space tugs ;
and landers for transferring payloads to new orbits or to and from --
t other planetary bodies. The landing systems will be required for those
payloads which are _c be delivered to and returned from planetary surfaces "" !
_.l (_he Moon, Mars, hsteroids,...). These additio'_l vehicles generally ._
;, would be much smaller and less costly than the freighter. Preliminary ! _
" designs for many of tVJm already exist. _
• Rapidly expanding space tr=Jel and tourism appearJ to be an inevitable ;
consequence of the indicated technological developmen's. Once the -_ I
,._ costs of space launches have been suffi_ ently reduced, and safety )
_= sufficiently assured, the interest in space travel or tours undoubtedly _l i
will quickly lead to an accommodating industry. A commercial industry, d
initially, could cater only to the wealthy as a space tour even 25 ,i
or 30 years from now might cost roughly $250,00_ (1975 dollars) for
a trip of a few days, or perhaps a week, in LEO. However, if transportation -_ '| icosts continue to fall and personal income continues to rise as projected, -
then sp_ce tourism, which should begin before the 2!st century, could ,.
become a unique industry--one that appears to have a rapid growth potential
for the full interva! of this study; that is, for at least a 200 year period.
: Indeed, the onset of a space-tourist industry would increase the -:
demand for space vehicles and thereby help to reduce unit transportation i
costs. Increasing travel and tourism would create a need for other "'
space facilities: hotels, hospitals, even convention centers and museums,
, eventually. As transport costs drop, tours will undoubtedly be extended "_
to visit space industrial facilities, lunar installations, and space ._
colonies--as they come into existence. Tours might become a few weeks
long rather than a few days--especially while launch costs remain high
enough to preclude most repeat visits. ._
The expected number of future space tourists is strongly scenario ._
dependent. The projections offered in Figure 7 may be orienting--not -[
because they are "correct" but because they indicate the vast differences
that are possible bet,,een an optimistic and p _imistic future from
a space development point of view. The huge spread between these proJections :] ._
are related mainly to t_o factors= the average per-capita incense, .1
1985022650-041
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Table 8
,"' KEYS TO LONG-TERM OPTIMISd FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE
I. "UCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY
; DECLINING TRANSPORTATION COSTS TO NEAR-EARTH ORBIT
•, EFF IC IENT ORB IT-TRANSFER VEH ICLES
_" ORBITING SPACE BASES AND PROFITABLE SPACE INDUSTRIES
, INCREASINGLY AND RELIABLE "INTELI. IGENT" ROBOTS
" LUNAR BASES AND COLONIES
PLANETARY SPACE STATIONS AND COLONIES
. 2. SPACE TRAVEL AND TOURISM
= _ "INEXPENS!VE" SAFE TRANSPORT
= _ SPACE HOTELS, HOSPITALS, CONVENTION CENTERS
":_ f EXCITING JOURNEYS
"; 3- FAVORABLE HEALTH EXPECTATIONS .;
" . I"HYc;I CAL--MENTAL --EMOT I ONAL i
• LONGEV II'Y
:' 1 t(_l: 4. ATTITUDES IN SOCIETY I:
INCREASING PRIVATE INVESTMENT ':
1 :NATIONAl. ENTHUSlASH
-. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONAND PEACEFUL COMPETITION
I- 5. QUALITY OF "FRONTIER-LIFE"
/ •
FAVORABLE SOCIAL DYNAMICS
-. BENIGN POLITICS iRAPID ECONOMIC GRnWTH
,[
![ '
.[
|
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only about .I percent of the world's population annually would tour
outer space, even after 200 years. In the Optimistic Scenario after "'
about 150 years almost anyone with the desire can travel into space
and more than 10 percent do so, annually. Indeed, after 2100, the
many purposes of space travel probably makes the term, tour, inappropriate
for that scenario.
-T
Perhaps the most critical of the "Keys" in Table 8 is that related _;
to *he health of human beings spending long periods of time in space;
particularly for people who would live "permanently" in space colonies _.
and, of course, for those born in space. Currently, so little is understood
about potential health problems, and possible solutions to them, that "'
no one can know whether living u_ space will, on balance, be beneficial
or deleterious to a person's health. Even if the effect is small,the difference between a net health benefit and a net health deficit ..
could be enormous for any future in which people "permanently" occupy
space installations. If the net benefits are positive there might -_
be no limit to the numbers of people who over time choose to live in _
space. If the net effect upon health is neative , then, except possibly
for the attitudes of a relatively few eager space buffs, working or _.
living in space would be interpreted by most people as requiring sacrifice.
Clearly, that shouid entitle space-based employees to extra compensation "' :
but even so it is not likely to be attractive on a large scale--at
least not after the novelty of living in space has worn off. [
f
Undoubtedly the health aspects of living in space will have physical,
mental and emotiona! components. A measurement of the total of these _ J
effects may, in fact, be very difficult. Suppose, for example, that
the human body tends to become physically weaker and of different proportions, !
but that the mental capacity improves and the emotional reactions vary _
depending upon local space cultures _.d individual proclivities. How !
would these be "added" to give 3 net positive or negative result? .t
Also, longevity might be different for those living in space. However,
it is not unlikely that by the time substantial numbers of people are
living in space--perhaps after 2025--that the average life expectancy ._
on earth might by then have increased to 100 years, or more. In that
case longevity in space might not become well established until sometime --
i_ the 22nd century, except possibly for the results of animal
experiments--which mignt not be convincing. "
During the next 50 years the life sciences are expected to experience
a radical transformation, as they are in a state of "exploding" progress -.
currently. Certainly, after that much time, much more accurate statements
could be made about a person's state of health and of the probable ""
effects of space travel or space living upon this state and upon the !
aging process. Whenever such assessments can reliably be made they could
prove crucial to space developments requiring the long-term presence of _!
many people. _ore optimistic long term projections should specifically J
assume at least small net health and/or longevity benefits: in relatively
pessimistic projections the assumed health effects would at best be uncertain.
"t
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The fourth key to space development is related to various driving .;
forces of earth societies. These are on three levels. First, commercial
space activities must be profitable. Whether financed by private investors, _.
quasi-public institutions, o- governments, they will have to bec_me
profitable if they are to receive the continuing large infusions of -.
capital required for long term growth. For prolonged rapid growth
the required capital flow can become enormous; as can the annual value
of space production. The potential growing disparity among the results .;
for three scenarios is illustrated by the projections of Table 9.
These results quick!v become mind-boggling numbers, especially
those of the Optimistic Scenario. But after 200 years, even the end "'
result of the Pessimistic Scenario might leave today's space agencies at
a loss for projects on which to spend _uch funds. Moreover, because of
probable technological advances an investment should buy much more after _.
200 years than it would today. Transportation costs alone are expected to
decrease greatly, by about a factor of 30 even in the Pessimistic case.
The second driving force is national enthusiasm. Whether or not
the profitable commercialization of space is rapid, many aspects of
space exploration and development are known to be extremely important for
basic sciences. In addition, many valuable spinoffs from technological "'
development must be anticipated as well as new services to society. _.
National pride in such eccomplishments will be a significant factor.
It probably accounts for much of the current wave of interest in both ..
, the reality of space ventures and space-oriented fiction that in the
U.S. is being expressed through books, periodicals, movies, and television.i A growing national interest and pride in space accomplishments will '
I
be required if public funding of these activities is to increase over4
i time in real terms. Prolonged national enthusiasm appears to be a
prerequisite for _n optimistic outcome. 1
wl
Finally, and potentia!ly of great importance over the long term 9
is a requirement for a degree of international cooperation. Space ! .
development will be very expens!ve, at least for the next several decades. ..
Without cooperation each interested nation would have to depend on i
its own resources, a path which would effectively prevent most of them -o
from participating strongly and which also would impede those which do.
Competition is often desirable in many enterprises on earth. -.
Cooperation may tend toward a stagnating bureaucratic monopoly. However, ,
for space development that outcome for cooperation appears unlikely for -;
at least many decades. The value of cooperative efforts has been demonstrated
by the creation of ESA (European Space Agency) and by its joint venture "_i
with NASA in The Spacelab program. Moreover, without a measure of .;
international cooperation the persistence of competion, growing competition
among nations, could lead to unduly great difficulties in resolving -:
potential conflicts of interest in many extraterrestrial regions. .i
B_
.1
._ _ wp_lb=_=,_..".-_ .'- . ....
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I_, Table
PROJECTED ANNUAL INVESTMENTS AND
PRODUCTION IN SPACE
($ TRILLION)
2000 2025 :050 2076 2100 2125 2150 2176
IF #I l B .015 .045 .075 .14 .20 .30 .4 .5
PESSIMISTIC IPT - - .oos .o, .o3 .,o .3 .5SCENARIO .015 .045 .078 .15 .23 .40 .7 I.O
'-' #2 B .03 .II .35 0.7 1.2 2 2.8 3
MODERATE P - .01 .05 0.2 .4 I 2.8 6 :
SCENARIO T .03 .12 .40 0.9 1.6 3 5.6 9
#3 B . I0 I .0 5 20 50 90 200 500 i
OPTIMISTIC P .02 .4 4 I 30 180 900 3,GO0 12,0OO
i SCENARIO T .12 1.4 9 50 230 990 3,800 12,500
I
B = BUDGETS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT '.,
[- ,P = ANNUAL ECONOMIC PRODUCTION, IN SPACE ,T = TOTAL, (B + P)
I, i
[ i
°
" i
I
I
[
e
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Eventually unresolved questions of who owns or has prior rights
to certain preferred regions of space could become a persistent irritant
to international relations. All of the preferred regions of space
are not yet known, but we can guess at a few. For example, at least
four of the five La Grange points are of potentially very special importance
because they are the only stable space points in cis-lunar space(stable
with respect to the earth-moon axis--see Figure 8). The four points :
are L1, L_, c_nceived5ofL,and L (L_ is omitted only because it seems that no .ione has y_t special use for it). Other special points
or regionTwould be the poles of the moon where nearly perpetual sunlight -.
might be available and where water is most likely to be found in nearby
craters; and perhaps the moon's "equator" (the line around the moon's "'
, surface which lies in the plane of the moon's orbit about the earth).
Perhaps the most in,portant region for th_ near-term is the earth's ' :!
unique Geosynchronous Orbit. This is a circle with about a 160,000 .
t mile circumference that might become crowded within a few decades.
Can segments of this circle be claimed as national rights/ Yes, they _
: already have been!
'i Perhaps a matter of even greater importance would be the need to _.
i feel that over the long term non-military space installations and
t
satellites would be safe from military threats. Orbiting manned space _'
i stations crossing over enemy territory during periods of imminent or i
overt hostilities might become particularly stressful places to be
"trapped" in--especially if any deliberate damage to space satellites _]
had already occurred. While space warfare might be preferable to
terrestrial warfare, the possibility can only create an atmosphere _ ' }
restrictive to peaceful developments in space--especially, to manned
space installations. {
One specific area in which international cooperation or space law
should soon become very important is related to space debris. The
tendency to assume that space outside the earth's envelope is so large
that man-made debris may be ignored has limits. Natural processes will T" "
always provide free cleaning services to some extent. For example, .:
gaseous emissions are swept away by the solar wind when not otherwise
captured by atmospheric envelopes. Objects orbiting within 250 miles -.
of the earth's surface generally will be captured in less than a decade, '
or perhaps much less, the time depending on the geometry of the orbits ""
and the sizes and shapes of the objects. Perhaps the most dangerous kinds
of debris are those of small but greater than microscopic size--e.g., i
orbiting remnants of explosive bolts or small bits of debris produced ..
by random collisions among uncollected orbiting objects. These bits
of millimeter-or centimeter-sized objects might accumulate to dangerous -]
proportions in long-lived orbits if their formation is not effectively i
prohibited by appropriate space law. The contemplated future transport
of raw materials from the lunar surface to various earth orbits must
be accomplished without "leakage" especially if, as has been visualized
by O'Neill and others, the raw materials are to be catapulted into
X
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[_ Figure 8
r-I' LA GR AN GE POINTS OF TH-_ E-ARTH-MOON SYSTEM
L-3 /'EAR]'H _ L-I ".,MOON L-2
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space and subsequently collected. _ It is not too early to attempt :,
to visualize the kinds of space debris which might become dangerous
1 and to devise ways to ameliorate the potential threat. Certainly thet -!
I principle of keeping space--especially cis-lunar space--safe from collision ,
I wlth man-made debris must soon become an essential part of space ethics. ..1
i
i Thus, although it appears that a substantial amount of internat ! icooperation in developing space would be rewarding for all concerned, .;
' history alone would suggest that such cooperation would at best be
temporary. But history itself is not a completely reliable guide to -_
the degree of future international cooperation or its effect upon space i
developments. However, history has demonstrated that competing nations "_
are often willing to make great sacrifices. Then, and often only then,
have the pressures become b-eat enough to cut red tape, to accelerate
their programs, and to take the risks required to prevail. Cooperative .i
ventures_ on the other hand, usually need to achieve a continuing consensus.
A nation might be reluctant to spend more than (or even as much as) -"
its original commitment, if there is an overrun or change of plan, _.
and much haggling may occur over appropriate sharing. Furthermore,
no single nation may get the bulk of the credit for a successful outcome -,
and the psychological potential for exhilaration tends to be diminished.
The above characterization of a cooperative effort is often but
not always true. Cooperation can boost morale when it creates important _j ,
results that people approve of. One can imagine, for example, a very
large multi-national effort to build a cooperative lunar facility _hat , !i
is enthusiastically supported by the participants, even while some
other space exploration efforts remain competitive. A cooperative .i _:
lunar project could also exist du_ing an ongoing competition for leadership
in space exploration or in earth-orbiting space manufacturing facilities. _ _
Thus, future space programs might achieve many of the advantages of _1
t both cooperation and competition. Of course, the particularly useful .
cooperative projects would be those which might not otherwise be feasible. "" _ i
It might also turn uut that cooperation in large space projects ,.
helps to resolve some conflicts on earth_ perhaps because it refocuses
attention on other important areas; but to expect this outcome may -:
be wishful thinking. In the Moderate Scenario discussed later a lunar
venture in a cooperat!ve context provides unexpected benefits that
surprise the original supporters of the venture. ,,
It is also important to distinguish between minimal passive -,
cooperation and high levels of active cooperation. A tacit agreement to
avoid violence in space illustrates a minimum level of passive cooperation "_
which 3houId be relatively easy to achieve. Investing huge sums in .t
a joint lunar space station would be a high level of active cooperation.
*F
Gerard K. O'Nei11, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space
(New York, Wil,iamMorrow and _ompany, Inc., 1977). it _'
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I Hostile competition or even the potentia_ for war can sometimesbe conducive to space developments. Certainly, this has been true !,
in the past (e.g., ballistic missiles, anti-missiles, reconnaissance
satellites,...). In the future one can at least imagine, for example,a protracted war restricted to battles in space. In this circumstance
if both (or all) sides are making "all-out" efforts to win, their efforts
would be accompanied by mobilizations to acquire the maximum capability
for exploiting the militarily useful resources of space. By way ofanalogy, much historical exploration and development has been motivated
". by the search for military bases abroad and their associated strategic
considerations (see Appendix B). Thus it seems possible that spacedevelopment might, paradoxically, be the recipient of future benefits
from either excellent cooperation or vigorous competition.
_, The last of the be the most difficult to _ _
5 "keys" appears to
analyze. It is related to the possibility of evolving and expanding ;
space cultures--people organized into "societies" living in space, i
Initially, such societies may have fewer than 10 people, and eventually _
- could grow to 100,000 or more. The social and psychological effects
of prolonged living in space in any of a variety of habitats, none of
[_. which is presently well understood even in physical terms, will have
i_! to be discovered through experience. It is not at all clear that special
preparations or selection processes can be devised on earth which would : ,
assure the viability of such, social systems in space. If such societies I !
-. grow very large they are likely
then to develop internal political
l
systems whose nature could be completely foreign to our past experiences.
Little more than great uncertainty now exists in any conjectures
about future processes of making psychological, social, or political
adju_t_nts to life in space. Whether learning can effectively be
- F transferred from any troubled society to an _her, or to its own successor,L in order to improve future prospects for all--or indeed whether any
such societies in space, troubled or not, will actually emerge in any
important sense--appears to be almost completely a matter of conjecture. _ i
A "solut'on" contemplated by O'Neill for large space colonies to
be located near the L-5 La Grange point was to construct them so that
• r they appear and feel almost identical with the earth environment--at
L least during a normal social mode--complete with wind, rivers_ clouds,
trees, animals, plants, houses, and with the earth's gravity. Whether
this would be desirable or even feasible canno_ be known for sure. It
E is an interesting and "conservative," but horrendously expensive, concept
which like any other would have to endure thorough reality testing. 1
Any "solution," of course, would also h e to be sustained through
a period of assumed rapid growth. If such societies are viable, then
over time they could be expected to increase in size and number, perhaps
I[ i
*Gerald O"Neill, The High Frontier.
I
I
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rapidly. Based upon past experiences this expansion process alone
could be expected to bring additional socio-political challenges_ the
satisfactory resolution of which would have to evolve relatively peacefully.
Tile hypothetical societal problems presented here appear to be
quite beyond the I_primitive jj analytical powers that exist today. This
study will simply assume that acceptab!_ solutions or resolutions are
possible_ postulating lesser or greater degrees of difficulty according i
to rather arbitrary standards. Naturally_ in the most optimistic scenario
any such problems will be overcome with the least difficulty. _:
.,
• i
;!
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E CHAPTER III
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
• _ r PART I: THE TRIUMPH OF THE MACHINE? (]976-2000)
i,
A. The..Explosion of Technology
_,, Although it was not easy for political leaders in the de_eloped
" _ r. countries to realize it during the 1970s, in part because of the economic
. shocks (inflation, energy crisis, unemployment, material sh_r.ages,
food shortages, etc.), individual technologists were becoming aware '
of the very rapidly growing analytical and industrial power in theirf
r_ own fields--although they may not have been too aware of the parallels
E /" in other areas of science and technology.
_ r The last to understand the new phenomenon were the members of the ?
"_ i shrinking New Class. Its influence in the developed countries had ;
'_ peaked in the late '70s and subsequently faded t_ insignificance over
_ _ the next two decades. By 1990 many of its earlier goals had become ,
":_ [- generally accepted by society (e.g. clean air and water, seatbelts, '
"._ I. resistance to nuclear power) but many of t_-' remaining goals involved
too much faddism, litigation and harassment (solar-power worship, extremism
in safety, ecology, etc.) for the ideology to remain influential. Perhaps "l
_:_ _. the major reason for the decline of the New Class was a growing public
' awareness that even modestly competent management, with help from innovative
i technology that free societies can create and develop into commercial _
: F systems, could provide economic growth and a generally-improving (but _i
_ never ideal) quality of life--as m_asur-_--by accepted reasonable criteriaI. ]v
for health,safety and environmental purity. The futurologists of the
r late 20th century had become fully aware of the knowledge explosion,
. _ |. which according to their popular lore "started" in the '60s (actually I,
i it was the early '50s), and which became popular intellectual terminologyn the decade of the '70s. But then_ because of a natural ag betweenr-
I! knowledge and its widespread application, the felt tide of innovative
technology--with several important exceptions such as rockets, lasers
newand micro-computers--was not to become widely apparent until around
t [_ 1980. It has been an endless crescendo ever sinceo
The early technological groundswell was greatly aided by a sequence
of magnificent inventions and developments in basic sciences, electronics,photonics, communications, lasers, space exploration, and a growing
array of powerful ne_v scientific instruments. Nearly all of the rapid
progress in technology, in one way or another, usually quite directly
and impressively, was related to the remarkable in solid-stateprogress
electronic computers. During the amazing sequence of computer developments
each advanced design was itself assisted by the previous generation
of computers in a scientific marvel of "bootstrapping." I
I_ *See Appendix A for a definition and discussion of the New Class.
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" i B. The Eerly Space P,rogram in t!,e U.S...I
f Budgets for the U.S. space program after the brilliant Apollo
_
moon landings (which, were it not for the exceptional progress in computer5 -i
during the early 1960s, could easily have resulted in disaster and
.}
aborted the _pace effort) nevertheless declined steadily to a new low
I just as the Space Shuttle became operational in the _arly 1980s. In 1980,
for example, NASA's $3.7 billion budget (in 1975 dollars) was close to i
its lowest level since the lunar landing. The government's (that is,
the public's) inability to appreciate the future potential of the space -_
! program had led to a wait-and-see attitude--while Congress allowed !
the inflation of the 1970s to erode NASA's programs. The budget history "'
• _ for the U.S. and NASA during that era is given in Table 10.
" Although this budgetary wrinkle in U.S. space program history ._
was to be subsequently regretted, in the sense of opportunities lost
through budget constraints, evidently it also helped to set up the "I
- psychological basis from which emerged a nearly exponential growth !
'_ in space over the following lO0 years, and probably also for many more i
years to come. _.
i '
The technological heart of any space project, naturally; was the ""
_. electronic computer. In an early study NASA had concluded and then _
stated quite clearly: _1 ;
Without the speed and accuracy of automated data hand]ing the
space ventures...would be neither practical nor possible. Use T|
of the computer now pervades all NASA activities, so much so that _
it is surprising that its necessity was not forseen in most of
the science fiction written about lunar and planetary exploration
"' ]before it actually began.
This insight together with the near certainty of continuing rapid increases
in the power of compute.'s and instruments meant to NAS_ that cpplied _I i'
scientific and techroIogical progress was "exploding". Indeed, those .!
who looked carefully also saw that basic theoretical sciencec must
also develop with continuously increasing rapidity. An immense (and -,
rapidly growing) problem solving capability, with a competence that ,1
previously could hardly have been suspected except by a few avant-garde
technophiles, was being extruded into reality by the improving sciences, _.;
the new automated instruments, and _he leverage provided by the amazing I
computers. With these tools the te_hnc_gical co_nunity was poised to _:
create a set of cioselt integrated technological marvels, some of the
greatest of which were to occur in the development of space--in its ;]
science, exploration, earth applications, travel and industrialization. .t
i National Aeronautics and Space Administration, A Forecast of .J:_: Space T-ch,,o ogy, 1980-2000, SP-387 (Washing on, D.C." Scientificand Technical Information Office, January I976). p. 3-3. I!
' I
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Table 10
FEDERALBUDGETAND NASAAPPROPRIATION, 1961-1984
TOTAL NASA NASA
FISCAL FEDERAL APPRO- APPROPRIATION
YEAR OUTLAYS* PRIATION* (REAL YEAR DOLLARS)
1961 $177,305 $1,749 $ 964
196P 190,299 3,251 1,825
1963 195,374 6,448 3,674
1964 204,887 8,816 5,100
1965 199,999 8,881 5,250
1966 220,464 8,481 5,175
1967 250,536 7,904 4,968i968 27I,474 6,q94 4,589
1369 266,161 5,790 3,995
1970 269,116 5,157 3,749 (
1971 275,362 4,339 :3,312 I,
1972 290,174 4,164 3,310
1973 292,269 4,054 3,408 ; !
1974 294,427 3,323 3.040 ; ,)
1975 332,332 3,231 3,231 )
1976 353,378 3,376 3,552 "" ;
1977 367,538 3,430 3,819 !
1978 383,616 3,399 4,064
1979 387,534 3,509 4,559
1980 4,6,612 3,696 5,243
1981 436,155 3,552 5,523
1982 452,321 3,598 5,932
1983 47_,181 3,893 6,664
1984 479,656 3,969 7,048
xIN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT !975 DOLLARS.
-i
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C. The Earth-Centered Context
rl
As the stage was being set for a burst into spaceafter the turn -I
of the century there were a number of interesting developments "on
the ground" that were to be "arranging the chairs." I mention a Few "_
of these here for orientation.
1. Energy Supplies .t
The conventional wisdom (i.e., the myth) of the early 1970s that --
the world was running out of energy--usable, relatively inexpensive ._
energy--that so frightened the nations of the developed world at the
time (and for a few years fed the fantasies of the leaders in OPEC)--had _.
disappeared by 1994. It wasn't becaus,_ energy self-sufficiency had
been achieved in many countries. Rather, it was by then clearly apparent, _'
even by former believers in the limit_-to-_rowtn philosophy, that immense
reservoirs of energy were still available in natural gas, in coal, in i
shale, in uranium and thorium, in geothermal and solar sotlrces, and .&
even in conventional petroleum sources--the location and extraction of
which had experienced a major revolution in a mere two decades. Also --
ma_or contributions to energy costs and security were achieved through
conservation in homes and buildings, by more efficient conversion of
fuels to zlectric power, by the recovery of formerly wasted heat, and
t
by new designs in industry and transpcrtation for efficient utilization
of energy. As a result most of the newly rich OPEC countries, deeply "_
committed to internal industrial development programs found themselves
with unforeseen worries. Market forces gradualiy reduced the price _ *
of oil to about $I0 per barrel, in 1975 dollars o.'ivered in the U.S.
The years 1980 to 2000 saw the development of inexpensive reli_ble
solar cells and a myriad of ways of adapting them to autos, trucks, -: ;
homes, buildings, factories, farms and central power stations--in addition
.i
to the obvious _mplication for tneir potential use in space transportation
systems or for their application to space-based electricity generators
which could even supply power to the earth, in the unlikely event that _ , i_
space would becom_ a preferred source.
Also, the anti-nuclear-power movements of the '70s had diminished ""
considerebly by 1995 as the industry's ability to control the nuclear ..
fuel cycle became very much improved technically and was effectively
communicated to the public. New designs promisea a steady improvement "T
in the cost, reliability, efficiency and safety of fission reactors.
Indeed, it w_s recognized thac economics alone demanded this of fission ""
reactors else they would be displaced by the improving cost-effectiveness ?
of alternative power sources. (Also, by the late '90s the gaseous-
core nuclear reactor had bec_ne the potential future champion of large ._
engines for space power generation and orbital transfer vehicles that
promised to be hard to beat. Still there was approaching competition -_
from nuclear fusion engi.,_s to "worry about.")
Even though the economics of fusion power for earth-based system_
was to remain in doubt for decades, great strides in that technology _!
.!
f
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I
T "popped up" every year--seemingly out of nowhere, if one's information
_ came only from news media sources. Thus the prospects remained exciting
not only for competitive inexhaustible fusion power after 2020, but
r for highly efficient fusion-powered engines for space transportation
L soon afterwards.
These energy developments were somewhat depressing to commercial
interests which had large investments in the solid fossil fuels.Although many technologies associated with these energy sources had also
,oY progressed--especially in-situ coal and shale conversion processes--their
r competitive prospects had dimmed by the year 2000. Still these technologies
• ; L and the required solid fossil fuel resources would be available wherever
they were needed during the next several dacades and would Facilitate
the long-term transition to cleaner and essentially inexhaustible nuclearF
L and solar energy supplies.
r 2. Resources
.i
=_I To a surprising extent the worried world of the 1970s had also
_ come to believe tilat many non-energy resources--especially metals-- :
l- were likely to be exhausted witllin a few decades. By 1995, despite
_ [ a booming world economy, such images had virtually disappeared except
L[ as amusing anecdotes. In a mere 25 years technologically oriented
._ _ efforts had:
"=' (l) doubled the estimated recoverable resources of most of the
metals formerly considered to be on the verge of exhaustion
_-: i" such as copper, lead mercury and silver;
(2) developed the technology for mining the seabed for nodules
F containing copper, nickel, and manganese in huge quantities; i
- (3) developed "inexhaustible" alternatives for the major uses I
of silver, mercury, chromium, lead_ zinc, and tungsten--at }
least for most of their commercialanticipated
uses-
(4) developed and demonstrated recycling systems that were soon
{_ to become 99 percent effective in recovering valuablei metals fro- liquid wastes;
! [_ (5) reduced the relative amount of metals required in industryby creating more efficient designs and steadily increasing
the use of new plastics, ceramics, glasses, and composites
as substitutes;
(61 tested several new methods for extracting metals from sea
i water, some of which seemed almost certain to become economic
early in the 2lst century; and
(7) used electronics to probe the lunar surfece and a few asteroids
E with extraordinarily promising results for the 2lst century
• - ___I_
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and beyond, when minerals from these sources would become
useful to a burgeoning space industry.
3. Environment
,d
E_ery developed and some developing countries made substantial _.
progress in improving air end water qualit%, during the '75-'95 period
and, moreover, in many cases found commercial ways oc chang;ng wastes
and pollutants into assets. For example:
- o
(I) Solid wastes were turned into foods, fuels,
fertilizers, and mineral sources.
(2) SO, emissions became a major source of commercial
suTfur, sulfuric acid, gypsum and other useful
materials.
(3) Coal ash increasingly was used for road surfacing, .,
and desirable land-fill projects. l
(4) While nuclear "wastes" were providing valuable
=l
isotopes for industrial uses and medical applications,
processes to recover and return 99.99 percent of --
plutonium and other act;nides from the nuclear
power fuel cycle _ere developed and successfully tested. -" I
}
(5) Technologies for utilizing much of the formerly "_ !!
wasted heat from power stations and manufacturing .,
plants were steadily progressing,
(6) The recovery of low-level metallic wastes from
m
effluents down to I ppm was soon to become routine
in all important industries. _;
1 " I
(7) Biological "pesticides" _,e replacing chemical ones -' _
at an increasing rate, even as the latter were
becoming much more efficient in selective targeting.
.,
By 1995 the potential utility of most of these processes were
still in their infancies and their future prospects were oenerally -.
(and rightly) believed to be very bright. In the two decades before
1995 many people had envisioned th_ space program as one way to dispose "'
of nuclear wastes; that is, to use space as an unlimited trash receptacle.
.=
Although this solu_!on was oossible, other approaches on earth were
soon found to be much more feasible--especially those which turned -,
those wastes into resources.
4. Food
.®
Although the medium-term (2000-2025) prospects for adequate food .}
supplies were generally perceived to be very bright, the shorter term m!
l
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i needs before the year 2000 were to remain marginal or dangerous for afew of the less-developed countries with massive populations that were
dependent upon good weather and/or the good will of the food-exporting
countries Although their positions were not secure the situation
was to improve more or less steadily after the early '80s. Moreover,most people in the world were coming to realize that, basically, the
:i most important requirements for agricultural progress in the poorest
[ countries were related to providing adequate incentives to farmersand protecting them from crippling taxes, price controls, and other
regulations. Technical and economic assistance became readily available
to needy regions and were effective where governments helpea ratherthan hindered the flow and utilization of such assistance. As early
as 1995 there were at least 30 models of developing cou tri s that had
_ been responsive to the emerging ethic--that external aid was available
_I_ F to all societies which were allowed by their governments to accept
- _ and employ it effectively.
Space-based systems played a growing role in nearly all of thew above developments. This role was interesting, if somewhat obscure, .
during the '70s; but by the early '80s these systems were offering such
valuable information to those institutions that were learning to _tilize
U it that the number of for of
customers and applications those programs
increased at a rapid rate. Both private entrepreneurs and government
soon re_iized that an interesting source of revenue was at hand and,
r as a result, the receipts from sales of information from satellite I
systems grew rapidly as is shown by Figure 9 for tne period 19702000 ;
This income together with a growing demand for Space Shuttle services
in the '80s contributed to _,e rapidly growing space budgets after 1987. _'By that time it had become quite clear that information from earth , i
applications satellites was often a great bargain and therefore could be
sold at substantially higher prices, where that was a desireable course
either for the U.S. government or the blossoming entrepreneurs.space
D. Improved Space Vehicles +
' 1. For Launch to Low-Earth Orbit (LEO)
[ Designs for advanced launch vehicles which could greatly reduce
transport costs had been sketched since the early '60s and many of the
promising alternatives were portrayed in NASA's 1975 Outlook for Space
st'Jdy. However_ budget constraints forced NASA to postpone any seriouslarge-scale ef?ort until 1990. Nevertheless, enough of a useful tech-
nological base existed, thanks in part to the efficient use of computer-
aided deslgns, that when a significant upturn in their budget firstocccurre i the late '80s NASA was quick to respond with projects for
two major vehicles:
second generation Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle tSDLV)
(I) The
which became operational in 1996 and reduced transport costs initlally
I by about a factor of 2.5 ( to about $300 per pour, d and--after further
[
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I improvements--to $200 per pound in 200S. Also, after the year 2000the SDLV became the primary vehicle taking travelers to space on a
commercial basis.
(2) The l/2-million-pound payload SSTO HLLV which became operational
in 1998 and was soon delivering non-human payloads to space at $100
per pound, and which (by 2008) was sending materials into space at
l the rate of 200 million pounds annually. (About half were U.S. payloadsup to this point in time, but this fraction was to be gradually reduced
as the space capabilities of other countries were increasing rapidly.)
Indeed several countries (principally Japan, England, France, and Germany)had contributed substantially to the development of this vehicle and
had worked out a cooperative arrangement with the U.S. for operating
several of them from launching facilities in Europe and in Japan.
During the late '90s radical designs were being examined for new
HLLVS which were destined to reduce launch costs (to $35 per pound by
2025), in part because of the availability of metallic hydrogen as afuel. The economics of space transportation in terms of the cost for
launching inanimate objects into LEO for the 1976-2076 period--as well
as the current projections to 2176--appear in Figure 2 (page 36). It
must be remembered that the costs for human transportation, because
of the G-restrictions and other required amenities, were to remain
greater than average "freight" costs by factors ranging between 2 and 4.
2. Propulsion Systems for Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTVs)
[ Before the Space Shuttle became fully operational in the early i i
1980s, the first vehicle considered for transporting satellites from
LEO to more distant orbits was the Interim Upper Stage, a relatively
inefficient system whose chief virtues were its reliability, its low
cost to develop and manufacture, and its availability when the Shuttle
became ready for routine use. However, the costs in using this OTV |
were relatively high; a_so, as it was fueled by solid propellants it !
was an inherently heavy non-reusable system. Therefore, before _he '.tShuttle became operational NASA contractors had develcped a modifi=d_
orbital transfer vehicle, the Spil_ning Solid Upper Stage. This non-
reusable vehicle was still encumbered with solid propellants but wasconsiderably more efficient for many purposes. These two vehicles
clear.y constituted a stopgap arrangement for orbital transfers, mandated
by the tight budgets of the '70s.
To complete the Space Transportation System (STS) many concepts
and preliminary designs for the required new OTVs existed. These advanced
I "space tugs"--both manned and unmanned--only needed the caress of new
funding to start a serious competition for the future STS. Concepts
started to emerge from NASA's design divisions during the late '80s
and by the end of the century an imposing arra_, of new alternativesfrom the Solar Sail to the Advanced Fission Engine were available or
in development (see Table 11).
!
!
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E. Space industrialization
Prior to the Space Shuttle era one of the n_re difficult concepts -;
for the public to accept as a coming reality was that of "floating
factories" in space. Naturally, an earth-centered mind had difficulty "_
envisioning a steel mill or copper smelter in orbit. This is quite
understandable--particularly if one had visited any such installation i
on earth. However, the MISS (Made in a Space Station) concept had -,
fascinated space technologists frequently enough that by 1980 the detai_ed
plans for early ventures in space manufacturing and construction were -"
well along; indeed, some preliminary experiments had been performed .i
during the earlier space flights of the '70s.
Even after the first successful Shuttle-based experiments aboard
Spacelab were reported by the news media in 1984, it took several years "_ ;
for the public to adjust to the approaching reality--that space could
become industrialized relatively rapidly Perhaps the completion and "_ '•
operation of the first space station in 1992, continuously occupied -|
by astronauts_ followed by the construction in space of a 100-meter-
diameter antenna in 1994--both highly publicized and well-photographed -"
events--were among the more significant experiences which affected
the public's MISS imagery. Through television many people were able
| to become "sidewalk superintendents" of these milestone events and .. ;
I were thereby better able to bridge a gap which otherwise would have i
required a quantum jump in imagination. "' ,!
_1 The early prototype MISS products soon became highly valued collectors' 7! items. The first crystals, plastic spheres, biologicals alloys, whiskers, _ !
i silicon chips, glasses, castings, and ball bearings from the space i
I laboratories indeed became prized museum pieces• But more important ,,
was the spreading knowledge of the special properties and commercial _
use of MISS products and processes--and of the potential for constructing
large space structures of many kinds.
Having witnessed the constrt,ction of the first relatively simple "-" "
installations in the form of modular depots, habitats, R&D laboratories, i
antennas, etc., the elaboration of the more complex space stations to l
come could be depicted and accepted more readilf. Thus, psyl ,logically .,=
the stage was set for a flurry of new interest in the development of
Space Industrialization (S1). Shortly afterwards, in the late-'8Os, -T
when it became understood that excellent profits might also result !
from many of these ventures and that the potential for future grcwth
was very large (some claimed, "unlimited"), the fancy of many investors
was ensnared and the first boom in Space Industry stocks was on. Of "_
course, some were foolish enough to make naive investments. Also in -_
i those days some unscrupulous commercial promotors existed who preyed
upon emotional outbursts of this type. But the few cases of incompetence
• l or fraud did not seriously detract from the excitement of the impending J
! developments. The first major commercial S1 facility was completed 1 "
] 985022650-06 ]
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[ '°_'e"ORBITAL TRANSFER VEHICLES IN OPERATION OR IN
; [ DEVELOPMENTBEFORE 2000
i [ PROPULSION CONCEPT* YEAR DEMONSTRATED
1. IUS AND SSUS (SOLID PROPELLANT) 1980
2. _RGE S LAR SAIL 1989
r 3. CHEMICAL (F2-N2Hh) 1989
B
• 4. LARGE _gN ENGINE (Hg) 1991
F 5. CHEMICAL (F2-H2) 1992 "
['i 6. COLLOID THRUSTERS 19937. E-M ,_CCELE_TOR (MPD) 1994
.. 8. BEAMED ENERGY 1995
9. NUCLEAR FISSION ENGINE, IST SPACE TEST 1997 I
!
10. ADVANCED METASTABLE CHEMICALS 1998 i
[ i'11. OPE_BLE LARGE NUCLEAR FISSION ENGINE 1999
*IUS: INTERIM UPPER STAGE ,i
SSUS: SPINNING SOLID UPPER STAGE ; jE-M: ELECTRO-MAGFNTIC
T
MPD: _GNETOPLASMODYNAMIC
CHEMICAL SYMBOLS--Hg: MERCURY
F: FLUORINE
, N: NITROGEN
H: HYDROGEN
[ '
[
i
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In 1994. It was nearly completely automated, yet about 12 people had I
to live in space just to operate and maintain the facility. Its first -;
commercial products were biological materials of great purity _navailable
from earth-bound processes (vaccines, hormones, enzymes) and processed -i
silicon "chips" for computers. This facility was followed only six _
years later by one more than 5 times as large, operated by about 25
people. Soon after that production in space as a concept was to become -_ ,
routinely accepted. Even a "steel mill" in space was believed to be
.}
only a matter of time--at least it could no longer be a startling surprise.
.t Space technologists of the time, of course, were thinking more about
high-technology processes involving computers, lasers, robots, space
,_ vehicles, lunar observatories, expeditions to Mars and space colonization. .,
F. Lunar Pro0ram .i
_I By the mid '90s the Moon had been mapped by e_com_ted orbiting _ |
-|'! vehicles of both the U.S. & U.S.S.R. Also there were enough space _i
i_ tugs available by then to establish and supply a manned lunar base.
.,i The first arrivals (from a joint U.S., Europe, Japan and U.S.S.R. proJect
I begun in 1994) landed on the moon in 2004 to set up a temporary station
"i for scientific and exploratory purposes. Subsequently two permanent .,i
"'_ colonies were set up, one on the far side of the moon to permit optimum
_ astronomical observations, the other on the near side for a research -_
,.! laboratory and exploration center. By 2008 facilities existed which .! ,
; allowed twelve people to stay "permanently" on the moon. Supplies
had been delivered regularly to help construct their underground habitats
and develop various surface operations. These first colonists (9 men,
" 3 women) were an extremely capable group which, within a year, had _ !
, found water sources on the moon that in some places could be tapped !
: by wells less than 200 feet deep. This discovery made it certain that °'_ i
the moon would soon become a much more important link in future space _l
programs.
In principle, because of the avail;bility of water, the moon could _I ,
soon provide essentially all the material needs of its inhabitants " i
I
and become a relatively inexpensive source of materials for space s_ructures "l
and of propulsion fluids for space vehicles. During the next quarter,
the industrial program for developing lunar resources was to make possible -,
the construction of the first large colony in space at the L-5 "point."
A major goal of the early lunar explorers was to establish the ._
feasibility of using the moon for many purposes other than scientific
observations. Although the anticipated scientific rewards related to -_
astronomy, geology, and astrophysics alone were believed to be sufficient .I
to make the venture worthwhile, a huge long-term payoff depended upon
the successful solution to a number of problems such as (I) finding
water; (2) establishing the feasibility of a "nearly" closed-cycle l
i ecology; (3) demonstrating the feasibility of living comfortably for
months or years at 1/6-G and returning to earth without deleterious
health problems; (4) proving the feasibility of mineral exploration,
L
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I mining, and sm:lt_ng; (5) successfully resolving the sociological problemswhich tend to arise in any new environment, but which could be especially
severe when the change is as sudden and as encompassing as that posed
I by the airless "barren" moon where each lunar day is 14 times longerthan an earth day.
If the satisfactory resolution of these technical and social problems
I could be achieved then the feasibility of colonizing not only the moonbut the "whole solar system" might be established, in principle. That
this feat was essentially accomplished on the moon by the year 2010,
I less than 60 years from the _ime the first small earth satellite waslaunched, provides a stunning perspective on the great technological
and societal transition that began in the second half of the 20th century.
(During most of that same 60 year period, paradoxically, many citizens,
I and even some national institutions, were actively if_ncourag i ng,
not demanding, a return to a former and simpler way of life. They
had been led to believe that insufficient energy and materials would :
I be available at reasonable costs to support the traditional progress- _oriented activities of human civilization for more than a few decades.) f
G. Early Space Tourists
In 1993, when it was agreed that the Space Shuttle had been adequatelyI 'tested, a orior plan was carried out to demonstrate the utility of _ ithis vehicle as a "spaceliner" by introducing the public to the concept |
of commercial space tours. This first tour was a very well publicized
I three-day voyage to low-earth orbit which included a rendezvous with _t e recently completed Space Station. The special passengers chosen
for this voyage were NASA's director, the governor of Texas, 2 Senators, | i
I 6 Cong:essmen, the French ambassador and 12 other VIPs, (6 from Europe, j2 from Japan) together with Marlon Scott and Elizabeth Welsh, at the
time the best-known movie actor and actress in the U.S. . -
L
I "The special two-hour videotape documentary of the event becamea tremendously popular worldwide sucess--in large part because the
enthusiasm emanating from the ?amous actors was vividly conveyed by
I their spontaneous enthusiasm during the voyage. In addition their ,subsequent "orchestrated" television appearanc s further stimulated
public interest in space projects--especia!!y space travel. This single
event helped the average citizen realize that the potential of space
I ventures perceived as a long term set growing
could be of activities
with great commercial promise. Of course, the array of social services
supplied by the space program, as they became more fully appreciated, i
i also made it increasingly popular. This popularity stemmed mainly ;,!from the publicity surrounding weather satellites and advanced COMSATs.
Gradually the public also came to appreciate other earth-application
I satellites as well as the scientific advances made possible by spaceprobes and planetary exploration. For example, during the 1990s, Future
S_S_S_S__aceDevelopments became a standard course taught in many colleges
!
I
till I I J I
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_; and technical schools around the world. However, the realization by
average citizens that perhaps they, too, or certainly their children, e
might soon be able to travel safely to outer space--perhaps even stroll
on the moon--was crucially important in creating supportive public attitudes. -"
Outer space, more and more, became an exciting frontier which anyone could _,
experience indirectly; and for those with a sufficiently strong desire
the dream of actually going up there had become a potential reality. ._
_h
Indeed by the end of the century, after the SDLV became operational_
_ a new company, International Space Tours_ Inc., announced that 600
people would "tour outer space" that year in the first commercial system
licensed for the purpose. The cost (in 1975 dollars) that year was .,
to be $.5 million for a 5-day tour confined to near-earth orbit. Still,
the demand for seats was several times the capacity of the system--even
_i at thct price. It was a good start for a fledgling business_ one that |
_ was destined to become one of the world's largest.
ii
_I H. International Cooperation "_
•_ The Apollo moon landings had largely been driven by a feeling
_ in the United States of a need to recover its (Sputnik) shattered image ._
; as the world's leader in science and technology. The Americans assumed
v it was a race and devoted the resources required to win--even though
the Soviet Union denied it was entering any contest. The enormous
international prestige that the Americans gained from their successful
program was frittered away afterwards as the national malaise of the
'70s set in. The flood of socio-political problems during and after the -_ :
Vietnam involvement turned the U.S. public away from "large" space _ c
budgets. The conventional wisdom of the gloomy '70s claimed that, instead
. of spending tens of billions of dollars for "a few moon rocks," the
money should be directed towards social purposes. The one-sided space
"race" had indeed ended. As its budget declined and its world-renowned • ;
capability eroded during the decade of the '70s, NASA wisely attempted _ i
to stretch its resources through promoting cooperation in space ventures
with the rest of the developed world, including the U.S.S.R. The cooperation
, effort was publicly announced but was treated with suspicion by many --
Americans, who saw the Soviets as their major potential enemy. But
i:i within a few years cooperation among the Western nations became effective, -,
and to some extent with the Soviets as well. Although its beginning
was slow the interaction among the various national space agencies _"
was to bloom into an enormously rewarding program for all humanity. .i
The major milestones of the 20th century cooperative efforts were ._
't the U.S.-S.U. Apollo-Soyuz linkup of 1975; the 1984 Shuttle launching ,i
i of the Spacelab module built by the European Space Agency; the firstspace tour with VIP passengers from several countries, mentioned above;
and_ perhaps most significant, the international agreement in 1998 to
begin the $50-billion 13-year program Lo create the so-called Su_.__e[
Shuttle STS--the first fully reusable unmanned HLLV-SSTO 1/2-million-pound
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i vehicle for launching payloads to near-earth orbit, in addition toa new array of advanced "space tugs" to complement this launch capability.
The program soon grew to a $I00 billion effort but this extension was
a measure of its success, not the result of cost overruns. NASA had
I the central responsibility and added to its successful management historyby keeping within the budget. The design of the second-generation SSTO
vehicle that evolved after the end of the century incorporated the
t technology based on a new superfue] which helped make the improvedi performance feasible. This v hicle ould tripl the former SSTO's
payload capability, with the same gross weight at lift off (about lO
i million pounds). '
The major benefits from the cooperative international effort included
(I) avoidance of duplicate development through technological exchange,
I (2) earlier funding of huge projects, (3) the establishment of inter-
• national laws and.procedures for settling disputes about "rights" in
space and on planetary bodies, and (4) perhaps most important_ the :
I effective restriction of the use of outer space to peaceful purposes(COMSATS and observation satellites for military intelligence were _ ;
allowed, but all weapons in space were strictly forbidden). _ I
I International cooperation in space, which many skeptical analysts . i
had predicted would soon decline or collapse for the usual political
reasons, instead soon gave rise to an unexpected aura of the kind that
I is often associated with successful enterprises, and resulted in the _ [
rapid sharing of information, mutual technical assistance, and a minimum _ i
of friction among the personnel of the various nations. Indeed, in each )
I participating country an attitude gradually spread among those associated C i': with the space program that resisted political pressures seeking special
national "advantages." Because those proJects associated with the
" m cooperative development of space were able to avoid most of the national i_
I struggles for political advantages or ideclogical goals, it is not I
_ surprising that the space community increasingly became international--and !
I eventually, intrasolar---in its perspective.
l
I. The Emergin _ Space Culture
I Within each nation the natural heroes among thc, se _nt_rested in ?
a long term movement into space were the astronauts. For them the work
which they had to do literally became a fu_-ti_e occupat:on--roughly
• I a 100-hour week. Quite generally an astronau"s occupation also became
I his primary recreation. A self-selection process evo!veo that effectively
? weeded out any aspiring astronaut who was le:s _:_, co;_piE_=I/ d_dicated
_ to space projects. Still_ the competition bec_,_c r_,e,'ce and remained
:i _ so for over 50 years. The astronaut prcfe_i',,_ b-_,:am , a_ cf the most
'_ "glamorous" in technologically advanced so_i_ci_:_. Th_ _u_ce"......._: ,ul
" m competitors evolved into a new _lite culture .qith ._zomn_it_,entvo their
_ profession that the media often described es e r,Pv, t.,m] cF
m
one in which they were viewed as the "high priests"--y_t: ,:efor,,_aJ ....
rituals or dogmas were practiced or needed.
,.|
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Obviously the space culture was not planned, it just happened;
and as it grew it gradually transcended its former boundaries or "bonds" _t
of chauvinistic nationalism. That new attitude was not always understood
by those outside the space community, even after it became a prominent
theme in the communications media. The astronauts had found that direct ,)
physical experiences of transcending the surface of the earth helped
create a psychological counterpoint which led them and the other members __
of that community into a commitment to a way of ]ife, a spirit, which
transcended earth-centered national traditions and cultures. That _) ,
k'._ sociological development became one of the major factors which led to '
s_me phenomenal changes during the 21st century. More about that later. bi
' J. Health Aspects of Manned Space Developments _
i As soon as the possibility of sending humans safely into earth
orbits was considergd to be feasible it was also recognized that one
• of the crucial factors, perhaps the most crucial for the long-term t
i prospects of manned space ventures, would be related to the effects "_"_ of prolonged space voyages upon the health of astronauts. In which
_I ways would _pace travel and space-based occupations be found to be _,
•-I beneficial or hazardous to human health? How might the benefits be _n
_t improved and the hazards reduced? Those questions had to be answeled. ,
If astronauts had tc become a class of health-sacrificing "martyrs" then -- ,
z, severe limits would be placed on the potential scope of space-based '
civilizations. Of course, it was known that much could be accomplished
in a space proQram based only upon the transien_ use of astronauts_ _
with each one making a minor health sacrifi-ce. This could be accomplished _ ,
by developing systems that were designed to minimize the use of human -J
beings and restricting the time any of them would spend away from the _,
protective environment on the earth. However, the prevailing attitudes 4
among space-oriented planners considered such an approach as a fallback 3
position of last resort.
The great task for the biochemists, physiologists, physicians,
and other professionals in space-oriented life sciences was to make
the experiences i the space environment, on balance, beneficial in
terms of physical health, if at all possible. Numerous problems were
to appear, many of wnich were only dimly perceived during the 20th ,_
century, let alone understood. T e life science research programs
which at first had been only modesLly funded became impressive by the
end of the century. Indee_ they grew rell tively more rapidly than ._
most other portions of space budgets and b_, the year 2000 exceeded
$4 billion annually (worldwide). ._
By that time the major problems had been for-ulated and some
, potential solutions were in sight. Indeed, by then it was confidently
, predicted that through a carefully designed program the health benefits
'i of space-based operations could exceed the health hazards. Thus it .. ,
was con.lectured that over the following 50 years it could be demonstrated
"% ,p
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I that living in space would become associated with significant net health
I benefits. In fact, the perceived turning point came in the year 2024.
From then on the remarkable "exodus" into space which has occurred
I became inevitable in princiole. Only the timing was necessarily somewhat
U uncertain, since additional'technological developments, which were
"soon" to appear, were required to give humans the ability to live
m almost anywhere in the solar system 9 and eventually even beyond it
U if they so desired--but more of that later.
The principal health problems that had to be solved initially
I were (1) the ones associated with prolongeu weightlessness or near-
i weightlessness, (2) those associated with radnation, and (3) those
as3oc;ated with a closed cycle or very nearly closed cycle operation
I of a space station, colony or "spaceship." One of the marvels in the
I history of science is that not only were these problems eventually
solved but that, as an unantic;pated benefit, humans born in the space
.. environment were to become p_ysically and emotionally relatively healthier .
than those born on earth. Indeed the!r natural longevity is now expected
m to be about 30 years above average, and their mental capab_'ity, on
average, appears to be significantly better as wel . An ir oved human
I being, substantially improved, emerged From the combined efforts of
I sp_ce scientists exploiting the natural benefits o_tainable from the
relatively benign space environment--once routines were developed that
i permitted an optimized utilization of the range of artificial gravitation
J readily available to the "permanent" inhabitants of space.
I K. Spinoffs
That research and development, on the average, may be a good societal i
investment, is an idea that has always been obvious to people who value i '
I progress available through technological advances and economic growth. 4
For them the ongoing political or bureaucratic struggles related to R&D
f budgets are generally about how much to invest in which kinds of R&D. In _.
i this context, one of NASA's early probiems arose because its very rapid .
early growth, which culminated in the sensational Apollo moon landings, i
led to budgets which _ecame hard co justify to the "m_n-in-the-street"
I on an economic basis. Having won the "race to the moon" at a cost of
I about $40 billion, NASA's budgets declined steadily in the subsequent
decade. During the 1970s it was not apparent to the U.S. electorate
jr that the space effort should be sus_ain__ause it would be an
economically profitable investment in R&D. More than a decade was
requlred for the situation to change--that is, for the U.S. public
m- to conclude that investments in space were a long term bargain, perhaps
|_ one of the best economic investments they could make at the federal ".
I_ level. Their persuasion came about gradually, in part due to the perceived
l ,
' *A historical perspective on the attitudes of human cultures - ,
_ toward new frontiers is given i_n Appendix B. It suggests that er)nomic
I considerations were usually dominant prior to the 21st century.
,
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importance of past technological rewards, as the potential for future
technological spinoffs became better understood. After all, the growing
importance of COMSATs, integrated circuits, pacemakers, imF _ ,_ea,her
prediction, and some of the stunning prospecting successes credited -"
to the LANDSATs (to mention only a few examples) a!one justified the °,
historical expenditures on space projects up to the late "80s. After
that time U.S. budgets fr," space-oriented projects began to grow rapidly. -.
As public attitudes changeo NASA was no longer seen as an interesting i
but expensive "toy" but as the manager of one of the better investments
,_ in the future that required fede,al funding. The space program enLered -,
the 1990s with no majm boondoggles to mar its history, while its successes
were deefaed not less than a catalogue of marvels by most of those who -J
took the trouble to examine them carefully.
: By the late '90s, moreover, many of the ",nportant spinoffs had
had sufficient time to emerge from the compl!cated p,'ocess of developing,
' testing and marketing. By tL_n analysts had also developed sound met_od,_
for estimating their econom;c ,_'ue. The results became widely accepted
_, as 3 calculation of the minimum impact of the value of spac_ ;nvestments,
.: even though it portrayed enviable record, fn addition, the space program
was given credit for its many important contributions to basic sciences,
ones that could not be quantified but which were publicly extolled -_
" as prir_- nuring the later years of the 20th century the discoveries i
of _xtraterrestrial primitive forms of life, b!_ck holes in the galaxies, _ }
•-' and unexpected pulsations in the sun, for example, led to several revisions _ '
in previously _ccepted scientific formulations of some basic laws of nature.
I
Paradoxically perhaps, but not unusual as a theme in man's history,
the funding of U.S. space projects during the '70s _as being eroded
just as the results of prior efforts were beginning to shower increasing
" benefits on Americans, indeed on the world. In business language the q
space program was being "sold short" ju=t before its true va]ue was
- about to be rec_nized. All t is cllanged after the late '8Os. By
the end of that decade the popularly accepted "rule" was to emerge _
from the well-known Apex tnstitute study that the effective economic _
return from prior investments in space technology should yield at least
the equivalent of 20 percent per annum for 20 years.
Changing perceptions and attitudes led to the phenomenal growth "_ L
in space-oriented developments that began in the ]ate '8Cs and has
continued until the present time on a worldwide basis. Private investments
grew more rapidly than public ones, but did not exceed them unti_ the
year 2045 because of delayed _tarts and much smaller initial invesrments_
in addition to the inevitabl_ political problems. Thus, technological 1
spinoffs of the space program, almost a throwaway concept to NASA in
the '70s--a straw to grasp in attemFting to justify its existence and
: restrain budget trimmers--after 1990 were to furnish some of the leverage
_' which reoriented the public's perception about th_ value of space artivities.
, %
_ ! _.._
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_. L. Milestones
From a review of budgets or progress in space it is clear that the
• last quarter of the 20th century began somewhat slowly but finishedI with a roar that became an omen of the Future. A perspective on this
early period can be found in the data of Table 12. It was a time of
growing excitement. Of courser even in the late '90s a few nrotesting
" ! voices could occasionally be he,.rd predicting gloom and doom ahead--but
they grew fainter with time, The extraordinary changes in technology
coupled with the rapidly-expanding success-oriented space cultures
I which had sprung up in many countries merely :gnored the gloomy forecasts.Institutions dedicated to the fu ur of space pr liferated during those
times and atLracted participants from all age groups, but especially
I from the youthful ones. The gloomsters asserted that it was just anotherpassing fad--but their predictions were soon to be shattered.
Still progress during and after 1990 was constrained, not by funds
I but by availability of trained personnel and the inherent limits posedby the need for thorough planning and testing of each step in each
new project. As a result the pace of space development was at a maximum
_ consistent with safety and efficiency during the decade before and| the decade after the year 2000.
!
I
I
,!
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Table 12
,t
U.S. SPACE DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES (1976-2010)
BUDGET _,
CONSTANT $1975
WORLD U.S. -.
1976 9.0 3.4 Viking-I & II "'
1977 9.0 3.3 LANDSAT-C, HEAO-A, Voyagers-I & II
1979 9.1 3.2 SEASAT-A, NIMBUS-G, TIROS-N
1981 I0 3.1 Shuttle tested in orbit, HEAO-C, MAGSAT, SMM-A _,
1984 12 2.9 SPACELAB-I Symbolizes New Era of Cooperation
1986 13 4.0 1st LEO Space Station being engineered, Space Telescope --
launched _,
I_88 16 5.0 Ist large antenna (50 meters) in LEO, SPACELA8 4
1989 18 5.8 Improved Shuttle increases payload 20_ automated Lunar
Rover landed :!
1991 21 6.5 International Navigation System
1992 24 7.5 la0-meter microwave antenna, U.S. Personal Communications
System, GI_I Crop Prediction System. 1st International _
(U.S., Canada, Japan, ESA) Space Station--6 people. ,_
1993 27 8.5 Saturn orbiter launched, 3isease Vectors System operational
Ie34 32 I0.0 A_teroid Rendezvous Spacecraft launched -- '
1995 40 13.0 Global Air Pollution Analysis System launched. Ist Space- ,j_ i
Industrial Facility (4 people)
i996 45 14.5 Large Reusable Chem;cal OTV. .4
1997 50 16 Expanded Sl facility (20 people and I-MW power). Beamed :
Energy OTV operational, Severe Storm Prediction System "_
1998 60 20 (A) $50-Billion Program (International) _or SSTO launch
vehicle, Expanded LEO space station accommodates 22 _'_
people; experimental platform in GEO with lO0-antenna J
1999 70 24 Ad, anced Weather Prediction System, Expanded SI facility
(20 people and I-MW power)°
2000 80 30 2-Kilometer diameter antenna constructed, Marine
Resources System
2001 88 35 Multi-Service U.S. Communications System
2002 98 39 1/2-million lb. payload SSTO HLLV operational Earthquake
Prediction System launched '
2003 109 43 2nd Space !ndustrial facility launched (lO-ttW SSPS a_d
50 people), Multi-Service Int'l Communications System
2004 120 47 Advanced _uclear OTV Funded, Permanent LEO Modular
Space Station for 50 people Completed. 800-meter
GEO antenna
2006 140 55 ]st test module for L-5 Station launched (6 astronauts),
1st Moon colony established (]2 people).
2008 160 60 1-1/2 million lb. payload HLLV operational, Ist Fission-
Po_tered OTV tested successfully.
2010 185 70 Lunar colony expanded to 30 people ,_
#
%
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II OPTIMISTIC SCENARIOPART I1: FIRST QUARTER--21ST CENTURY
I A. World Economic Growth: A 100-Year Perspective
During the 21st century the explosion of technology, the explosion
I ol knowledge, and the consequent increase in the wealth of the worldwas, in th U.S. tric ntennial year. 2076, to r ach proportions which
would not have been believed possible--6-y-99.99 percent of the world's
citizens a century earlier. Moreover, it is also now clear that this
I growth phase will almost certainly continue. In this tricentennia# year,
any perspective on mankind's destiny appears to be far different from
those which were visualized and recorded a lO0 years earlier--except
I perhaps for a few scattered projections by science-fiction writers andfuturists that were not taken seriously when they were made. The changes
that occurred between 1976 and 2076 have been enormous and pervasive,
I if somewhat uneven in their impact upon various existing cultures.
For example our economists now estimate that the gross world product
per capita over that 100-year period--assuming that such quantitative
I comparJs-6-ns are meaningful--rose to about 230,000 in 1975 dollars.
That number tells us that a family of four on average now receives
an income which I00 years ago was associated only with "millionaires".
I Of course, the bulk of the world's population then was still associated
with relatively underdeveloped countries. However, even the poorest
countries today have reached the level of $10,000 per capita, again
l in 1975 dollars--an astonishing improvement, in retrospect, from thesubsistence levels of the 20th century. Moreover, it is clear tha
most of them will close the remaining gap rapidly.
o
I For many of the underdeveloped nations analysts had made differing
but generally somewhat gloon,y "prognoses" during the late 20th century.
However, as practical forms of assistance from institutions in the more
I advanced countries were created and made available, the experts cameto realize that no more than two generations--roughly 50-75 ye_;rs--would
be needed before most of the former economic distinctions, and many
of the undesirable social ones, would be relegated to history.
By the year 2020 a prevailing ethic emerged among the technologically
advanced cultures that, in effect, encouraged each human being to become
I integrated one groups are now as members
into at least of the which know
of the Solar Civilization. This transformation was to be accomplished
by each person as optimally as possible_ in accordance with his or her
I heritage and innate talent_ and with as much help as could be givenand accepted. However, the advanced societies were only encour=ging,
not demanding. Anyone who wished to do so could choose instead among
other lifestyles which were variously labeled= hedonistic, artistic,
I bohemian, traditional, contented, or natural. Pcverty or crime stemming
from inherited emotional or mental defects or from the impoverished
i environments found within most cultures of previous cent,jries_ was to _,
,
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all but disappear by 2050; thus lifestyle choices could usually be ,I
i made without duress. Also, by mid-century little resentment existed, .i
or was expressed, between those who became attracted to the ou=ward-
I bound culture and those who chose the more relaxed lifestyle of the -!
! earth-centered cultures. The more traditional cultures did continue .i
J tO have to cope with a much higher level of crime as that tends to
i develop in relatively permissive societies which unwittingly encourage --
i what in the 20th century was called the "weak superego" for want of l
I a more scientific explanation. Consequently, cheating, vandalism, -I ,
theft, and some irrational violence still occur--but much less than ,
before, and it seldom spills over into any of the cultures which are
members of the Solar Civilization. -_
t
B. The Computer--Once More _
The electronic computer which had not only made rapid technological
change possible, but inevitable as is now obvious to all, had by about J
2025 reached its nearly ultimate capability in terms of intrinsic develop-
ments in hardware_ That is, by then the various possible designs had t
approached near enough to the theoretical limits that these limits _
precluded more than another factor of 5 in computational speed, by another .I
• factor of 10 or so in memory density, or another factor of 10 in reliability.
Indeed by that time reliability had increased to the point that the i
probability of failure caused by random external disturbances which _
l
might affect some component of a computer--disturbances such as penetrating
cosmic rays or from relatively large meteorites in space applications, _ , i
for example--usually determined the basic reliability of the system. 4
Also by 2025, in addition t_ near-optimum reliability, the figure i
of merit of commercial computers was about a thousand million times _ .,
, greater than that in 1976. Nevertheless, this exceptional hardware did _ "
not imply the end of progress in computers' usefulness. Indeed, in a
major sense it was just the beginning. Increasiqa accomplishments _ .
/ i
were still to arrive in an endless stream in sof -e and in computer _ i
architecture--that is in the programming and net ing of large arrays
of computers--as well as in ingenious adaptations .o m_tomated processing,
product design, robotics, and algorithms for problem solving--adaptations
' which some people had long ago termed "artificial" intelI_gence. Of
course the distinction between artificial and human intelligence has
become increasingly blurred over time as the human-computer interface
becam_ more and more intimate and intertwined. ..
The earlier fear, especially among the artistically inclined, that -,
a computerized civilization would make humans become more "mechanical" is
J
; A practical figure of merit must be related to computer's purpose.
' Generally it will be 'based on a formula related to processing speed, _
memory capacity, access time, data transfer rate_ weight, volume,
reliability and cost.
i
•,, .. .. I
1985022650-073
I
| 67
I recollection the numerous myths in history. The
IIOW only an amusing among
sense of freedom, the quality of life, the expectation of excellent physical
health inc!uding the elimination of all bacterial and nearly all viral
I diseases, the conquest of birtn deformities and the ability to preventor rel ase individuais from mental "box " such as autism 9 schizophr ia,
and severe neuroses,- these all became available by the year 2025 because
of the computer. As a result within the dominant knowledge-oriente--_
I cultures improvements in mental and emotional health helped create
a better environment in which each individual's productivity could,
in principle, if not always in actuality, be tremendously enhanced-
I -especially as the physical resources and information needed to assistindividual productivity were also constantly increasing.
I C. Space Developments
i 1. Infancy to Adolescence
The second half of the 20th century is now generally regarded
as the infancy of space development. During that time the utilization
of space for science, exploration, communicatior-, earth observation_and industry was shown to be possible and the first steps into space i
were taken as an earth-based infrastructure was being created to support
the expanding program. It is logical to surmise that in those early iyears a series of technological marvels or " racles" was occurring
in the same general sense as it is currently. But then, for the first i
time ever, human beings were able to leave the earth on voyages into , '
outer space after countless millennia of surface-bound existence amid
strife-torn civilizations. This period of "space-infancy" was followed
by the "adolescent" quarter, 2000-2025, during which the excitement
of space expanded rapidly into a new generation of enthusiasts whoseheroes from childhood had been the "captains" of the great spaceships
(the successors to Saturn V and the Shuttle)--but captains derived
from the reality of space exploration instead of fiction. ". j
This quarter was to be one of accomplishment, investment, growth
and hope that would reorient most of the cultures of the entire world,
and that would offer them tangible evidence that culture couldany
understand that its future could be secure and its horizons essentially
unlimited. As one small example, it was in this quarter that not only
short-term weather prediction but longer term climate forecasting (upto several mon s) became sufficiently accu ate that a profound sense
of confidence in that service came to prevail throughout the world.
"Knowing" the weather accurately for a few days or weeks was pleasant
and, in a Few specific cases, vital. But of truly great importance,
especially for the developing nations, was the new capabllity to anticipate
a drought or a period of unusually heavy precipitation months or more
[_ in advance.
Earth-applicatio. s- satellites matured into huge commerciai enterprises
I that furnished "indispensable services. Unanticipated earthquakes became
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; memories. Precise navigation became cheap. Collisions of ships or
aircraft virtually disappeared. No company explored for minerals without .b
first utilizing processed data from space. No one any longer feared
being lost in a remote mountain or jungle (all__ the wrist communicators "i
and backup "emergency-beepers" in the group would first have to be ,j
lost or smashed--a million-to-one chance).
.4
Long-distance communication, over 10,000 miles, came to cost about .,
, the same as short-distance communication of one mile. In either case
: the signals to and from CO_.ATS traveled about 50,000 miles. But the
_p
service was cheap and used a lot--by video or audio as people wished.
Holographic imaging was also readily available where accurate 3-D images .,
were important enough to justify the higher cost.
--Q
What became particularly fascinating to many earth-bound observers ._
were the large space structures and the automated machines that maintained
and serviced them; viewing of those operations were available through -.
video transmissions. The weird-looking array of tel eoperators that }
: replaced malfunctioning modules and the preprogrammed robots that serviced "
these modules and restored their functiols could be observed in action
and entertained surprisingly large audiences. The earlier (year 2000) -_,
I estimates for the relative number of humans who would be required for -_
1 maintenance of the large space-based based communication systems had been
•t reduced by more than a factor of 10 by 2025--partly because of greater ""
reliability, partly because of unanticipated advances in automated maintenance. ._
The huge space structures themselves added to the former wonders of
the world. Many of them were miles long in at least one direction; some 7
with symmetric geometries were the size of cities. However, they were ""
gossamer thin when viewed at close quarters. On earth they would have
been quickly destroyed by a light wind let alone any rain, hail, earthquake, "3
or many other energetic phenomena associated with the earth's surface. _|
The array of functioning space vehicles were undergoing a long-term _l ".
trend of improvement and diversity--in accordance with specialized
_J
applications--that was to steadily increase their operational efficiency.
By 2025, for example, launch costs to LEO had dropped to one-third of ..
those in the year 2000. This reduction coupled with increased per-capita
income had made space travel and tourism a booming enterprise. While -"
the need for human attendants for routine space maintenance and repairs
had decreased, the d6mand for _man "space guides," as those employed ""
to facilitate the space travel industry were called, grew as fast as .,
tourism itself. By the end of the quarter the first small space hotels,
| hospitals, and museums were functioning. Also, of course, the inevitable -_
_. interplanetary races and other space sporting events (such as zero-G tl
acrobatics and winged slaloms for "indoor" competition) were burgeoning.
i]
1985022650-075
}I 69
I 2. Space Industrialization
The quarter also witnessed the initial great surge of space
i industrialization, the growth of which was to expand exponentially 'as the unique properties of space were coupled with advancing technology,
decreasing transport costs and man's ingenuity to create a vast array
of space products, processes and services. Eventually this was to
I lead to the construction in space of computer systems, laser communications,technological instruments, robots, cryogenic engines, space vehicles,
beamed power systems, and habitats for large orbiting colonies, to
I name a few of the "products." The raw materials, of course, were tobe increasingly obtained from lunar nd asteroid s urces--although
the latter was just beginning to he significant by 2025. A major industrial
I emphasis of the period was being focused on better robots, the automatedor "intelligent" machines which were to do the really difficult work
without complaint or politicking and which, once developed and debugged,
functioned extraordinarily well in the non-corrosive environment outside
I the earth's envelope.
This was the quarter in which private investment in space-based
I ventures began to compete with other glamour industries on earth--incountries (such as the U.S., Japan and Brazil) which encouraged private
ventures to function in space. Although some institutions and individucls
I "struck it rich," that was to become less and less important within i
the Solar Civilization. It had become exceedingly clear that the principal
benefits of space development and its spinoffs, as well as earth developments,
would accrue to all of mankind and this fact, coupled with a steady
I reduction in economic insecurity almost everywhere on earth, led to _a growing degree of international cooperation that would have shocked _
the traditional maneuvering politicians of the 20th century.
I The first quarter of the 21st century was subsequently dubbed
the Great Awakenin 0. People almost everywhere in the world "awoke" _
to find that they no longer were destined to be poor; no longer needed
I to live with diseases or illiteracy; no longer had to be victimizedby weather, earthquakes, or other forces of nature; no longer must
remain isolated from other human cultures; no longer needed to live
I in fear of external invasions or of being sent into battle; and nolong r had to risk becoming the unwanted dependents of others. The
shackles on minds, emotions, and physical health were to be rapidl_
I discarded--at least for the children. All but a few of the most remoteand isolated cultures participated in this awakening, and even those
remaining few were "soon" to join in.
In 2025 the world's investment in ventures exceeded $300billion, a sum which if predicted seriouslyspace 50 years earlier might |
have caused guffaws or a call for a straitJacket. Yet the investments
I were constrained even at that time, not by bureaucrats haggling overbudget allocations but rather by physical limits to the rate of expansion
!
!
1985022650-076
. J
i
7o -;
that were demanded by careful enginering and sequential decision-making
based upon tests and performance. It would not have been productive _,
to have spent more. However, the expenditures on earth for healthp
education, and training of the new generation, although not directly
oriented toward space, were to provide the basis For rapidly expanding .i
space-oriented projects for a long time to come.
3- Colonization
Jl
I
The first serious design for one of the "large" L-5 colonies was
started in this quarter (in the year 2020, to accomodate 2020 inhabitants).
From its inception it was known to be an experiment whose failures or ,,
difficulties would provide the experience which could open the possibility
of rapid future expansion. The stable L-5 region was clearly one of _
the preferred places for testing the concept that large space colonies .;
might become one of the great developments of the Solar Civilization and
provide a stepping stone toward the even more advanced concept of large
colonies which could travel anywhere in solar space--perhaps even further,
eventually. Naturally immense unforeseen problems hampered even the ""
prototype project during both its construction and "debugging" phases.
It was not until the year 2045 (25 years later) that all the important :
technical problems had been solved and a serious building program for ., ;
L-5 colonies could begin. =t
q
The same kind of difficulties did not attend the lunar base program ,a_
which expanded rapidly during this quarter. By 2025, 1,400 lunar colonists
were engaged in an array of unique projects. The scientific ones emphasized ._ ' i
astronomy 9 geology and closed-cycle agricultural research. The technological ! :
ones concentrated on exploration, mining, food production, surface o0
transportation, and the now-famous electric la¢'qch facility which was
first operated in 2023 and initially could "catapult" 2 tons of moon-
processed material per hour into space for use at earth-orbiting space _-j
stations or at the L-4 and L-5 colonies. .
Although planetary exploration by Fully-automated probes and vehicles _'_ i
was a continually expanding program, manned exploration of the planetary
bodies was to furnish its share of spectacular adventures as well as
practical applications. By 2015 the first humans had orbited Mars
and landed on its two small moons, Phobos and Deimos, to set up a fuel --
depot_ a control system for roving vehicles on Mars and a small laboratory
for observation and communication purposes. "_
_m
By 2025, 200 astronauts were exploring some r stant planetary
bodies (with landings on the Asteroids, Mercury a..d Mars) and observing -q
other from orbiting space stations where landings were not feasible
(Venus, Jupiter, Jovian moons). These were courageous people risking "
life and health at the ,arthest frontiers in the spirit of true pioneers.
The superb chronicle of their adventures is now taught to every child _,
showing an interest in space exploration. In retrospect it appears ._
astonishing that 95 percent of those explorers survived--although 15
percent of them had to be rescued at least once. _t
] 985022650-077
!I
"I; Each tragic loss was an occasion for grief and subsequent agonizing
reappraisal. Each successful rescue, on the other hand, was followed
by a public ceIPbration and a burst of renewed confidence. Neither
I the astronauts nor the public had previously expected the survivalrate among the explorers of dist nt planets to be as high as 90 percent.
Consequently, despite the gloom surrounding each disastrous event,
L_ m the remarkable survival rate and the drama of the successful rescues
_ I allowed the public to accept the risks involved.
D. Life Science in the Space Environment
I mentioned earlier that by the year 2000 a growing confidence
I had arisen among life scientists studying the health problems of spaceinhabitants. This confidence was bolstered by the relatively large
budgets devoted to those purposes. Consequently it was no great surprise
I when, in the year 2025, NASA 3nnounced that it believed that the world's_, scientific community had "solved the critical problems" associated
with prolonged missions in space. The solutions were complex in the
sense that identical procedures would not apply to everyone who was
I to spend a year or more in space; rather there were, generally speaking_three major categories into which such travelers could be placed depending
mostly upon age, natural variations in individual adaptability, and
prior exposure to the space environment. For those naturally best suitedto space, and wh had begun their careers in a weightless environment
before they reached 24 years of age, there were no limits to the amount
of zero-G exposure--only a requirement for a minimum specified exercise
regime and an diet. Those in the most sensitiveappropriate category
were
generally past 40 years of age with the least acceptable natural adaptability;
astronauts in this group would be required to spend at least 20 percent
I of their awake time in at least a I/8-G environment--again with a suitable ;
exercise and diet program. The intermediate category would need to i
= spend 5-10 percent of their awake time at 1/10-G or more. Those in
_ the latter two categories would obtain their minimum G-requirements ; ,
& in the artificial gravity of rotating space structures, i
The above "solution" w-s a satisfying one because it was expected
to result in a small health improvement at the 9_-percent confidencelevel, and equivalent health (compared to an earth-bound existence) at
the 99-percent confidence level. Thus the space experience For nearly
every astronaut would offer somewhat better health as an added bonus.More importantly, the inf rence could be drawn t at over time the relative
health benefits derived from living in the space environment should continue
to increase. Subsequently as these benefits were measured and foundto be substantial _hey tended to encourage additional outward migration.
Exceptions to potential health improvement were involved in various
professions= For example_ it included those who participated in highrisk space exploration or in space races. Those people generally accepted
; an unusually high exposure to radiation-in pursuit of their careers_
_ _,_
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in addition to a higher accident rate. Those were health and safety
r' risks that could be calculated and kept within reasonable limits but
which entailed irreversible costs. Another group included the rescue ..
&nd maintenance astronauts who were called upon to perform emergency !
duties beyond the capability of robots. Again, in addition to the _,
higher risk of accidents, radiation exposure beyond the limits set
for more routine situations (space stations, lunar colonies) was the "_
principa] health hazard; separate standards of acceptable risk were ._
,t set for these specialists.
Almost as important for the long-term future of space was the ,_
confirmation during that quarter of the feasibility of :losed-cycle
_agriculture" for large space station_ or other suffici :ly large
; orbiting colonies. This development made possible a _rc_ nf extensive 6
_ colonization at L-4 and L-5 and opened the way for _ i-term _ _ater -_
_' than 5 years) exploratory missions to various planetary systems b_ !
i a nearly unlimited number of people. Indeed it opened up the path "_, !
:_ to the eventual colonization of any habitable portion of solar space ._i
(which, vclumetrically speaking, did not exclude very much) and an_, I
. habitable planetary body. _;
¢
E. Travel and Tourism i
As much as any other index, the annual number of travelers to -.i t
space provided a measure of the growing interest in and of the economic
development of space. The number of tourists increased by about a :.7 i
factor of 200 during this quarter--reaching 100,000 anually--and was "!.,
constrained by the capacity of available transportation, not by the i
number of wil]ing travelers. The combination of increasing per-capita _
wealth, decreasing travel costs, and high standards of safety assured _i
a continuing boom in this fledgling industry for the foreseeable future. "_
During the quartc_ the cost of a two-week tour including both P,
geosynchronous and near-earth orbits fell almost I0 fold to $250,000. i
Roreover, a limited number of higher priced tours became available,
including a lunar journey for some of those who qualified and could -"
afford the $2 million far_. Still many qualified people who were willing .i
and able to pay the fare could not obtain a seat. Preference was given
to those who were active n space enterprises as well as priorities
for their relatives--a po;icy which led to some grumbling among those
who were disappointed. A_so, to accommodate at least some of the younger
and less affluent people eager for a space tour, a nonprofit lottery
system was established in 2017 that enabled 500 lucky people to visit _
outer space that year. Lottery tickets, at $100 each, became popular o
gifts. Currently that approach is still being used in some of the
developing nations. -_
'_i_ Rany people found that they would rather enjoy space tours vicariously
through comprehensive video programs, some of which used holography when
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I effects feasible and desirable. Indeed such programming contributed
3-D were
significantly to the education of young people interested in the space-
oriented culture. But everyone knew that a truly deep aesthetic experience
i was only available out there in orbit, or on the moon.
I F. Demilitarization
Growing international space programs had created some alarm in
the latter part of the 20th century. Technological advances had produced
I a capability for very destructive weapons, defensive and offensive, aswell as for commercia] developments. Fears that almost any space
installations could bn quickly demolished by distant death rays might
I have created a serious impediment to space development. However, thedemilitarization of space began to be effective aft r the cel brated
"Solar System Treaty" between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries was
I negotiated i_ 1998 and signed by all participants on December 31, 1999--amarvelous symbolic gesture with which the 21st century began. By the
early 1990's former desires to extend military power into space had
weakened. Partly it was because of the high cost but, more importantly,
f it reflected an emerging worldwide sentiment in favor of establishing
I a peaceful future in space for all nations, for all mankind. i
i
• _' The now-famous treaty is seen as a turning point, not only for
L space programs but also for the subsequent waning of the large national
military establishments on earth. After 1987, confidence in successful i
solutions to the energy, mineral, environment and food problems perceivedIW
' ! in the 1970s grew rapidly and helped lead to more stable and more prosperous
I
economies. This outcome coupled effectively with the rising spirit
of international cooperation in space efforts, and tended to reduce
• W earlier incentives for promoting violent solutions to political problems.
& Thus, unexpectedly, 1998 came to be seen in retrospect as the turning
point at which the militarization of the major national powers and . i
their alliances began to shrink.
This change did not occur quickly; it began with a slow decline
of mi!;lary budgets and over time, almost imperceptibly, the earlier
compelling logic for the maintenance of huge arsenals gradually disappeared.Nations did not reduce their military R&D establishments, and usually
kept on building prototypes of new weapons and maintaining their intelligence
organizations, but the overall strategic tone and military doctrinegradually changed to r flect the new percepti s of political realities.
Any remaining interest in nations conquering other nations had all
- I" but vanished by 2015, at which date it was fully and overtly recognized
1 and accepted as an obsolete notion. There remained, of course, a general
understanding that the rise of "another Hitler" was not impossible
in principle, and that continuing worldwide vigilance was needed for
assurance that suc t megalomaniacs could not achieve control of anyof the leading national powers. Even this Fear, however, was to be
essentially eliminated by 2025, partly as a result of the proqress
X
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in the life sciences which could assure the basic mental, emotional
_" and physical soundness of all citizens through the prevention of serious ,
; genetic defects in the newly born, but mostly because of the spreading
influence of the ideals of the Solar Civilization to whose members ""
; increasing individualism, democratic traditions, and a humanitarian .,
concern for all less-fortunate people were all fundamenLal concerns.
i Thus, by the end of the first quarter of the 21st century the world had -.
discovered that an era peace-on-earth (i.e., war avoidance) had evolved
"_ and had become pert of the new style of life almost "by itself"--or "'
i so some claimed.
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,' _ OPTIMISTIC SCENAR']
•, |, PART II1" . REFLECTIONS ON DEVELOPMENTSFRO,I 2025 TO 2076
_ _ A. Maturity in Space
The 20th century has been described as the infancy of space develop-
• in ment and the first quarter of this century as its adolescence. It
1
. is now felt, to continue the analogy, that the world reached maturity
in space during the last 50 years--however naive this statement may
iI - appear to be 50 or 100 years from now. After about 125 years of continued
(some say amazing) growth many of us do feel a kind of maturity. Children[
f today accept 3pace travel as simply natural, much as children of the
_ _" inid-20th century came to accept automobiles and aircraft.
• |- During the early period of space development (i.e., in the 20th
] century after WW-II) space budgets in the developed nations were often '
• thought of_ strahge as it now seems, as a kind of annual sacrifice; or
sometimes as an entry fee to an exclusive "club"--comnosed of industrialized
nations supplying funds to organizat ons like NASA which were dev t d _
_i f" to the study of space science and technology through actual exploration.
/ Ordinary citizens often had iittle inkling that there was much to be
gained from this effort beyond COMSATS, a few extraterrestrial rocks and
_ some astronomical observations which they had been told we[e important, !.
'" though they had difficulty understanding why. !t
Today the rich rewards of those early efforts are apparent to
- everyone. The frontiers of space exploration have been pushed farbeyond our most distant planet, Pluto, and the resourc s of space are
being ingeniously utilized for the benefit of humans everywhere in
" I" the expanding Solar Civilization. Space budgets are now on1! called
-" i. investments, and they have had a long record cf economic success.
Thls year, with $10 trillion from earth sources and $15 trillion of
income from space production being reinvested, the total of $25 trillion
• !i-. (in 1975 dollars) for investments is roughly 5 times the gross worldproduct of a century ago. During that Bicentennial year the U._. Congress
was debating whether the (reduced) budget for NASA should be $3.3 or
(" $3.6 billion This year sp=ce investments from the U.S. will exceed
I, $5,000 bil_:on.
r
B. Social and Economic Pro_/ress
By any historical standard prior to this century, the world has
become relatively very wealthy in a very shert time. Poverty, crime,
i and diseas_ no longer have the meanings which existed "way back
then"--durlng 1976-!986, the years for celebrating the Bicentennial,
E for example. Poor people today are so labeled because they chooseto be poor; that is to live in the "style of their forefather-'sns without
the benefit of hundreds of robots, without specialized knowledge, without
most of today:s technology and, naturally, refusing space travel. OfIi
1
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course they are well off in terms of Food, housing, surface travel and
health care; and most of them are involved in their own cho!ces of arts
and crafts, sp_rts ar,d recreation. Generally these groups are held
together by their religious convictions although a Few claim to b_ I
almost purely hedonistic. Yet they have been a steadily diminishing
portion of the world's population and now constitute iess than 20 percent
of the total. T
World population is now 9.4 billion peop!e and is expected to
remain stable. Our extraterrestrial population, now at 40 mi;lion_ T
is small compar.d to the total but it is expected to grow rapidly for L
at least several decades. As our world product is about S290 trillion
(260 on earth, 30 in space) the GWP per capita is almost $30,000. ..
Moreover, except for those who are poor by choice, the income ;ap has
shrunk considerably from that of a century ago. Toda/ the prospering
_outh Asians and Chinese have attained a per-cap ta income level which
is about 40_ of the world average. This lag in r_lative income is "_
mostly due to the fact that many of their older citizens did not have
an opportunity for a thorough educatior during their school years--a
situation that does not exist today. --
Every child born after 2050 has been free from mental or physical
defects (again excepting some among those who choose e tr_Jitional .. i
existence). Currently these children are being raised under ideal !
cir umstances, as they can best be defined. Thus, by 20th century _t
standards each child today is expected to develop into an intellectual
genius, to be in nearly perfect physical health, to be emotic_ally _ ,
alert and responsive without neurotic instabilities, and to live about .
120 years with 80 of them being higr,iy productive. Consequent y, nearly
every ch!id born after this year is likely to be active during the " ;
celebration of the U.S. Quadrirentennial, the nature of which I will
speculate abm't later on.
C. Automation
t
The first 200 years of U.S. history coincided ,'ough!y _,ith the
, industrial revolution. Thus, since the American revolution people
I in the more rapidly advancing technological cuZtu,'es have devoted increasing
j efforts to developing, maintaining, and operating machines. During
i the last century this has not changed, hut its qualitative and quantitative
i nature are obviously quite different. Of course, the world today might
I be _,Jzzling to almost any v_sitor from the Bicentennial year. For
one thing there are no obs 'vable pollutants from industrial enterprises.
I Indeed, most of us now live with very few of the background noises .,
i of the former civilizat;on--the occasional exceptions are transitory
experiences. Nearly everything called work I00 years ago is now beiny
] done by highly _,tomated and usually "very intelligent" machines.
Wherever the loca, envir_qlqent is unsuited for human comfort our interaction _
with these machines, or rob ts if you will, is communicated electronically
or optically from an appr priate dist3nce. Maint_r,_r, ce Frocedures ._
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[_ are usually automated and specTalized maintenance robots are designedto func'ion reliably, esp-cially in the more chall3nging environments,
such as in the deep sea or on the lunar surface.
Most human beings today specialize in providing knowledge apd
skills which computers or robots do not yet have. Each person's many
different "personal robots" have been programmed to as=ist him in his
I- work; in addition everyone has at least limited access to the latest
I technologies such as space vehicles or computer networks. Scientists
and technologists generally have access to wl,atev_, instruments or
I-- computational facilities they require--although where expenditures
: are required beyond those authorized by routTne standards, peer-group
permission must be obtained.
T
O. Computers and Electronic_
( A few ,,_re remarks abou _ computers are in order before we get
l back to space. It would bc almost impossible to describe to a person
from the 25th c_ntury what changes the computer-based technologies
°; f hav_ wrought. Perfect human health--mental, physical, and emotional--is
: a "computer product." That is, like most of present technology, it
:_ became possible only because of progress in computers. Present computer ;
_ systems a_e optimally designed hardware comoonents netted together !
_ in a worldwide electronic and optical network which simultaneouslyt
is both private and intimately public, as befits a good system. Thus
_ any information anywhere about any subject that has been connected
i to the public grid is quickly available te anyor,e through electronic-
I optic_ l information transfer--as is access to any person anywhere in
-_ th_ _lar system, when such access is mutually desired.
L
: Even today, though overall "efficiency," or c_pability, of our
compute_-based information network is estimated to be much more than
a m, llion times greater than it was at the turn of the century, our
experts bel!eve that there wilt continue to be remarkable improvements
; durin9 the next I00 years--or for as long as people desire T_, some
i believe. It would probably have been very difficult for even an informed• citizen in 1976 to anticipate that after a mere lO0 y_ars the computer
i power available to each individual would exceed the total computer,wer of the world in which he lived!
E. Extraterrestrial
_[ The expectation today is that the population in space will continue
" to expand for some time. On the moon today t,,ere are about Z00,009
people, perheps half of whom spend more time there than on earth ahd
. |" who have come to prefer it, partly because of the exhilarating !ow-
L gravity environment. Some people are predicting [hat the lunar populationm
may eventually exceed a billion. Certainly we are aware of no major
cbstacles _o this occurrence other than the debate abou¢ the lunar
atmosphere. With a billion residents, the amount of gas leaking from
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their "closed environments" and from automated lunar industry may become
so gr_at that tF_ moon may acquire a sensible atmosphere--a potential &
annoyance to |u_ r astronomers as well as to the maF.Jfacturlng processes
requiring high vacuum. Most of our scientists believe that there are
so many alternatives to the lunar platform for observatories that it ._
would be better to "move some of the astronomers" than to restrict
other lunar developments. It is also possible that the gaseous leakage
can be adequately contained. D
- Because iunar materials are experiencing an increasing demand
for use at space stations and orbiting colonies the mining activity i
is apt to grow rapidly for a few decades, or perhaps much more. The -,
" L-4 and L-5 regions have a population that nearly equals that on the
moon and are the rm.st rapidly growing space habitats and industrial
facilities in orbit. Within the next few decades most of the newer _.
space vehicles (except the larger SSTOs) are likely to be produced at
the L-colonies. These two regions are evident!y destined to become -;
great industrial parks in the extraterrestrial Solar Civilization--at |
" a
"_ least that is the way it appears now.
Meanwhile the space frontiers are being expanded by exploration i
-- te:ms. M_rs has about 2_530 people in its colo,,;es now. Its low gravity --
pleases the surface residents, the more enthusiastic of whom predict
that Mars will "soon" be engineered to provide climatic conditions -"
on its surface suitable for the introduction of several kinds of earth _1
flora and fauna. Today it is mainly a self-sufficient scientific outpost,
. but it also produces a substantial quantity of fuel for space vehicles T]
which can be recharged from Martian orbital space stations.
- The rest of the 20,000 exploring astronauts are well scattered
tover the solar system. Each planetary body is to be exhaustively
investigated--by robots alone only where the environment is too hostile "| I
for human presence. All cf the large asteroids will have been examined
and catalogued before 2090. Some of the_,l will be towed in during this "_ '.
• coming quarter to provide exhibits, fuels and minerals for the planned
" Asteroid Industrial Park. Chunks of the more valuable asteroids, of
course, are even now being moved .egularly to the L-colonies; this
creight has increased about 100-fold since 2050--last year about 10
million tons were brought into cis-lunar space.
F. Space Vehicle Developments i
The most impressive achievement in propulsion, announced formally
in 2072, just 4 years ajo, was the new non-radioactive fusion=electric mD
.. engine which operates at an efficiency of BO percent and is expected
to reach 90 percent d_ring the next 10-20 years--that is, in the current
! model at least 80 percent of the fusion energy is available as electric 'I
* energy for propulsion. In an alternat design the fusion products =6
| may be direct,y ejected from the engine without electrical conversion.
, ii1
_.-
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- With this engine very large space vehicles should be able to traveleconomically at great speeds. Its capability will be particularly
important for missions beyond the asteroids. Consequently, not only
should the manned exploration of the distant planets and their satellites
be greatly increased because of the power and efficiency now available,but the rate of expansion of the Solar Civilization into the farther
reaches of the Soi_r System probably will double or triple.
Perhaps yen more exciting is the potential, which no,q appears to be
quite likel_ that during the next few decades even more advanced fusion
engines may onen up the possibility of manned interstellar exploration--at
t persistent dr_:am among the more devoted buffs of the Interstellar Exploration
Society--one that some of them claim will become a reality within 50
years! Most of our scientists are dubious about that claim.
Alt;,ough by using a kind of rough averaging we estimate that the
cost of space transport has fallen dur'ng the last 50 years to about
I/5 of the cost in the year 2025 (it is now about $8 per pound, in
( 1975 dollars, for a launch to LEO of a vehicle transporting people),
there exists such a large array of special-purpose vehicles that statistical
averaging obscures some of the important economies which are achieved
by specific designs. Also, depending upon specific circumstances,
the transport of human beings between orbits costs from 2 to 20 times i
more than that for most inanimate materials.
Transport time is sometimes an urgent consideration and other
times not. For example, in transporting lunar raw materials or chunks
of asteroids, the rate of arrival at the space industrial center is '
usually the dominant factor; whether the travel time is a week or a
year is much less important--especially as robot-time usually costs
much less than human time in the relevant systems. This is the reverse{
of the 20th-century relation in which automated machines or central
computers generally cost much more than human labor on a per-hour basis.
The income of a competent engineer is now about lO times more than ,
that of his counterpart a century ago, while the value of "equivalent"
20th-century automated mach:nes, instruments, robots or computers has
fallen by a factor of I0 to 100--if indeed the use of the term "equivalent"
i in this context has much useful meaning today.
G. Travel and Tou,'ism
f Because of the steady drop in costs the phenomenal growth In the
use of space has set a new record, reaching 120 million travelers last
l year. The average length of time per journey is now over 30 days andthe average cost for a trip which includes 10 days on the moon is about
$100,000. Space travel and tourism currently :s a $10-trillion annual
f- business worldwide--about twice the entire world's GWP a century ago,
• 1. and perhaps 30 percent of present annual expenditures in soace development
projects. A "standard" tour might spend several days in various earth-
[
I o
1985022650-086
80
z
orbiting space stations and industrial complexes, a week at one of
the L-colonies, about !0 days on the moon and a few days visiting space
museums, sports stadiums, and hospitals. Some of the features which
have proved to be especially attractive are power stations, exploration
vehi_les, space robot displays, giant laser-communication centers,
: and astronomical observatories. However, many people have found that
their greatest single spiritual experience came from spending several
hours, or as much as a day, in a space suit, orbiting all alone. The
i first such experience is generally reported to be the one which is)
the most profound. _.
!
._ It. Interstellar Exploration
:t Some interstellar exploration buffs keep redesigning the space
vehicles which they be!ieve may soon be sent to investigate one ofthe nearer stars with a human crew. The estimate (in 2060) was about "
$8 trill'on for a vehicle with 20 people which might, with luck, make
i a round trip safely in about 150 years. While that is still too expensive '
the buffs claim that within 50 years the first such mission will be -.
J undertaken, perhaps even with a larger initial group--as none of the
_i starters may be among the finishers. None of the problems involved
; in such a mission seem insurmountable, only costly, dangerous, and
of questionable value. But when the total cost of such an adventure
,; comes down to less than 2 percent of the GSP, who knows, the first .i
' star-bound explorers may prevail.
One-way scientific missions with robot explorers are now being
: launched regularly toward interesting stars, black holes, and various "'
F anomalous regions within a lO0-1ight-year radius. Scientists are eagerly _.
awaiting the returns from the first contacts which will occur in about t
"' 5 years, although it will take another 4 to I0 years to get the information -J
back through the interstellar cof_,anication network, which the robots
are installing as the vehicles reach out toward their destinations. "" '- i
, Black holes, as we know, are still tantalizing the astrophysicists.
Several thousand have now been positively identified and the theory --
of their fnrmation, sizes, and distribution is now we;1 understood.
Still the physical laws applicable to the processes within these holes
have resisted the most ingenious attempts to understand them. For
-?
this reason the data that might be returned by the First probes approaching
a black hole are eagerly awaited and, some believe, might revolutionize --
some of the basic theories of physics soon after they are received.
Who knows what that might lead to? ""
._ Powerful astronomical instruments have mapped our galaxy in considerable
_" detail. Of the planets as large as or !arger than the earth that exist -.
_[ within 5000 light years of us, probably 90 percent have b._en identified
and catalogued. At least I0 percent of them appear to h_ e a potential ""
for some form of life and perhaps 12 planets are considered to offer
conditions that make advanced life forms possible. Only one of these, "i
_.,
-
...... _ ........... . ._,_. ,_. -_ -. .
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however, is near enough to be reached by any of our probes within the next50 yea s. Still the sensitive re eivers of the interstellar cot_unication
system will be constantly listening from now on--and the system will
be continually expanded into deep space and in many directions.
I. Solar Civilization Government
f
i Even though certain residual traces of 20th century styles of
government are still present, the concept of total sovereignty upon
( which the former nation-state system was based has largely been supplanted
[ by our Solar Civilization and the institutions of various local cultures.
With the elimination of poverty, crime, disease, insecurity, and war
during this century and with the expansion into both the space Frontierand the earth's oceans (6 percent of the earth's population now lives
on floating cities) many of the traditional functions of nations were
no longer useful. To what nation children born in _pace or in ocean
I cities should "belong" was a concept that simply eroded away. Languagebarriers were quickly transcended early in this century with computerized
translators and over time the "natural" language of our present civilization
F became the con_non central one. Of course, many people are still facile
the languages with which they were raised and some of the remainingin
"poor '_ people speak only their traditional languages by choice, i
f But our present "government" would be incomprehensible to our
great-grandparents of 1976. In those days politicians of democratic
countries pretended to be the "servants" of the people, when in fact f
f they held the power of masters and frenuently used it viciously or
1 stupidly, often covering up their deeper .notives so carefully that
they deceived themselves more than others. None of that is possible
r today. Dishonesty is no longer needed or useful; it is hard to find i
I and parents are careful to exorcise it from their children when it
appears. Governing today i___serving the people and is not one of the
more exalted profes_lons. Effectively power exists in real knowledge , i
r - i
and in specialized physical skills; no longer in hypnotic propaganda,
: wealth, or class traditions. Our society has learned i_ detail about
the astonishing foolishness and irrationality which was inherent in
people's behavior prior to this century, and which has fortunately
become only a memory--a set of recorded events, _nlikely ever to be
repeated. Today, it is difficult for young adults to believe that
they have only so recently, and luckily, emerged frown the long era
i of "jungle" civilization.
The central goal of th _ Solar Civilization is _o make life a glorlous
I 120-year adventure for each citizen. Death, when it comes, is usually
- | considered to be no more of a tragedy than a long sleep would be--except
[i for chance fatal accidents, and these are relatively rare. Our fellow
human beings, whatever their origins or destinations, are almost always
_ pleasure to ._eet and to interact with. That is our custom, and teat
is how people believe it should be--always.
'iX
,I
!
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ii 0PT.STC,c .A.0PART IV: FORECAST: THE NEXT lO0 YEARS
i. A. Future Exploration
NOWwhat of the future? There have always been those So believed
i that mankind has progressed about as far as it could--but those opinions
are not too numerous now and usually emanate from the traditional cultures.
.4
For most of our space professiona!s the gist of the future potential
of space exploration is summed up by the phrase, the universe beckons.
This phrase goes beyond the mere human visitation to other stars or
their planets--an accomplishment not yet achieved but believed quite
; generally to be one which will become routine and whose beginning is
! even now on the drawing boards. More about such ventures later. First ,
I simply want to set forth more fully the meaning of that phrase to
._ the current generation.
: It is taken for granted that the outward development of the Solar
Civilization wil! continue in many of the directions now clearly indicated.
( All accessible planetary bodies will be mapped, explored and colonized--by
, L
i humans where this is feasible, and by robots wh_re (or while) the environment
- prohibits human access. Massive planetary engineering will be a constant :
-; program for each planetary body, whether it is a small moon or great
i
; Jupiter, itse!f. But there is no great hurry as such undertakings
at present are interesting as scientific investigations, not as economic
or social requirements. Even in their _ -]y stages such projects (assuming i
that the expected sustained technologic_ advances in the efficiency '.
of space travel do occur) should make the trip from earth to Jupiter, and
soon the more distant planets, a frequent "routine" journey--less arduous
by far than the trip from England to the U.S. during cclonial times.
Travel in the solar system is now potentially available for almost
anyone who has a strong desire or need for it, and living in a space
colony is a commonplace experience for at least a million people; we
expect that the space-based population could well expand to billions
over the next hundred years. Wherever large groups of space explorers
might choose to travel they can now take with them complete closed-
cycle systems for relatively comfortable living, including the requisite,
portab;e industries with a full set of operation and maintenance robots.
Any vital information wuuld be stored or made available through the
laser-linked Solar Communication System. Thus the only significant
commu:,lcation or information delay= among our Solar Civilization COniT,U, ;ties
f
• *But who maintains the maintenance robot_? Perhaps we might soon
, f have super-maintenance robots to do that job. But then who maintains
{ / them? Historically thinking, it is we humans who must do the final
- maintenance. Consequently, that will be the limiting factor--or will ,
t.
"- it? Either _v_y, it is going to be an exciting adventurel
t,;::_;:!::c; _.', :.... '_ ::.,7 i,l:*:.l) __..--_[ENII_ALLYSI,ANI(
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will be the inevitable ones caused by the time it takes light to travel
_i the intervening distances.
! Perhaps (anG this is my personal view) the shape of the future
i expansion of our Solar Civilization into space will be somewhat analogous
+ to a slow motion unfolding of a gigantic explosion which over the millenia :
ahead would gradually reach outward to the limits of the universe in
every direction. Thus, some people today visualize that self-contained_ +
+i self-sufficient communities (w!th populations ranging from thousands
Li to several tens of thousands, and for each person hundreds if not thousands -.
of specialized robots) will gradually expand, first throughout the
far reaches of the solar system, and then well beyond that--maintaining
.r continual communications (indeed, becoming part cf a grand communication
, network) but generally roaming farther and farther from the solar center.
_I The _normous energies available near the sun will not be available
+1 to those who are outward bound But even now some of the energy needed
.r can be plucked from the outer planets_ soon from any passing comets
,i
and other space "debris," and finally even from the diffuse hydrogen
atoms if not from the "vacuum" of "empty" space, if need be. OF course,
+ fusion energy coupled with efficient recycling of matter inside each *_
-; colony could if need be, provide the bulk if not the total requirements
;-i for almost any journey--even one to distant stars--that is now contemplated. _+
. In this concept of our ever-expanding space-based civilization +
the design of complete systems for interstellar voyages appears likely
. to be substantially different from those generally visualized prior _ ;
to this century. These concepts, usually involving speeds approaching
that of light arid possible round trips within a lifetime, are now deemed
appropriate only for vehicles operate' purely by robots--many of which
are already proceeding at optimum speeds to the nearer stars• But
voyages of colonies of people will take much longer and are likely J
to be part of the general long-term expansion into the galaxy, while
maintaining intimate communications with _ll neighboring communities +_ !
(thos_ within a few light weeks or so). Thus the applicable image ..
for the next few centuries possibiy, is one of armadas of large self-
sufficient space colonies emanating "r_ially" outward from the Solar +-
System, maintaining constant contect through laser communications_
+_ drawing in increasing portion of their energy requirements (over time) +"
from the endless resources of space and continually developing the ..
community organization (and each of the individuals within it) while
the grand voyage proceeds. The first destination of any first journeyp -.
which itself clearly must be a part of an endless process_ can only
be the first objective of the expedition. That journey would simply '
represent the physical segment in space-time that the community will ..
be occupying as it proceeds with its business of living, learning, and
interacting with the other communities of the expanding Solar Civilization. -_
_ The above image, of course, may ch,lnge gt)atly during the next -_ '
hundred years. To me it is simply the current most likely one. However,
,!
l
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E since the part of this grand expansion that would leave the solar systemwith people has not yet begun--ncr is it likely to for another 50 years
or so at the earliest--who can say with confidence that it will come
-- about as described? After all, there are still some who contend that
, the "ultimate" constraint the speed of light yet
even posed by may
be overcome when we have delved sufficiently far into the en_iess store
of scientific secrets that nature only gradually reveals to us, _ bit
I at a time. Obviously that alone could, and a few believe will, usherin n ncomprehensible new univ rse of discoveri s that would make
the above image of the Future appear to be naive--or primitive.
{
I An awesome aspect of looking backward in time lies in the implications
of the exponential nature of the knowledge explosion that has occurred
over the last few hundred years. If that expansion is projected forward
- another hundred years at its recent growth rate it would imply, despiteour impressive progress in space exploration, our current knowledge
of the cosmos, and our understanding of the infinitesimal 3tructures
Ii of the component parts of matter-energy, that currently we are stillmere infants in knowledge--that the really impressive breakthroughs
in comprehending the nature of the universe are yet to come. Each i
- of the last several centuries has witnessed ever more awesome and radical
changes than the one before, at least by one or more orders of magnitude
where numerical measurements are ,elevant. Futurologists are very i
excited by the prospects ahead yet they must feel a little shaky inside
I at what might occur, knowing that beyond a few decades the future is iessentially opaque, however much they may try to peer through it For i
i
a gi'mpse of whac is to come. # ,[-i In a more practical vein some long term projections for the next
century, for whatever such exercises are worth (relatively little,
i judging from past experience), have been made by a team of futurists ian I will mention a few of them now, more in the spirit of entertainment t
than as a serious guide to what will be.
f
t
i i B. 100-Year Projections
f l) First, the population living in space should increase dramatically,
I perhaps to as much as a billion people by 2176. A significant fraction,
perhaps even 1.0 percent_ of them may be outward bound in the sense
• discussed above. Even the I billion total is an extrapolation based
( on a gradually diminishing "exponential" growth of the space-based
• t population (see Table 13) and is coupled with assessments of the rate of
future economic growth on a relatively conservative basis. The space
Ii population by then would be about as large as the population on'_ earth--which is expected to remain at about the same level as it is today.
E 2) Space travel and tourism will grow rapidly but its naturewill have changed dramrtically by the Year 2176. Also the number of
people traveling annually From earth to various space destinations
1985022650-091
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will increase by about a factor of 1,000. Even now space tourist is
a term which is rapidly losing much of its former meaning. Except
for first-time visitors most space travel is now associated with specific
projects that the travelers are involved with. Whether a large space-
liner or personal space vehicle is utilized for the journey will be
a matter of optimizing the choice. A century or more ago a tourist
was defined as a person traveling in a foreign land interacting with
an unfamiliar culture, usually irom a somewhat protected and insulated
vantage point (or path). Today cultural insulation is largely non-
existent--except among the remnants of traditional cultures that remain
so by choice. Our knowledge-oriented civilization has no interest
in developing tourism as a method of intercultural communication.
Indeed, it would be an extremely inefficient approach. Information
about any aspect of space cultures, as with earth cultures, generally
is available quickly and accurately through the Solar Communication
Network in any of the desired standard forms (i.e., visual, audio,
holographic, symbolic, etc.) or any combination of these. !
3) Economic expansion in space is projected to increase roughly
by a factor between 100 and 1,000 (the median GSP projection for 2176
is $12 quadrillion, for those who find such estimates meaningful) compared
to a factor of 25 projected for economic growth on earth. The proJection
assumes the continuation of the relatively unproductive traditionalists,
that relatively crowded conditions on earth cause investments to flow
:t into space projects, and that because the climate and the diurnal cycle
on earth are constraints on development, better opportunities and adequate
resources will exist beyond the earth's atmosphere..i '
_ Within the world's knowledge-oriented cultures the average gross
:_i income of a family of four now exceeds $120,000 annually and has been "
increasing monotonically (and almost exponentially)--(see Table 13). _j
! Although our total population (earth and space) is not expected to
increase much during the next century, average income in terms of per .....
• capita gross product should by then increase substantially, perhaps
about 40-fold.
i 4) Space travel is soon expected to become much cheaper as the: result of sev ral imminent dev lopments. One is the recoverable momentum
I system which will, in orinciple, enable exo-a_mospheric travel to be
t almost free in terms of the amount of required matter (eJection mass)
and energy, at least wherever travel time is not a major consideration ,
and even that may be only a temporary constraint. For long journeys
in which time is important, we have expectations of constantly-improving ,i
fusion engines. The futurists now anticipate that during the next
i 100 years costs will drop to about $2 per pound (in bicentennial dollars) ;
for transporting people from the earth's surface to near-earth orbit
(freight should be cheaper, of course). However the more importrant _
aspect of commercial travel beyond cislLnar space is the time/cost ._
]985022650-092
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Table 13
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
I,L POPULATIONAND GROSSPRODUCT
(PAST & PROJECTED)
.:i POPULATION(BILLIONS) GROSSPRODUCT*($ TRILLIONS)
! YEAR EARTH SPACE EARTH SPACE
[ i975 4.0 --- 6.61
2000 6.0 .4"* 20 (.045) .02
[ 2025 7.7 20** (.169) 50 (.037) .36 (.12)
2050 8.8 500** (.137) I15 (.034) 4.0 (.10)
; 2075 9.4 1,O00 (.127) 260 (.033) 30 (.084) i
= . i
2100 9.7 .01 (.096) 720 (.041) 180 (.074){" 2125 9-9 .07 (.081) 1,670 (.034) 900 (.066)
iI ' 215o 9.9 .3o (.o6o) 3,500 (.o3o) 3,600 (.o57)i 2175 lO.O 1.00 (.049) 6,700 (.026) 12,000 (.049)
t
"i *FIGURES IN PARENTHESES ARE AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR THE PRECEDING• i QUART R.
1 **THOUSANDS
•
..... •............................- -_-----,_=. ,_-T-=--:-T-...........
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_ ratio. It is in this regard that the improved engines will be most useful.
For example, it will soon require no more than 4 weeks for travelers to
reach Jupiter without great expanse or discomfort during the journey
t. . at approximately I-g most of the time) and only about 2 weeks intl.e
the event of very urgent business, although the latter requirement is
not expected to be frequent--at least not during the next decade or so.
: 5) Our futurists expect that some of the most exciting possibilities
• that lie ahead will be related to the interaction of people and computers.
As in the past we cannot see, except in vague--perhaps meaningless--ways,
what the important discoveries or applications are likely to be. However,
informed specialists continue to speculate upon potential "direct"
linkages between advanced computer systems and the human brain. In
principle that could improve human memory, greatly speed up thinking
processes, and perhaps enable us to learn while sleeping (or even while
- awake--on an unconscious level). Technology already has led to considerab|e
progress in all but the last process, but not by a direct linkage--rdther
through much better understanding of the electro-chemistry of brain
: functions. Even now_ however, the innate capability of the healthy
[ brain is known to be at 1east lO0-fold greater in terms of memory than
that which is usually achieved by our best students. However for creative
- problem-solving ability our scientists still can't make meaningful
.. quantitative estimates of the human potential; it is only believed
,_ to be very much greater than that which we have experienced.
Coupling these possibilities with the evolving information networks
and a growing number of trained contributors clearly makes the future
: continue to appear "explosive" in terms of its potential for new knowledge_
just as it has been since the middle of the 20th century when the electronic
computer appeared. More or less consonant with experiences of a hundred
years earlier, our information systems still produce much more data
than can be rapidly digested--an inevitable "problem" associated with
rapid growth in the system's capacity. But, in retrospect_ the progress
is astonishing. About 200 million people are now professionally engaged
_ in improving information and communication systemsl all of them, of
course also use the i:=tegrated Information and Computing Network (IICN)
; as a tool to help with their specific tasks.
C. A Universal Brain?
One of the more common spectacular images of the future potential
is that of a great "universal brain" composed _f all of the brains
of the inhabitants of the Solar Civilization linked optimall' nto
I the vast I ICN which by innate design is self-programming a therefore
is rapidly self-;mproving over time--even as it enhances ..Je _ffective
• brainpower af _ users]
Although individuals still conceive of themsJlves as independent
autonomies--as they always have done iq the past--currently they are i
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[more aware than ever of tneir interdependence through the IICN. The_jor diff rence b tween cu rent attitudes and those which prevailed
a century or so ago is that this interdependence is now considered
I ,_ desirable; that rather than promoting robot-like humans it creates
t. l "human-like" robots where these are desirable, and frees human beings
[ '" to perform ever more creatively in endeavors of their choice. No adult
is ever forced to participate in any project, and anyone who so wishes
i_ ! can leave the knowledge-oriented culture without fe-r of reprisal. It
_ t even happens occasionally, although quite rarely. Actually_ the drop-
._ in rate in recent years has been lO0 times greater than the drop-out
l Thus, the expectation exists that in whatever manner the "Universal
!} Brain" evolves into a more meaningful entity it will be an entirely
- desirable arid natural evolution that will almost continuously be recasting
I the image of the human role and its destiny in the universe. Few people
i now doubt that over the long term (more than lO0 yea_s from now) that
- the concept of human destiny will come to include the exploration of
t- the whole galaxy through actual visitation and then, perhaps, even
colonization. Eventually, who knows, humans might be e×ploring other
galaxies as well. It is the expansion upon these necessarily murky
ideas of what else man's destiny will include that often engenders
[_ the greatest xcitement.
¢
,[
!.
i
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[ Chapter IV
TWO P_oSlMISTIC SCENARIOS
[ PART I: THE CHINESE SOLUTION
r A. 1976-2000i
The New Class ideologyt
'i During the 1970sa social phenomenon arose, spread rapidly and
: became especially strong in most of the technologically advanced non-
cemmunist countries. Its influence was expressed thrcugh (a) a rapid
_ growth of environmental and conservation movements; (b) a growing concern
_ ( about the large economic differences between the richest and poorest
"_ _ classes within each country as well as the differences among nations
_'_ (e.3. , the North-South dialogues resulted from this concern); (c) a
"! T _o-Malthusian doctrine which opposed economic growth in the wealthierI nations and actively opposed most large industrial--especially e_ergy-
_| supply--projects in those countries; and (d) an increasing transfer
E _ of responsibilities to the innovators of new products or proceszes that
_ t { required them (by governmental regulations) to furnish prio" proof thatany new risks which arose would be insignificant, plus the responsibility
| of. ,ying damages if they were wrong (i.e., forcing them to obtain }
•.I; i adequate amounts o_ long term risk insurance if it v,as available--or
to assume the risk themselves if it was not).
! This new ideology appears to have started during the 196Us in the
i U.S., developed and spread rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, and
then led to a persistent struggle to improve the Quality of Life (QOL)
in the industrialized natiuns even though it also imp;i:d a bare minimum
. of economic growth during the balance of the century. To many obse;'vers
of that era the ideology had a strong quasi-religious overtone--t_,at
!ed to a kind of "modern-day Zealots, 'j som of them claimed. From
our historical records it was not alwats--or even usuall .... clear how
an improved QOL for society was co be defined or interpreted, as one ,'
group's perceptic., of such an improvement often implied restraining
or lowering another's standard of living. The argument that this ideology
also created disincentives for hard work was brushed asi3e by its adherents,
who were sometimes referred to as the New Classo Work according to
them was to be made desirable, not hard. Consequently any required
hard work should receive extra compensation. The New Class ideology
made it clear that health, safety, ecucation, economic security, a
more equitable distribution of income, and O"_at_r opportunities for
a happy life in a clean environment for all citizens should be the
primary goals of government. Indeed, this ideology was, in principle,
to be extended to help all developing _untries--especially the poorer
ones--gradually to imp,'ove their QOL u:..il their'_ were on a par with
•[7 those of the developed countries.
"" t i'
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Technology was to be kept bo.n useful, by providing for materiel
I needs, and controlled, to keep it from creating any significant new
i risks to health, to the e-vironment, or to the capacity of nature to
provide resources. That technological progress cont;nued to take placei
] under these circumstances was probably due to the fact that unusually
powerful tools already existed. The solid state computer, the laser,
I instruments for automated chemical analyses, automated production
I machihery, and a revolution in the basic sciences and in engineering
i resulting from t" computers and instruments had come into being during
the 1950-1975 quarter and gained such strong momentum that it continued -_
I to develop dsspite the growing ar, ti-technology resistance from the
_i New Class. I'hefull impact o_ this technological revolution was so
vast and co_:p!ex that in those years relatively few scientists fully
appreciated its potential. Thus, the increasing technological developm(nt
in the most _dvanced countries was able to compensat_ for a changingsocial system which grad[_ _ly was to drain (from technolngy) its funds
' and its brains, and to make commerrial applications to _,novative productsJ
and processe: increasingly cumbersome.
i|
._ After 1990 the New Class ideology continued to strengthen in the
'I
i_ OECD nations (including Japan, but less rapidly), a<d even started to
affect tne Soviet Union. However, Third World nations remained relatively
.4 impervious to its temptations. They accepted some of the obvio,=sly I.
,= desirable environmental changes and gave lip-service support to the }
New Class goals where it was to the!r advantage. Within the OECD countrie_ -_ i
the low economic growth rates of the 1980s and 1990s were rationalized
by the New Class as a requirec worthwhile sacrifice to _chie_e thei_
! main purpose---an imprcved QOL over the long term for all nations.
However the U.S.S.R., China, and Brazil were among the relatively ..
successful large (non-OECD) countries that effectively resisted New Class
, concepts and continued to stress economic growth and technological .l
progress--e,.h in its own style, of course. Also, each of these countries
was destined to surpass t'e United States in space development within _
the next 40 years--a direct consequence of these ideologica: d;fferences.
lhe great _oncern about energy shortages within most o_ the developed
_ countries abated somewhat in the 1980s for three rcasons: (l) an economic
slowdown !n the OECD countries and a reasonably successful energy conservation
effort (from 1978 to the yea- 2000 total energ T demand of the developed ..
nations increased on average only 0.5 percent/year); (2) by 1985 OPEC
found itself with an enormous excess production capacity and considerable -_
infighting or elbowing for markets occurred--a "game" wh;ch eroded
their _ohesion as well as their income; (3) very successful exploration ";
for oil and gas occured in several developing countries--cspecial!y .!
_ in Brazil and Mexico--and usua,ly w!th some financial help from the
'_ _ wealthier nations. The reduced demand for petrcleum, and _ts increased -.
production capacity meant that available supplies would be more than [
sufficient to m,_t the world's needs until newer eneray technologies "_
became import=,_t contributors early in the 21st century. The abatement
i
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Ii of the energy crisis was interpreted by the New Class as a victoryfor their ideology while their opponents in the industrialized nations
grumbled about forced conservation measures, inadequately sized autos,
r- and--most of all--persistent economic stagnation, a trend which the
N_ Class favored (_nd pointed to the r_laxed energy situation as evidence
=o vindicate that policy).
!
i U.S. Economy
t Although the GNP in the U.S. increased 50 percent during the quarter
i ce_tury, that represented a growth rate of less than 2 percent and a per-
c. La growth rate that nominally was slightly positive, but which
i cerms of material consumption was slightly negative--but which was
1 also, according to claims from th___.eeNew Class, was more than offset
by an overall improvement in the QOL.
f The U.S. space budget during the last quarter declined, in real {terms, by about one-third to $2.4 billion (1975 dollars). Funding of
science and technology also eroded, especially during the 1990s to about
8F percent of the 1975 level. Innovations became ve'y thre3tening tomany industries as available risk insurance was inadequate or too costly.
Also, where government licensing and/or permits were required, the !
time and effort involved in obtaining them continued to ihcrease, much
to dismay private industry. For example, after 1990 the estimated
the of
time between the in;tiation and completion of a coal-fired electric it
power installation increased to 15 years--compare_ to 3-4 years in
" Brazil, and 8 years in Japan (in which only a decade earlier it hadalso been less than 4 years). As _ result higher unemployment and _.
lower salaries prevailed in most technological areas of the U.S. By
i 19_0 the beginning of a reverse "Brain Drain" was observed--unemployedtechnologists looked for and found opportunities in the growing Third
World countries as stagnation continued in the U.S. -
t
" Even highly successful projects generally did not create_pace
" confidence in similar outcomes for future programs_ especially because
their long term economic benefits could not be "proved" in advance.
For example although the LANDSATS wer_ known to be h_ghly useful doubtabout the value of futur improvements _strained t e expansion of
that effort. The remarkable success of COHSATs became embroiled in
Ii national debate over the value of excess!ve communications--in anyevent they were left within the province of highly-regulated private
ventures. The Advanced Space Shuttle pregram, proposed in 1988_ was
buffeted about for 3 years by arguments about the growing risks from
the impact of spacecraft launches on the upper atmosphere. It waspostponed Indefinitell in 1991.
i The U.S. space program probably would have been an earlier casualty _ ,of the emerging social system had it not_ astonishingly, been spectacularly
successful. Still, it was a rare year that its budget we_= not eroded
, I
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in real _erms, although the continuing inflation often made it appear
i to be constant or increasing.
The space program increasingly _as oriented towards current needs
on earth by deploying satellites to improve communications, monitor
pollutants, predict weather, provide accurate navigation, prevent sea
I and air collisions, find mineral resources, predict earthquakes, assess -"
: agricultural productien, determine water resources, etc. Although .
-_ these tasks generally were performed better than was anticipated, that
i did not keep the space budget from falling. Each success tended to --
become a routine service and was soon forgotten by the non-technical
public. These services, once established, were thought of as "free"--that ""
• is, it did not require money to be spent out of pocket in order to ..
_! get a weather report or a measurement of atmospheric ozone. The value
i! of the satellite-based communications system was buried in the telephonebill, the inflationary changes, and the co plicated and the peculiarly
American system of charges for television services. It was difficult -•
for the public to appreciate the relative cost-effectiveness of the '
space prog.am because of its inherent complexity, its dependence on
t government support, and because expressions of host'lity against the --
risks created by science and teclmology increasingly came into vogue.
| - •
•-i Nevertheless, there were some impressive new successes. The Solar i
=. Sail was shown to be effective as a spacecraft which, in 1993, after
a rendezvous with a new Comet, was sent to observe the planet Mercur_ -.
from a low orbit. A large (2_0-foot diameter) Antenna was constructed
in space in 1997, 1 year after a Modular Space Station was placed in -t iLEO (with 4 people aboard). Roving Landers were successfully landed ..
on the moon (1995) to gather scientific data and one was to be sent
to Mars in the next quarter. A small Space Industr;al R&D facility -. .
with a 20 KW Solar Power Satellite was established in 1998--bu_ the !
Soviets were well ahead of the Americans by then. -_
Particularly disappointing to the space specialists was the refusal 7
of the government to Fund their more ambitious projects such as the .. ' i
Advanced Space Transportation System, a program for colonizing the
moon, or" a life science program for establishing the feasibility of -"
permanent space colonies. An advanced transportation system, of course,
..
would have been tantamount to a long-range commitment to a large and
growing _pace program. That was not consistent with the new ideology. .:
i Although those attitudes discouraged space enthusias_s_ space -=
professionals, and, indeed, most of the scientific and technological
, commbnities, the American public barely noticed it. Of course New "_
I Cla:_ leaders were pleased and claimed that humanity had been protected ._
from potentially great risks. In the late '90s many of the more aggressive
I N_w Class leaders within the OECD nations concluded that the time was
"_ _ ripe to start bringing their ideology to the more successful developing
:1 cou,,tcles as well as the centrally-controlled econom,es--especiaily --
the U,S.S.R, and China.
......- ' -, . ,. -- 7 >C......7.................... ...
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! Chan_es in Brazil
i The most spectacular economic successes during that quarter century
i occurred in some of the developing nations; the outstanding example was' Brazil. A desire for wealth and power which had been lit in Brazil during
the 1960s and 1970s faltered in the early 1980s and then became rekindled
" into a unquenchable national passion that overcame obstacles such as
inflation, worldwide recession, energy shortages, heavy indebtedness,
i and regional illiteracy-- obstacles which were effective barriers to
many other nations. A major key to that success was a stable government,
after 1985, which was strongly oriented to entrepreneurship From the
private sector. As a result the Brazilian GNP rocketed from about
$110 billion in 1975 ro $750 billion at the end of the century. Their
economic success was greatly assisted by the financing available from
.[ the developed nations and by the technologies brought to them by large
iii= supra-national corporations. These corporations found an increasing
symbiotic relationship with the Brazilian passion for growth, after
which the "honeymoon" became a protracted one.
Brazil's educational system acquired a strong science, technology
I _ and business orientation. Because of profitable industrial growth and
i the encouragemen_ of foreign capital investments, but also from the
:t_ rapid exploitation of huge new oil and natural gas reserves, which i
_ I luckily were found during the '80s and '90s, Brazil was able to improve i
"'T_ ! its balance of payments rapidly. The Brazilian universities also developed
into very high quality institutions and soon were enticing the world's '
best brains with high salaries and guarantees of adequate research i
! ! support. The use of English in all technical departments of higher
l education levels soon became customary as foreign scholars, lecturers
, and professors, who were allowed co teach in English or in Portuguese,
• l almost always chose English. As high technology industries received i
very favorable treatment after 1985, foreign investment--especially i
from West Germany_ Japan and the U.S.--continually increased thereafter.
t
More because space development was a symbol of technological progress {
: than For its commercial potential, the Brazilians began a serious space
program in 1990 which grew 10-fold it, I0 years to a $1.2 billion level,
, a level that at century's end was within striking distance of the U.S.
space budget ($1.8 billion). This growth became possible because many
space scientists could be recruited from Europe and the U.S. Later_ while
{ celebrating the turn of the century, Brazil committed its space program
i to at least a 6-fold increase during the next 2S years, a level that--tf
attained--would be roughly equa0 to the year-2000 budget estimated for
the Soviet Union--the acknowledged world leader in space at century's end,
! Awakenin_ in China
J i" Another "sleeper" in the economic growth "race" turned out to be
!
China. Because of its customary policy of self-reliance China's average
8 percent growth rate during the last 15 years of the 20th century was
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i seldom noticed except by professional China-watchers. Although foreion
i trade with China was growing, it hardly compared with that of other
large nations. Consequently, the developments within China tended to
i be overlooked or soon forgotten. By the year 2000 its GNP had reached
I Sl.25 trillion--a very respectable amount and substantially greater, if
less flamboyant, than Brazil's $.75 trillion. Of course, China's per-
capita GNP was only about $1,200. But the population had stabilized and
its expanding infrastructure had been kept reasonably we)l balanced Gver time.I
i A quiet Chinese "passion" resided in the population's traditional --belief that their "cultural superiority" would enable them, in time, to
! succeed wherever they chose to compete. It was clear" to some observers
that they were making excellent progress in technology, economic development,
science, and in space projects. Evaluations of their QOL were more
subjective and depended strongly upon the values and data selected
by the analysts.
Thus, it was not obvious that the Chinese were destined to become
an envied culture in many ways. They had been admired for decades
because of their independence, self-assurance, their conviction of
cultural superiority despite prolonged earlier poverty, and their refusal
to accept (let alone ask for) outside assistance--even during severe
! natural calamities. Thus, their interest in space development, which to
them was a symbol of progress, was only natural. The pace of their space !
program, of course, had to be determined in competition with other demands,
but their attitude was simpTy that China would become the natural leader
there, too--as in all important cultural developments--in the course
of time. The ideology of the New Class had almost no effect upon the
Chinese who interpreted it merely as a temporary manifestation of
struggles within confused inferior cultures, going nowhere.
Particularly noteworthy, however, was the Chinese space program
which first became newsworthy in 1988when a COMSAT was launched into
orbit. After that their progress was rapid. By century's end they
had launched 140 spacecraft (with only 6 failures) and were reliably _
reported to be testing an advanced reusable launch vehicle which was
designed to perform at least on a par with the U.S.S.R.'s best, the
KUPAROV, an automated reusable space "freighter."
China's budget for space projects, though not publicly revealed
at the time, had been increasing by about 10 percent annually in the
1990's. By the year 2000, therefore, it exceeded that of the U.S.
Space development in China was less flamboyant than that in Brazil,
but was more secure as it did not depend upon foreign assistance.
There were at least a few observers who at that time projected the
long term Chinese effort in space to grow almost twice as fast as their
GNP and who thought it might even reach the impressive level of $30
billion/year by 2025. (This forecast, as we will see, turned out to i
be premature.) ,
...... -'-- I-_,_ -'_. -_ "- i
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I_ Progress in Japan
c 1
After 1990 the Jap-qese were judged by some investigators to be
r the most technically co_,.aetent nation of all, especially after making
' | allowances for their late start and a lower GNP/capita (than the U.S.).t However, their earlier goal of achieving parity with the U.S. in
GNP/capita by 1985 was no_ achieved until 1994, and even then it was
more because U.S. growth had slowed to about a 2 percent rate--not
" I
because the Japanese were able to maintain their earlier momentum.
Their economic growth averaged 5 percent in the quarter; that was high
: by world standards but only about half what they had achieved during
the prior quarter century.
Psychologically the Japanese were strongly affected during thisT
] p_riod by the habit of poor-mouthing their natural resource situation
("we are only a crowded small country with insufficient energy or mineral
resources of any kind," etc.). They had come to believe that they
were vulnerable, despite impressive evidence to the contrary--that
they were rich and were getting richer steadily. Feelin 9 insecure,
however, prevented them from making substantial investments in a long I
_ term space program, the economic advantages of which were obscure to
1 their principal decision makers.
: Of course, there were many other relevant factors, not the least
l of which was the inroads made by New Class concepts--especially after
[ the middle '80s when they felt the strong pressures of that ideology from
other OECD nations and from their own intellectuals. In many subtle ways
it was to have an increasing impact on Japanese culture. In particular,without much pressure from the r own population or from their p incipal
trading partners Japan's space program languished. It was to remain
in a relative torpor until the commercial utility of space investmentsbecame obvious--that change was to occur only after 2025.
Space Pro_Iram in Western Europe
From its inception the European Space Agency (ES._),whose principal
i contributors were West Germany, France, the U.K., and Italy, struggledf r vitality. Beset with problems of differ nt languages_ differing
economic needs, and a bewildering array of public perceptions about
its role or utility, it was perhaps remarkable that ESA was successful
| in its Space-lab project with NASA in th.- early 1980s. Despite thist.
success further attempts at a unified European program proved to be
,. too difficult in a period when R&D in both science and technology were
F experiencing declining investments. ESA was abandoned in 1989although
each country maintained some kind of space program thereafter, buteach of these continued to struggle with low funding. Only West Germany's
program kept pace with their GNP, but it was unimpressive by American,
let alone Soviet, standards.
[
[
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Space Progress in the U.S.S.R. ..
+;
Despite the Americans' spectacular e_rly successes in space (the astonishing --
I Apollo lunar landings, the miraculous Viking robots, the eminently
successful Space Shuttle arid Spacelab, as a few examples) the Soviet "'
+ tortoise was to be well ahead of the American hare by century's end. _.
+ That outcome was clearly signaled during the de-_-_e following the Apollo
t program as shc_,;r: in the graph below comparing the U.S. space budget -; Y
! over time witn the Soviet one. +.
I
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Both the Soviet economy and its space program grew slowly but i
steadily during the quarter at about a 2.5 percent rate. As a result "_
by century's end Soviet expenditures in space were estimated to be almost !_ '"
3 times those of the U.S._ and their advances in space science_ space
exploration, and the commercialization potential of space had become ",
impressive to space analysts. Even though some of the New Class ideology
had rubbed into the Soviet way of life, and affected the growth rates
in both their economy and in space more than would have been anticipated
prior to the '80s, the impact was relatively small. The simple fact -;
was that without significant competition from the U.S. the Soviets .
became the Giants in space deveiopment well before the year 2000.
After 1986 European and American space buffs were to be subjected to a i•. sequence of Soviet sp ce "victories" which depressed their morale. By year- "'
I 2000 the Soviet Union had successfully completed the following space projects: . i
i SSTO lO0-ton payload unmanned reusable "freighter" -:
So:ar Electric Powered (SEP) orbital transfer vehicle
Permanent lunar station (6 people) "-;
Lunar observatory and scientific laboratory _i •
Kilometer-sized space antenna
Space industrial facility (with 8 people and 150KW) FI
Space station in LEO |1
Advanced nuclear space "tug" _'
' t)l+
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Soviet-American cooperation in space technology which had worked
reasonably well during the '70s began to slip in the late 1980s as
i the imbalance in the arrangement became clear. By 1990 it had effectivelylapsed except for d sired voluntary disclosu es. A!though some people
imputed military motives to the Soviets, this was later shown to be
secondary. The Soviet Union had simply preferred to maintain a growing
advantage over the Americans. The tortoise its
was finally enjoying
- victory over the hare.
B. 2000-2025
(i Brazil
The Brazilian economy roared into the 21 .... century and became
the envy of the many nations. It averaged an 8 percent growth rate
over the first 10 bringing its GNP to $1.6 trillion. But afteryears,20t0, economic difficulties began to accrue which slowed its growth
considerably. First, their largest oil and gas Fields, which were
i developed late in the previous quarter, had become substantially depleted,and th ir oil income decreased rapidly after 2010. This forced them into
greater borrowing to finance much of their expansion goals--an option
which soon brought severe credit limitations, and affected their economicgrowth over the balance of the quarter. Furthermore, their growing !,
foreign exchange problems after 2010 first stopped and then reversed the
flow of external (and expensive) brain power toward Brazil--unfortunately * i
i before the hoped-for advances in their education system were completed. 'Thus they were unable to produce the indigenous competence needed to
assume the tasks which had been performed by foreign experts.
I Their booming space program which by 2010 had reached a budget
of over $5 billion, "the largest in the free world,"--as the Brazilians
I were not slow to proclaim--_as affected by growing economic stressafter 2010 and, although it continued to increase, the growth after "
2010 averaged only about 3-I/2 percent for the next 15 years, ending i
with a respectable, although not spectacular, $8 billion. From the
beginning that program had a dual purpose_ (l) to help develop Brazil'sscience and technology capability, and then to enhance their economic
development by exploiting space industrialization as well as the anticipated
spinoffs, and (2) to exploit the commercial utility of earth-oriented ,atellites. Later, in 2017, t y pro oted the world's first serious
commercial space tourist enterprise. But the space industrialization
and tourism both ended the quarter much less successful than the Brazilians'
I earlier expectations.
The principal problem in their space industrialization program
f was that its commercial success depended to a large degree upon theirability to export its innovative products. But in their enthusiasm they
had, too naively perhaps, refused to understand the depth of the resistance
!
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In the developed (and now largely post-industrial) world to innovations 1
in technology--especially from abroad. Thus, although a flood of new
end, to them, exciting products and processes emanated from that program,
foreign consumers did not eagerly run to buy these products and services. 1
Slow acceptance and long procedural delays made the commercial aspects
of the program very awkward as the economies of scale needed for efficient
production often required expensive, large-volume space installations.
This resulted in a number of costly abandonments during the quarter, 1
as well as broken dreams.
The space tourist industry was formally started by B_azil in 2017.
Initially the cost for a 3-day LEO tour was about $250,000. Business
was brisk for about five years and then flattened out just as a greatly
expanded capability was being installed. Supporters of the New Class had
condemned such costly "gaudy" expenditures as inconsistent with their -.
indeology--a view which after the first few exciting years increasingly
restricted the available foreign business. However, a careful study _ !
revealed that the most significant factor was was that about 10 percent _
of the space travelers had been significantly affected by the SAS syndrome
associated with the transition to weightlessness, and by the subsequent
stresses from reentry and readjustment. This led to a bad press and
tended to discourage the interest of other potential space tourists. ""
Indeed, the Brazilian authorities had been all too casual in their
attitude towards the physiological aspects of the= new venture. They
had decided to treat it as a strictly commercial venture--a decision ol i
which in effect left the establishment of criteria for space traveler
selection and preparation in private hands. Unfortunat _ y, the franchised I I*
corporation in its early enthusiasm (and perhaps also f_m financial _
pressures) was less than adequately careful in its approach to the
physiological aspects of space _ours. By the end of the quarter the
industry's installed capacity (50,000 tourists/year)was double the _ !
demand for seats. Some enormous losses resulted that were to make
Future investors quite wary of commercial ventures in space.
U.S.S.R.
The Soviets entered the 2lst century as the world's space giant I
I
by virtue of a budget estimated at about $9 billion for the non-military
program. Their space industrialization effort was directed toward
furnishing new products and processes for Soviet industry. Even though 1
they were successful in creating many innovations which were interesting, •
even exciting, they made the mistake (common to new Soviet commercial
ventures) of overestimating the ability of their traditional industries 1I
to respond rapidly. The sluggishness of internal Soviet commerce was _
usually only experienced directly by those who tried to encourage change. IExcept in the production of new scientific or military equipment (and _m
not always then) the resistance of the Soviet system to innovation •
was profound. In a Soviet factory proposed changes generally promised
I
litt]e but trouble to the commissar of production, making him loath
to give up a satisfactory routine for something new--especially when I
• __,, __._- ,.,- ..-_....._..:..... _....
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i failures generally brought great punishmer, t, and successes small rewards.Thus, the Soviet space industrialization effort--like that of the
Brazilians, but for different reasons--encountered a severe marketing
i problem which greatly impeded its potential development.
Because the Soviet science and exploration program, was excellent,
however, they easily maintained their lead in these fields during the
I The Soviet continued to but the
quarter. space budget grow average
rate of growth rarely exceeded the "standard" 2.5 percent. By the
end of _he quarter it was _stimated to be $18 billion, bare]y ahead
of the Chinese who had made significant progress and had the secondlargest effort. A lesser efficiency, however, affected their nominal
budget advantage considerably.
China
[ Economic progress in China remained steady, if not spectacular,
during the quarter century. The Chinese also maintained a well-balanced
growing space effort suited to their own needs. In addition to their i
_" earth-oriented satellite program, (hey concentrated on adapting spinoffs
_ to utilitarian purposes. Interaction with the space programs of other
nations was kept relatively subdued, although their specialists were
- present at every international conference related to space developments.At these gatherings Chinese contributions, while few, acquired a reputation i
for unusually high qual;ty, i i
During this quarter their space budget--keeping pace with their t i
• . GNP--grew at an average of 5 percent annually. By 2025 it exceeded
$17 billion. The effectiveness ef their effort was clear to all space i
[ scientists--some of whom stated that China's program glowed wlth a _
( quiet brilliance that often was not observed because of the minimal _
communication and lack of publicity beyond their borders. But by the t
I end of the quarter a Chinese presence was observed almost everywhere i
! in space where other countries had been successful. The Chinese Space _.
Transportation System was well balanced and efficient. Their array
of space tugs included nuclear propulsion systems as well as ion engin,,s,
' ( solar sails, metallic hydrogen thrusters, and beamed energy systems.
i They had a large lunar base, a 6-man Mars station and were studying
the asteroids with both manned and unmanu_d vehicles. Their contributions
to space astronomy during the quarter had on several occasions startledthe scientific world with new findings (for example, the first reliablett
description of the d=stributien of black holes in the galaxy by type_
size, and density).
(
,_ JAPAN i
[. During this quarter Japan remained the richest country in terms of
GNP/capita. It had gradually changed into a consumer-oriented society--and
with growing elegance. As the lack of a widespread international c_ercial
_ _
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interest in space industrialization (except COMSATs and other ea-th-oriented
satellites) was apparent, the Japanese were content to participate in
the scientific and exploratory aspects of space in cooperation with the
Americans, the Brazilians and others. Also they preferred to maintain
their relative economic position rather than to attempt to further
out-distance other nations. They contributed a rather large fraction
of the space tourists who patronized the Brazilian system and appeared --
to be less disturbed than others by problems associated with weightlessness.
The New Class ideology, however, increasingly affected the Japanese _.
culture. Thus, demands for sharing more of their wealth with the poorest
nations were strong, both from within their culture and from outside. -'
These internal ideological conflicts combined with some growing altruistic
motivations to reduce their economic growth rate to 3 percent by the
end of the quarter (averaging 4 percent). Still their per capita GNP
reached an impressive $30,000.
U,S,
The U.S. had been in a deliberate prolonged economic recession
since 1989 that had been justified as the price of an improved QOL.
But by 2015 the QOL concept was not much clearer than it had been in
1976. The social confl icts between the productive and unproductive
segments of U.S. society remained severe. The U.S. had lost its position .:
as world leader in most innovative areas of international importance
as well as much of its earlier competence in orgaaizing and managing - ,
industry and in applying innovations. Its scientific contingent was
competent--but relatively small and isolated--an_ tending to emphasize
theory more than experiment because of meager funding. During the
2015-2025 decade it also became evident that the New Class was becoming
an "old class" and that its ideological grip was fading. As the quarter
ended it was not clear what new direction(s) the country would take
but there was a sense of imminent c,L._nge. "" _. "I
The federal space program by 2025 had dwindled to the point where
it was maintained at a mere $1 billion annually, with somewhat more ..
that that (about $2 billion) being invested by private industry which
had taken over most of the commercial earth-oriented ventures_ COMSATs_ ""
I LANDSATs, .¢,EASATs,etc., and the small Sl program which was developing ..
only very slow!y as an advanced transportation system (mostly constructed
by the Brazilians) was just being phased in through an international .:
i joint venture basis (involving Brazil, West Germany, Japan, Franceand the U.S., as well as private industries from each country). --
l
. °
!
Europe ..
New Class ideology continued to pre ail in Europe. The costs of -.
providing clean energy, achieving alJd maintaining adequate environmental
purity, and providing welfare assistance in and out of the EEC had
severely drained their resources--especially as their interest in new ;1
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! Ii technologies had weakened as well. W. Germany had a stronger interest'" in space development than the other European countries but fo_., _
: difficult to maintain, for political reasons, even though it ' _ r:,'
F large. Eco=_omic growth in Europe averaged about 2 percent :ing tK
1 quarter; about half of that was donated to foreign aid. Fortunately
• for Europe and the U.S. the Soviet Union did not develop its military
'_ I appetite during that period.
C. 2025-2076
I China
Strangely, perhaps, the quiet but pervasive Chinese confidence
- !
I in their ";nherently superior" culture may have been the most important
factor which led to their preeminence in science and technology--and
:; ; in space development, in particular--during the last _0 years. In
: ( retrospect, it appears that the Chinese have been more egalitarian, in
! a national context, than most of the countries which adopted the New
C]ass ideology. Indeed, in many countries it often was accepted only
: _ in a casual or routine manner, like that of a "Sunday morning Christian."
z
Early in this century, however, the Chinese had learned to couple
'_ , their egalitarian economic distribution system with a productive one
_ich emphasized excellence. They had, in principal, always included
environmental protection as part of their social system--even we1;
before the U.S., for example, passed its first National Environmental
! Policy Act {1969). The need for an appropriate balance between clean-I
'. liness, in the larger sense, and production was more ingrained in the
Chinese than in the other countries and consequently made it easier
to resolve conflicts between economic production and environmental
protection as they arose.
Economic growth, per se, was not the overriding motive in China
as it once had been in most of the "free world" countries. Rather they
chose to emphasize, unheralded, their strong admiration for wisdom,
competence, and excellence in all forms. Wealth was a great potential
( aid to the achievement of progress in this context but wealth, in itself,
was not admired as a measure of success. Moreover, their political system
(which made a gradual transition from communism in the 2_th century to
a full democracy by the year 2040) discouraged the accumulation of individual
" i w_alth, thereby effectively removing it as a primary personal goal. But
general increasing wealth for the country--also in reasonable proportion
l I I for the smaller regions, and for l_al communities or industries--became
expected mo_e than desired. Of course, the f.unding of specific projects
I - was always a struggle, and in retrospect the results almost always
were suhoptimal. Still, the sustained common goal was to promote the
greatnes_ of the Chinese culture through progress in ever_ importantattainable way: arts, science, technology, education, health, sports, etc.
Although the ,easons even now may not be completely clear theireconomic system cc"=clnued to function unusually well. The Chinese
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GNP grew steadily after 2025--roughly at about 6 percent annually in
real terms--as best that could be measured. By the year 2050, after
about 65 years of continuous and sometimes rapid growth, they were
rlch in a world sense, having passed all nations, except Japan, in
GNP/capita. But with a population of 950 million people their GNP
was almost $20 trillion in that year.
An unanticipated surprise, however, was thei, huge space budget
,e
which, increasing at an average rate of 9 percent from 2025, reached
$150 billion in 2050. By then the C_;nese had become the outstanding ..
world leaders, not only in space technology but in most branches of
science and technology. Morec,,er, it is now clear that after 2050
it was unlikely that any other country would or could surpass them
in less than a few decades. Their wealth, population, GNP, scientific
establishment, technological competence, and most of all, momentum
made effective national competition unlikely for the foreseeable future.
= Competition, however, was no longer a key issue to them. By mid-
century the Chinese culture had evolved to the point where it was quite
secure, where its exact national boundaries were no longer a major
issue. Boundaries became accepted as the result of an historical set
of accidents rather than the contentious 20th century view _hich made
r
a cause celebre _ver each debatable acre. After 2025 their culture
began to develop a relatively intimate exchange with the rest of the ,!
world. Results were sometimes slow in coming, but they were predict
China had bec_e a successful role model for both the developing and , i
the developed countries. Naturally, there were attempts to follow t _ ,
model as best it could be perceived and understood, but, it was diffi it.
. .*
Societies have rarely changed rapidly in predictable ways. Attempted
societal change is generally resisted and usually misunderstood by most .
citizens. However, the Chinese model did exist, and the communication
systems available almost everywhere in the world made the detailed "i
operation of this model easily accessible, if not always easy to comprehend.
t
Several important international developments had already occurred or i.
had begun to occur by 2025. First, it had become clearly understood, world-
wide, that widespread poverty in any regime was a sign of deep social sickness
within tha_ society. Moreover, there was always an escape available, in
principle. The wealthy countries of the world--especially China acd ""
Japan--were ready to assist any country or culture in which the desire
-.
to eliminate poverty was perceived to be genuine. This attitude had
for several decade, existed on a smaller scale but by the year 2050 ..
it had become a pervasive standing commitment to any society in which
elimination of poverty could reasonably be achieved without military -"
intervention.
Indeed, m!litary solutions to perceived or traditional international T_i _s had become less and less important over the first half of thi_
century. After 2050 they essentially disappeared. There were several _t
principal reasons. First_ Japan's remarkable early success had clearly
_J
LI
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i demonstrated that land area constituted an increasingly smaller fractionof any nation's real wealth, and therefore was relatively unimportent
for economic prosperity. Second, and perhaps more significant, was a
- medical capabiiity, fully developed shortly after the ,tear 2020, to preventany cn_Id from being born with any serious genetic defects--including
any which could seriously impair mental or emotional functions. Although
F application of the technology was only slowly accepted for a decade
' or soy by 2050 it was rare for =_,y child to be born with any such handicap.
1_ Thus_ the concept of a clean e,,=ronment had been ex_ended to include
genetic "cleanliness" and it helped to stabilize world society.
I Another reason for rapid decline in attempted military solutions
was a fading interest in such approaches among the leading great powers:
China_ Brazil_ the U.S.S.R., Japan, the U.S.A._ West Germany and Mexico.i had even startled the political world in the year 2028 by renouncing
any formal claims to Taiwan--and at a time w,len the Island could probably
have been retaken readily. The surprising result since then has been
i a rapid gravitation of the Taiwanese toward China and a great amount
of reunification sentiment in Taiwan--a possi5 ty that China was
no longer eager for, primarily because of the cultural disparitie _
I which had arisen out of the lorg separation.
Thus, in 2050 the stage was set for cultural changes in the world
I towards the Chinese model--which itself was evolving. The next 25years was to witness the world's most dramatic _volutionary periods_
one which led to our current society. Th_ notion inherent within former
egocentric cultures, that a democratic society should be oriented to
I maximize an individual's QOL and his personal goals wherever they may 'lead, was eventually found to be inadequate because of =ts inherent
tendency towards internal 6isruption, fragmentation, or even anarchy.
A basic conflict arises from its implicit encouragement of freeloaders,
who over time may approach or become a majority, and through their
political influence which (in a democratic political system) places
an unacceptable burden upon the rest of the society. ._
Some of the countries which had been dominated by New Class ideology
began to emerge from its influence well before mid-century. During the
decade of the 2040s the trend accelerated rapidly. Now the New Class
phenomeon is only history; it has been replaced by the theme of the U.S.
Tricentennial celebration: Rap.id. Pro_ress, through Knowledge and Wisdom.
The total world investment in space development this year will
be about $1.2 trillion--S500 billion from China's space budget, $300
billion from reinvested income from space production (2/3 Chinese),
I and $400 billion from private investmer,t and the budgets of other countries
• of the world. Perhaps what is most important about c_rrent world society
is the recent sense of harmony In all science and technology programs
Ii indeed in the world's interest in knowledge, in cooperation, and inestablishing desirable goals for mankind. The successful Chinese space
colonies at L-4 and L-5 the multi-national ones on the moon, and the •
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!recent large international scientific lanoratory on Mars, coupled with
the impressive, rapidly growing space incustries, have given the world
a new visior about its potential in the future. This change has also
been greatly aided by the Chinese space travel and tourism program.
That program was _tarted in 2030, shortly after the earlier Brazilian
venture became stagnant. About h If of the Chinese tourists during
the early years were selected from the li_ of qualified Chinese applicants
_t by a lottery. Since that time the industry has grown rapidly and a ,
modified lottery system is still being used. After 2040 citizens from --
all countries were invited to use the Chinese space transportation
system, which has remained the world's largest by fa,'. The growth
' of that system is shown in he table below.
"i
:i Table 14
CHINESE SPACE TRAVEL DATA
TOURISTS (THOUSANDS)
.'_
._ DATE CHINESE FOREIGN TOTAL
: 2040 20 I 21 i
.4
:! 2050 250 50 300 .) ;
._, 2060 3,0_] l,S00 4,500 -:
2075 20,000 12,000 32,000
7
Not only have the nu;_rs o_ tourists grown rapidly but the duration
! and nature of the available tours have changed. A typical tour today _ , i
lasts 30 days, compared to 7 in 2040, and the itinerary generally includes ., i
a week on the moon and a visit to at least one of the space indus_rial
, installations--in addition to accomodations in the special LEO facilities --
i for tourists (hotels, hospitals, museums)--and to a colony at L-4 or
L-5. However, the cost for a 30-day tour is less than that for a 7-day ""
I LEO tour in 2040. .,
i BP_Z I L
Early in thi._ century the course of nistory appeared to have given fl
'_ the Brazilians a unique opportunity to become the world's model for
successful development. However, the model which shone brilliantly for
i about 40 years was not soundly enough based to maintain its mc.nentum. "_ "' Of course, the Brazilians did extraordinarily well during that period _ .i
_ and became one _f the world's most advanced countries in several sense_,
perhaps the most advanced for a short while. One of their problems,
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I their large need for income from natural resources, had not ended whentheir more profitable resources were near exhaustion. That forceJ them
once again into heavy borrowing in an attempt to maintain economic growth.
i Second]yp they had became locked into international economic ventures
, that drained their resources. As a result their economy became stagnant,
or at best growing weakly; that in turn created various impediments to
their growth. Finally, the 40 years between 1975 and 2015, that gave
them an opportunity to become a world leader in economic and technological
strength 9 were simply insufficient for the required social changes
to occur. For that they woutd have needed at least another 25-45 years
of rapid growth in order to develop their infrastructure sufficiently
and to create appropriate long-term traditions.
f The Brazilian culture of the 20th century was basically orientedtoward conomic growth and employed technolog and c pital as its principal
means of achieving that goal. Their initial successful gamble to develop
economicallyto e_Dloit theiron borrowednatural funds, their subsequent successful efforts !.
resources for additional capital, and their
bold program to import both the technology and the technologists gave
them a tremendous opportunity, but as we now know it was insufficient
as a self-sustainin_ arrangement. After their principal export@ble
i resources were largely used up and international borrowing had reached
practical limits they discovered that their conversion to a modern
! industrial :_ciety was still incomplete. Then they had to endure a
long period of adjustment from about 2015 to 2050, during which their j
venture into space travel floundered and their economic development |
programs in space as well as on earth became relatively flat. |*
Their excellent early space effort, which reached the $6 billion
level in 2010 and far exceeded the American budget, at that time constituted
[ the principav hope for space develo_;.ent among the non-communist countries. | ,
I However, this budget grew only to abo, t $9 billion during the next 15 f
years. These sums were s,vFficient for a variety of developments including
I an advanced Space lransportation System, an early Space Industrial t_"
effort and a very respectable science and exploration program which
included a lunar colony_ an advanced modular space station in LEO,
and a manned one in geosynchronous orbit.(
Moweve_, the growth of their space program after 2010 was primarily :
dependent upon the successful commercialization of space travel and !
i tourism. They failed, in part because the tourist program was not ,
successful, as discussed earlier, and because _he space industrialization
program required the support of a vigorous and growing world interest
. in new technology. Unfortunately for Brazil during those years most
of the developed world remained in an ideological torpor which resisted _
t_ innovations in technology and thus hampered the commercial space effort.
Therefore, it was not until the middle '30s '._en the Chinese modelbegan to affect other nations significantly, including Brazil, and
Q x'
I
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opportunities For growth again appeared, that the situation again began ._
• to change. By 2050 the Brazilian economy once again was booming; their
space budget reached $25 billion and was growing rapidly. During the -_
tnost recent quarter it averaged a 5 percent growth and reached $80 .I
billion only las * year. Also, neither Brazil's economy nor space program
is now dependent on outside assistance, in the sense that it was at the
turn of the century. Of course, _he w_rtd is a,so much more cooperative -i
now and national commitments to the world space program appear likely -,
soon to become "standardized" as the program becomes more international
or_ as some expect, supranational. -_i
.i
U.S. -I
i
• As this year's Tricentennial celebrat:or, has begun I am at once
pleased at the rec_nt rapid progress and .... renewed commitment to • ,
-; space development by my country. Looking nezk i am still surprised -_
_,i at the astonishing pause in activity th3t the U_S. and many other countries -,_
:. experienced for about 65 years, 1975-204G ?_rhaps something valuable
: was gained through this experience--perhap:_ i_ h_d to happen to prevent "" '
i a disastrous outcome. That is an unknowabi_ and wishful statement i
.#
at present, but perhaps it can be analyzed in coming decades. We have
learned a great deal about societal trends, social forces, and human _
:" _ behaviour during the last century, and perhaps we wil I be able to solve _"_ ' i
those harder problems before long. _hile Americans are grateful to !
the Chinese for having helped to pull our nation out of a profound -_
slump, it is also clear that it would have occurred eventually by some !
other means. The Chinese themselves were the f_rst to make that point .t (
clear. But sooner is better than later. To have "'_st" another 50 ?
years in the "doldrums" would have been unfortunate )r perhaps billions _ ,:
of people.
]
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-- PART I1: THE TRIUMPH OF THE GARDEN* (2025-2075)
(A PESSIMISTIC SPACE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO)
From the viewpoint of the world's space buffs the first quarter
of the 21st century was a relative "disaster." Except for the flashy
effort in Brazil which was somewhat in disarray at the end of the quarter
._ and the period of steady progress in China, there was little for them
to celebrate in the rest of the world. Indeed, most of the world seemed
to be inward rather than outward bound. Science, technology and industry
were primarily being harnessed to fulfill perceiw_d material and environmental
needs and to make the world a very safe placer one in which people could
devote themselves to traditional artistic, cultural, social, and political
pursuits with a minimum risk to health or safety.
The potential rewards of space development and space travel had
been debated and found wanting--indeed had been judged to be too costly
and risky, especially where it involved manned programs. Moreover
philosophical and religious polemics app--eared in the communications
media more and more often which asserted that man's attempt to scatter
"_ his seed _ -ver further into space was an incipient new form of pollution,
if not desecration, of the purity and beauty of the universe. Concerns
about orbiting weapons in space, threats of pollution or damage to
F the upper atmosphere, the potential for space warfare, and the inevitable
__. collisions which would increase space debris and occasional space accidents !
were all cited as evidence of the evil potential of unfettered development
attempting to slip out from the controls of reason which had only recently _
[ been established on earth. *
The unfortunate experiences of the Brazilian space travel and
tourism venture furnished extra weight to the arguments against expanding ;space de lopment. Also the tendency of the human body to adapt to new
environments had created stresses among some tourists that resulted in
- unpleasant, if temporary, physical consequences with symptoms of vertigo, .dizziness, palpitations, weakness, headaches, and high blood pressure. "
Some of these symptoms were believed to be amplified by accompanying
anxieties--especially when real or fictional stories about prior space-
related health disturbances were discussed or recalled. Naturally,the worst of these stories received the most publicity and distorted
the public's ability to make accurate judgements about the risks involved.
Brazil
- The bankruptcy of the first Brazilian space tourism venture
had
a profound effect upon other commercial aspects of their space program.
This variation of the previous scenario begi,,s in .he year 2025.
Its first 50 years are identical with the prior scenario beginning
[_ on 133.P
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l Capital became scarce as the risks were believed to be high and the .i
' government became unwilling to subsidize such ventures. Indeed, because
of the losses in space industrialization ventures and a struggling _:
economy which had racked up huge debts, the Brazilian space program ]
was severely slashed during the 2025-2035 decade and it eroded further -'
after that. By 2050 its funding had fallen to a $2-billion level and
it had essentially become an "orphan" agency in the government--one -i
° of low prestige, stagnating in a no-growth maintenance mode. ._
!
Brazil's troubles in space were only a small part of deeper economic -_ ,
i difficulties that had begun before 2020. The need for new capital '.
after that year became more pressing as locally available funds were
. drying up. Brazil's abiiity to entice foreign technical experts had _.
_ _ ended and the previous in-flow started to reverse. Foreign scientists
_ ! and technologists attached to space projects were among the first to be - ;
phased out--and the trend was soon quite clear. All foreign technological
-_I personnel whose economic security in Brazil was threatened faced a -2 !
: very uncertain future since they generally had to return to home countries .i
"- in which their kind of expertise was already in surplus. Of course_ :
: there was no real threat of poverLy or disgrace--the developed societies --
-" were quite beyond that--but for most of the returning experts their
careers, status, professional identities, and morale were to require
._ a substantial period of adjustment.
; I
A flamboyant confidence that formerly characterized the giant .. i
country, which for decades had been the envy of the developing world,
_ disappeared during the '30s. Still the Brazilian people had attained a .Flj ,
_ relatively high standard of living. The GNP/capita was $11_000 in 2025 [} i
and has during the last 50 years slowly increased to about $18,000. Their !
ck of economic dynamism has been replaced by a greater concern for _
equity, justice, social welfare, and other requirements for a high QOL Lj i!which had be n relatively neglected during the heady growth stage. Thus
Brazil is now considered be a mature post-industrial society without
the restless driving ambitions that characterized its "adolescence _' during ._
.t
and shortly after the 20th century. _i
:,
"i I
.1
During the first quarter of this century the Chinese economic growth
rate had started at 6 percent but then slowed to 4 percent (averaging 5
percent). In 2025 their GNP had reached a respectable $5.4 trillion_ or
about $5,000/capita. As they approached this level despite the government
, planners' efforts to make a harmonious transition into a modern superindustriai
: society--which earlier had appeared to be feasible--the changes in
! Chin=se society had become so rapid and so complex that their struggle
| ro avoid the pains of successful growth became increasingly frantic.
t Their need for capital was immense but they remained aloof from borrowing.
Their determination to avoid indebtedness, while admirable, had become
_' imp, actical. They h_d used up their inexpensive indigenous energy
sources and needed to invest about $5-trillion just to phase into the
B! 0
_ ,pl_-_/_,,-. -_ -. .,. ,
1985022650-115
1'i
I[
inexhaustible the coming decades. Moreover,long-term
sources over
they avoided buying technology developed abroad and, as usual, insisted
on developing their own. This fierce independence was a luxury which
I was to increase their troubles. Perhaps most important, however, were• the emerging QOL issues.
r During the preceding quarter the restlessness of the younger Chinese
i had started to have an increasing influence on their society. Improving
1 communication systems had brought them into indirect but relatively
intimate contact with the world's many diverse cultures and the younger
; [ people were discovering and expressing a need for more direct interaction.
i _ They began to resent the feeling of being constrained within their own
relatively severe culture--one bent upon national progress outstanding
i f excellence in performance and cultural greatness, all of which implied( a life of dedicated hard work toward conceptual goals that after the
early '30s nc longer satisfied most of the younger gene,'ation. The
- dissidents' view of the external cultures and especially of the New Class
i l ideology--which to them implied a much improved QOL now, rather than a
" continued struggle toward hypothetical future gratific--ation--was simply
that it was vastly preferable to their own constrained and difficult rountines.
i _ The youth "rebellion" received increasing support from many adultswho had also become somewhat unsatisfied with their life styles. Tele-
"_ i vision, or even holovision, "travel" generally was not considered an
adequate substitute for reality experiences. Listening to music or i
i watching dramas was a poor substitute for performing in these arts. ,
}
- Or more generally the concept of finding and doin_ _our own thing,rather than fitting into the nation's plan, rapidly became an appealing i
• lure, once the new youth subculture became influential.
( Naturally the entrenched authorities r sisted, but insufficiently;
_ they tended strongly to believe the traditional notion that "it can't
happen here" or that the perceived trend would soon reverse itself--while !,. _( they watched it grow and become dominant. The main part of the struggle,
! _ during the period 2030-2050, was generally non-violent; but the outcome i
was clear before mid-century. The New Class ideology had effectively
penetrated the culture, without direct proselytizing, and over the
( 20-30 year period had won the political battle. With the "fall" of :
I, China into the appeal of the foreign cultures there was no longer a
nation which could champion the more difficult route emphasizing wisdom
i and excellence in every important endeavor. Evidently economic success ,whic_ l d to a post-industrial soci ty sooner or later was destined
- to yield to the temptations of a mode of life with more personal short-
term fulfillment. At least this outcome had occurred in nearly everyeconomically successful country in the world. The Chinese culture I
had been the last real hope for providing to an otherwise stagnant i
world a dynamic technological and economic model with a far reaching i
outward-bound vision of t_uman destiny. iI '
U .
IP|J,
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During this last quarter (2050-2075) China's economic growth was
almost nil after having averaged 2 percent during the previous one.
Their recent R&D budgets for science and technology, including space
development, have been shrinking. However, at $10,000 por-capita GNP
the population is free of poverty, their health is good, and they devote
themselves to work-play or play-work much as in the Western world.
Their political wrangling, of course, has been furious as it is almost
everywhere, as the government remains under pressure from innumerable
factions struggling to improve the elusive QOL for the citizens.
Chinese technologists and scientists have lost their former elevated
status but still keep the productive part of society going by developing
or maintaining the automated systems upon which the country's material f
well-being depends. Compared to the conditions of a century ago it
appears to be a very good life for most of the people. For those who
remember and long for a world of continuing progress, wisdom, and out-
standing performance in all fields of endeavor--and, as one of its
principal manifestations, for the ascendance of th_ Chinese people ..
into the farflung reaches of space--for them the current world is a
shallow one spinning s!owly, endlessly, round and round but with little
hope of making their great dreams come true.
The Perpetual Garden i
So many forecasts of the future had been made in the late 2Oth
century that almost any outcome would have had at least one prophet. -! '
As a post-industrial society develops, the tendency of most people t
to lose interest in advancing technology and economic growth "-d long
been noticed and frequently discussed. Indeed, it had become one of ':
the primary 20th century images of the future--probably because it
had already started to happen in the wealthier nations. Thus, a major
surprise-free prediction of that time--reflected in the wealthier nations
by New Class ideology--became a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. _ ""
But it became even more than that--in the sense that the attraction -'t. i
of the concept also spread to the other countries of the world, once !
they had developed their economies sufficiently. "
Whether or not the actual outcome was inevitable, advanced technology
has been used to promote it, Every major accident which occurred during .,
the last quarter of the 20th century and subsequently, and that could
help promote the spread of New Class ideology, employed modern advanced "_
communications to bring the details to the attention of the public.
Over the course of the next fifty years some special horrors occurred
that helped greatly in fostering the influence of this ideology. For -.
example, any trouble with nuclear power plants became instant headline
news after 1970. When the first really majcr accident occurred in ":
1991 in a "runaway" reactor near Los Angeles that enveloped a substantial ._
port!on of that huge city with a radioactive cloud, the ensuing panic
as people struggled to rush out of the city only ensnarled the flow of _! :traffic, adding automotive exhausts to the troubled city. Unfortunately _
] 985022650-] ] 7
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I" the accidental release of radioactivity was also coupled with an atmospherictemperature inversion and other meteorological conditions which prevented
an early dissipation of the radioactive cloud. In retrospect the radio-
I activity was much less of a threat than the panic--but this could notbe communicated to the residents in time. As a result a million people
were stranded far from their homes in huge traffic jams and, because
of shifting winds, often had driven into, rather than away from, the
I areas of greatest The subsequent public fury stayed at anexposure.intense level for weeks while the grim details were continually flashed
to the world by satellite television, in color.t
i The following year a liquified natural gas tanker ran aground
off Cape Cod; the subsequent explosion and fires caused 500 deaths,
,- 15,000 serious injuries and more than $60 million in property losses.
t This was followed in "rapid" order, in 1995, first, by the explosion
of a chlorine plant in Yokohama, and then a tragedy in space when,
after the first placement of a telescope on the moon, the returning
- spacecraft with three astronauts exploded, a few seconds after launch,killing the occupants. This occurred on the far side of the moon;
however, the tragedy was brought into full view by television pictures
_ relayed from the Lunar Orbiter.
The "small" nuclear war of 1997 between P_kistan and India involved
- "only" three kiloton-size weapons--but 150,000 deaths and a millionsevere injuries resulted. The prior war between North and South Korea, i
in 1993, was non-nuclear but lenger and almost as grisly, as civilians i
bore the brunt of the casualities because of indiscriminate attacks on i
--
population and industry. At that time advanced space satellites photographed
and transmitted these grim events around the world. "Technology" was _ !
blamed by the New Class for making possible each major tragedy.
C
The list goes on at great length. The essence of a 50-year sequence
of tragedies is now preserved in the famous 46-hour video program entitled
i Lest We Forget. This program is a mandatory part of the present education Ii of every chi!: in the post-industrial nations.{ +.
+
There are some "radical" intellectuals who claim that t!.. emphasis
• ( on tragic aspects of technology distorts the "true" picture--meaning that
( the actual and potential benefits are improperly weighed. This argument
has not gathered many adherents--except among dedicated technologists-
- -and tends to become weaker over time. The people prefer their livesto be relatively free of the risks of wars, radioactive contamination,
explosions in mines and factories, cancerous chemicals, and threa_s
to the fragile envelope of air that must protect us daily--to namer-
| but a few of the many dangers from indiscriminate technology, and the
lust for ever-increasing personal wealth.
The tendency in the U.S. today, indeed in most of the world, isto resist any potentially dangerous new t chnology--or t impact of
,1
the uncontrolled "Machine, as the technologica! subculture is popularly
, .............
i
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! referred to. In the most important sense this is the democratic process.
By a vast majority vote the Machine is to be maintained and carefully
nurtured, but it must be kept relatively small in numbers and subservient
tO the desires of society. For the past 50 years at least, the under-
standing of science and technology, the basis for the Machine, has
required fewer and Fewer people, although this is not a trend towards
zero. Over these years the technological sectors steadily lost status
(that is, political influence) as their active population shrank.
Although the ownership and control of industry and R&D establishments
are largely distributed among the population or within the government,
the knowledge required to maintain or improve technology is now concen-
trated in the small Machine subculture.
Some of our sociologists are concerned about this development
since a number of ominous scenarios about the future role of tne Machine
are thought to be possible, if unlikely. For example, suppose for
society's stability the number of people operating the Machine was
required to exceed a certain substantial minimum--that is, to prevent
the possibility of a relatively sudden collapse of the production and I
distribution systems. How ca,, it be assured that this critical point -
is not reached_-especially since social power and prestige are generally i
associated with the other professions such as Law, Politics, Finance,
Publicity. Artistic Performance, Sports, and Management? That is, i
the argument goes, the QOL in society more and more has become dependent i
on the Machine while, in a social sense, society increasingly disdains ,_ ,
or ignores its technological professionals.
The U,S. space program is now dependent upon a mere lO,OOO '
individuals who alone have the technical training to keep it functioning.
Tours in space have recently become relatively popular again and a •
slow growth trend in this activity probably will continue as long as
the Machine personnel can maintain it adequately. After formal schooling
and apprenticeship, each of these individuals will be required, over
time, to complete at least 10 years of additional study and training
to remain qualified professionals. During this period they will be ..
.' expected to help maintain society's "Garden," without, in a _piritual
sense, being a part of it. Our sociologists warn us to keep a careful -"
watch to ensure that this separatic of society into two subcultures
_a
remains sufficiently satisfying to both parts.
A similar situation, of course, exists in all post-industrial
nations, and appears to be relatively stable everywhere. Although -"
some sociologists continue to worry about it, most other people are
too busy to be much concerned. Indeed, the very long-term outcome "_
may be beyond analysis in any reasonable sense. The general prevailing L_
attitude is that the technologists are content with their robots, lasers,
computers, and rockets, and there is no reason why this should change. °i
However, the division between the technological and non-technological ""
cultures has grown very sharply during this century. It is almost
"I
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,; , as if two alien cultures have managed to live under the same government
i while one .f them shrinks slowly over time yet becomes increasingly
vital to the other. The majority is not, at least in principle, vital
| , to the minority- except in the sense that they hold the current political
I i and financial controls.
Now that China, Brazil, and many of the other Former "Third World"
f nations have become post-industrial, the remaining fourth of the world's
i _ population--principally in South Asia and mid-Africa--that are still
in the earlier stages of industrialization are being helped in their
f upward struggle so they too may become post-industrialized. Actually
I this process appears to be proceeding steadily and estimates indicate
that in the latter part of the next century that outcome may be quite
.. general the world over.
_ Growth in economic output has been very slow recently, when it
occurs at all. Energy and material consumption in the "Garden" countries
Fi has been almost flat for the last two decadcs. The continuing developmentof automation in industry is about balanced by the growth in government
and private services. To some extent the computation of real GNP is
(- somewhat of an art form, as technical changes accumulated over time
(. make it hard to make meaningful comparisons with GNPs of prior decades;
at least many leading economists have be_n making this argument for
-- a long time. However, the important measure to most people in society
I is their quality of life. Of course this has to be partially subjective,
" but the general consensus is that it is gradually improving, i
{- Some of the technologists operating the Machine--the space develop-
L ment enthusiasts in the U.S., for example--have expressed frustration at
what they believe is an excessive constraint on funds for projccts they
. ( would prefer. However, society can ill afford to ';lose" many of these
t highly trained people to the pursuit of expensive projects _t, ich may have
little social benefit, and possibly some important disuti!ities--especially
iI as each technologist usually has a substantial area of responsibility t,_at iF must be maintained for the benefit of society in general. The restlessness "
"I _ or frustration among the technologists has been chronic for some time
I but has not measurably worsened, according to government studies, and
" ( therefore is not expected to pose a substantial threat to society's
stability. Thus, our society, or our Garden, to use the popular term,
appears to have considerable survival potential for the long-term future.
I The people are busy, generally content with the present arrangementand do not wish to risk their QOL by supporting new developmental activities| which have even a small potential for disruption. Why should they?
This Garden is theirs. They expect it to last for a very long time-
_ -and to be enjoyed by their children's children's children's...children.
]985022650-]20
CHAPTER V
It
" A MODERATE SPACE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO
i', ill A. 1985-2010 PART I: A REVIEW OF SPACE HISTORY FROM 1985Social Attitudes Toward Growth
Almost every adult has experienced the feeling that social changes
occur very slowly. It happens more often to those who anticipate a
i particular change and are waiting for it to occur. Thus, during most
I
[-:_ of the great depression of the 1930s it may have seemed that prosperity_ would never come again. The energy crisis of the 1970sand early '80s '_
seemed like it might be unending, etc. But the sluggish appearance of
change often is an illusion. Since the industrial re_olution began over
I 300 few from industrialized countries have
years ago people experienced
even a 20 year period without profound social changes occurring. Moreover
the pace of such changes appear to have speeded up during the 100 years t
since the U.S. Bicentennial.
In this sense, shortly after 1974 the developed countries found
i themselves in the grip of an (a) economic recession, (b) a constantpressure toward inflation, (c) a conflict between rising pressure groups i
which believed in limiting economic growth and traditional growth-oriented i
citizens_ and (d) an ongoing ideological conflict between centrally-F
l controlled and market-controlled economies. Although in subsequent idecades the world was to change radically, some of the above features were
to be surprisingly persistent and would lead to rather agonized or
I agonizing cultures. Consequently, so much effort was to be spent tryingto resolve conflicts but with little success--although new areas of
conflict had little difficulty in arising--that a sense of becoming
f trapped in a web of one's own making began to spread and for several
[ decades had a depressing effect upon public morale in most of the ,
advanced countries, i
I Despite these socio-political difficulties their economic growthdid continue at roughly the 3 percent historical rate during the last
quarter of the 20th century. This was probably due in large measure to
the ongoing "explosion" in science and technology, in which a growing
technical effectiveness was occurring even while public attitudes reflected
considerable neo-Malthusian, or New Class, orientation about future
supplies, and while R&D budgets usually were under perennial stresses.
I The "explosion" could continue in such
circumstances primarily of the
• expansion of private R&D investments and because the "electronic revolution"
permitted scientists and technologists te do more with less money; those
adjustments more than compensated for the stiffening opposition to
publicly-funded R&D in science and te hnology.
° i +I"_:2CI:]}_NCIV,{;I; :;L.'. ',_ _"?_'i !':_."; T_1
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The U.S. space program was a case in point. Although the U.S. space
budget increased in real terms after 1983 the average increase, only
! slightly more than the GNP growth, generally was not satisfactory from
' NASA's point of view, and frequently was a source of bitterness to space
i enthusiasts who longed to see favorite projects funded. Nevertheless, -,
i in reviewing space developments over the quarter century the U.S. program
; achieved some remarkable results (see Table 7). "!
i
, _j
During this 2S-year period it became clear that the world population
:i would soon stabilize and probably would not exceed I0 billion. The .:
most useful technological assist to this expected outcome was a simple
procedure for reversible sterilization that could be applied to either •
"_ sex, and which for women even became insurable at $10 per year, with a
$100,000 payout for any resulting oreenancy. The two developers of this t
technique were awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine for their contribution
to the long-term welfare of humanity.
Military Systems in Space l
One of the more disheartening trends was the lack of any meaningful
progress towards arms control, conflict resolution, or effective inter-
national restraints against war. In this respect the disharmony among ;= . .
nations was reflected in armaments expenditures that easily kept pace {
with GNPs. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. maintained their arms "race" by , ;
" developing vario_,s measure-countermeasure "games" to ever growing complexity; I
;_ this included the deployment of several kinds of space weapons aboard _l i
maneuverable platforms--weapons employing various forms of "death rays" _.i
which could deliver lethal blows against missiles or satellites up to !
30,000 miles away. The deployment of these systems soon came to symbolize
national power and military prestige although their utility in a real -:{ _L
_[ war would be doubtful at best. Nevertheless, other countries had deployed -.
i a few of these weapons by 20lO--China, Japan, France, and the European
} Space Force (for the U.K., W. Germany, and the Netherlands). Moreover,
:_ by then these space weapons could be bought by almost any nation which Tt.. " i
;_ was on sufficiently good terms with any of the above Bi_ Six, as they
soon became labeled. Brazil was expected to make them the Big Seven o,
soon, and some military experts predicted a proliferation of these systems
to at least another dozen countries by the year 2025. ""
Non-Military Space Prggra_3 -*
Although the non-military U.S. space program was dampened by a "I
reletive!y slow increase in funding it was assisted by the cooperation ._
and more rapidly increasing space budgets of other industrialized nations.
None of these nations had developed an independent reusable STS (Space _
Transportation System) to compete w!th the U.S. Instead they chvse
to cooperate with the U.S. in building the advanced STS. NASA was pleased _
with this outcome since it reduced the burden of maintaining the new _ '
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Table 15
HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1985-2010
I. THE EARTH-ORIENTED SATELLITE PROGRAMWAS A REMARKABLE
SUCCESS. IT TOOK OVER ESSENTIALLY ALL NAVIGATION,
PROVIDED COMMUNICATIONS, MAPPING, EARTHQUAKEANDST RM WARNINGS, CROP AND W TER INV NTORIES; BECAME AN
INDISPENSABLE AID TO MINERAL EXPLORATION, AND OFFERED
CONSTANTLY IMPROVING WEATHERPREDICTIONS.
2. THE SPACE TRANSPORATION SYSTEM DEVELOPED THE IMPROVED
SHUTTLE AND LATER THE AUTOMATED (UNMANNED) SHUTTLE-
DERIVED LAUNCH VEHICLE TOGETHER WITH A COMPLEMENT OFSPACE TUGS AND PLANETARY LANDERS FOR MOON AND MARS
MISSIONS. BY 2010 THE COST OF LAUNCHES TO NEAR-EARTH
i- HAD DECREASED TO $100/LB FOR FREIGHT AND $250/LB FORHUMAN PASSENGERS (1975 DOLLARS).
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROTYPE SPACE INDUSTRY HAD REACHEDTHE POINT WHERE 28 PRODUCTS HAD BECOME MAJOR COMMERCIAL
SUCCESSES AND MANY OTHERS WERE DEPENDENT ONLY UPON
COMPLETION OF THE NEWEST TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. MEAN-
WHILE THE R&D FOR NEW PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES IN SPACEREACHED ABOUT $900 MILLION ANNUAL U.S. FUNDING (3/h
FROM INDUSTRY) PLUS ROUGHLY EQUAL AMOUNT FROM EUROP_
AND JAPAN. _*
4, THE SPACE SCIENCE AND EXPLORATION PROGRAMPRODUCEDA
SERIES OF SPECTACULAR DEVELOPMENTS. THE SPACE TELESCOPES
_i AND OTHER RADIATION SENSORS REVOLUTIONIZED ASTRONOMYAND
COSMOLOGY. THE TWO MARTIAN ROVERS FOUND EVIDENCE FOR
. RUDIMENTARY LIFE FORMS ON MARS. THE LUNAR STATION NOT :_
ONLY DISCOVERED WATER BUT VERIFIED THE FEASIBILITY OF •MINING FOR US FUL MINERALS AND WOULD SOON TO BUILD THE
FIRST SMALL-SCALE ELECTROMAGNETICACCELERATOR.
I 5. THE FEASIBILITY OF A MANNED GEO STATION WAS ESTABLISHED
AS WELL AS THE ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OF COMSATS, LARGE GEO
- ANTENNAS AND SOLAR POWER SYSTEMS.
6. SPACECRAFT MADE CLOSE-UP OBSERVATIONS OF ASTEROIDS AND
COMETS--DEMONSTRATING THE POTENTIAL OF THE ASTEROIDS FOR
MINERALS AND OF SOME AS HYDROGEN SOURCES. '
E
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system and enabled the group to develop a more comprehensive set of
orbital transfer vehicles and lunar landers. The _ombined budgets of _
the European and Japanese governments for space programs each increased '<
to over $3-billion annually by 2010--about a 4-fold increase in 25 years. _,
Although growing more rapidly, each was still less than 1/4 of the NASA's .i
budget. To this it was necessary to add $2.2 billion from U.S. indu.-tries
and another $.9 billion from tne private industries of the other OECD
nations--,_stly for investments in communication systems_ space tourism _
and space industrialization processes. i
-?
The U.S.S.R. space program continued to grow at its historical
2-3 _arcent annual rate, although as usual the a;iocations between military ..
and peaceful purposes were hard to unravel. It was rough,y estimated,
however, that in the year 2010 the Soviet expenditures equaled those of all "" ';,
of the OECD countries combined. However, the Soviet spa(- accomplishments,
while significant, did not equal those of their competitors, except
in the military develupments. Their principal reusable launch vehicle_ .-
operational in 1995, was capable of sending _10 tons to LEO at costs
roughly competitive with the improved Shuttle system. Perhaps because ""
by 1999 they had built more of these launchers than they would need
for at least another l0 years little improvement in these costs were ';
to occur for at ]east a decade. ..
i
Perhaps the principal surprise during the period was the growth of :
the Chinese space program. Although their GNP grew from about $300 .i '
billion to $800 billion or to about $900 per capita, they m_de a propor- [
tionately much larger commitment to their space ventures which, from a _] * _small beginning, rose to an unanticipated $5 billion annually. Th_
Chinese surprised the world by deploying in 2008 an automated "freughter" ""
which could deliver a l/4-million pound payload to orbit at roughly
$150/lb--which was less than the U.S. cost. It became quite clear that -" ._
the Chinese had maintained a greater respect for space science and technology _i _,
than had mest OECD countries and that they intended to be second to none
over the course of the 2lst century. Chinese presence at international -_ . ,
science conferences had been growing rapidly during the quarter and
by its end the number of Chinese scient'sts attending was s-_ldom exceeAed
by any nation other than the U.S. Moreover, the quality of their contri- _w
butions to the conferences was highly regarded. Those contributions
correlated strongly with the number of their representatives. ";
_m
The group of prospering middle-income countries. Brazil, Taiwan_ i
Korea_ Argentina, Chile_ etc., with a combined year-2000 population of
about 1.5 billion generally were much more conc, ned with economic growth
based upon imported technology than with space development. Efforts to _ ,
develop the internal infrastructure needed to support a modern technological _ '
society were succeeding but were not to blossom significantly before .:
2000--ar, d even then great differences among these nations could be observed
in their relative successes. _ : ,
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B. 2_10-2035
This quarter was destined to be a strange one for space development.
On one hand, a technological capability existed in three major blocs--the
OECD naticns, the U.S.S.R. and its allies, and China--for impressive
advances. On the otFer hand, a major distrust of motives among these
powers led to an increasing diversion of funds into military space systems
_ and a 3-way cold war "paranoia" was to prevail and distort prior plans
[ for commercial space developments.
il During this quarter the Chinese chose to orbit many satellites, someof which were (erroneously) believed to contain nuclear weapons. In
addition, they deployed ever more sophisticated defensive system_ which
inciuded observational satellites, maneuvering inspection satellites, and
- space-based weapon systems ranging fron simple exploJives to sophisticated]as-r and particl_ beam _'guns" OF course, they claimed that these
wer. pure!y defensive measures to insure the viability of the Chinese
i space installations as well as to dete_ possible attacks against theirinstallations on the earth's urface. Inevita ly, the Soviet Union
and the U.S. felt compelled to respond in kind and a reiuctant 3-way
F" space arms race was on. i
l
Although each of the chief protagonists had established small lunar
stations soon after 2010 and continued to expand them during this quarter,
i no weapons were based on the lunar surface• Rather a series of unilateralannouncements made it clear that each power intended to avoid military t
l installations on the moon except For possible communication and observation I'
systems. This understanding permitted lunar observatories, technicallaboratories, and exploration stations to proliferate in accordance
with the int_rnational space laws that had previously been worked out
(. under U.N. auspices.
( J
The lunar inhabitants understood, however, that if serious disputes
arose which required legal resolution by international courts on earth, ".
_ the viability of all lundr installations would be shaky. Meanwhile, for
lunar dwellers the experience of living and working on the moon had a
very strong psychological impact. They found it extremely difficult
I to feel anything other than respect and friendship for their "neighbors"
with whom they maintained close communications, The political or military
• affairs on earth rapidly became as psychologically distant as the "big
blue marble" was physically distant. As a result the lunar inhabitants
I rapidly gravitated toward a common feeling of belonging to a special lunar
society which, ho_vever "primitive," was in many respects beyond traditional
nationalism. The longer one remaiPed on the moon the more d!d nationalism
f appear to be a ludicrous basis for organizing human society. (This
(. perspective was to lead eventually to the formation of the United Lunar
Authority, the leadership of an international lunar society whi:h in
turn was destined to become independent of earth governments.)
I
-mmmm,,._-----_ -_ .......... .. - w_-_ _ _ -"'_ "'--'-'-_
P
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The Great Space War
One difficulty with space development during this quarter was related
to a growing fear of war and some concern for the manned installations
in earth orbit--especially within the fledgling space industries for which
there was so much hope. Private investment in expensive new facilities
continued at a high level despite the apparent war prone environment.
Most people did not believe that a war would actually happen although
later, in retrospect it was obvious that the political situation had
become so unstable that war was almost inevitable before the quarter
Ended. Even though it was clear that any new space facilities couId
very readily be destroyed by weapons which were constantly within view,
except For sporadic Fears, investments in space continued to climb.
It was also true that defense theorists and war planners generally considered
the small number of R&u and maintenance personnel in space to be potential
"demonstration targets," for any one of the three powers that first
wished to Flex its military space muscles. Still, there was no reduced
emphasis on manned systems or noticeable restraints on private investments
in space.
This "space-based powder keg", which was inherently unstable as a
i deterrent, resulted in the Great Space War of 2029. In principle, thiswas a war which could be fought by gener ls and their extensive staffs of
t officers, scientis.s, technologists, and various consultants. It could' be played like a chess game w th little destruction that would be directly *
visible and with few human lives involved--providing the war did not
i escalate to a surface exchange of weapons. Perhaps the script could have ,
! been written in advance. A spdce war was more difficult to deter because
_ a "clean" victory was nossible, in principle. 'Io power needed deliberately
.? to escalate to even a limited use of highly destructive surface weapons.
Yet just that possibility may have made the war inevitable.
How the shooting started may never be known. Too many irreconcilable
claims and accusations have been made that were soon beyond investigation.
All that is clear is that the Soviet Union and the Chinese not only -.
blamed each other for starting it, but for escalating it by destroying
U.S. satellites in an attempt to catalyze U.S. reprisals against the
other side. It was all cler--the space battle that is--in one day. ..
! Almost everything of potential military value in space that could be
shot at, was--often more than once just to make cure. The measure-counter- ..
i measure game was played out in full. About 98 percent of all the military
satellites and lO0 percent of the orbiting military stations had been "_
reduced to scrap in orbit. About half of the non-military satellitas on
earth-oriented missions were also lost. For both the Soviets and Chinese
all of their personnel who had been manning space stations and space ..
industries were casualties. Fortunately for the Americans only one manned
installation was fired upon. Altogether, less than 300 lives were lost o=
i but perhaps $800 billion worth of equipment (original cost) was destroyed.
ii ""
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The major blessing, however, was that the destructive orgy didnot descend to the surface of the earth. Indeed9 as very few human
beings knew that a great war was happening until it was all over, they
were som_i_at incredulous when it was first reported by the news media.Even then it took week or more for the reality to sink in. A major
war without sound a_d fury which began and ended in a single day? That
concept was beyond human experience except for a few prior fictional
portrayals with some accidental similarities, but those had had
never
much impact in any event. On the moon the stunned lunar inhabitants
had monitored many of the events, but they had no precedent or guidance
_-_ for responding to the strange sudden insaLity of it all.
L
The reaction on earth took years to evolve through the steps of what
could have been a well-rehearsed play. The accusations, recriminations_investigations, deliberations would rise up_ interact, and subside--over ';
and over like waves emerging sporadically from several epicenters of
gradually diminishing power. But from the beginning the wisest heads
knew what the principal outcome would be. The over--fororgy
was good.
Space would be returned to peaceful purposes once again. It would take
decades before some investors would be sufficiently convinced that the t
risk would be worthwhile--but for others_ as generally happens afterwars, peace appeared to be secure and before long investment began to
return. The more astute investors reinvested rapidly and benefited
F greatly. As a result, a few great corporations were to arise and dominate Icommercial space enterprises. The Great Space War has been the only i
space war in history. Fortunately_ the human casualties were so few.
- • !Technological and Economic Progress
[ While military institutions were devoting much of their technologicalcapability to space weapons and spac fense systems, scientific9 exploratory,
and industrial uses of space were also pursued by each of the major powers
.- but at a relatively low level. Nevertheless, lunar-based science and .
mapping, exploration by unmanned Martian rovers,technology,
asteroid % i
and soon _'_erwards the installation of small Martian scientific stations {
by the Chinese and the Americans were among the highlights of the quarter.
- Large space colonies were not seriously contemplated although considerableR&D on the life science aspec:s of self-sufficient_ long duration operations
in zero or low-gravity spacecraft were steadily pursued and much progress
[ occurred that was to be field tested early in the next quarter.
[_
Meanwhile the developing countries were making reasonable economic
and technological progress. Economic growth ranged from 4 to 7 percent
i more countr;es_ and from 2 to percent for the ':annually
for the ambitious 4
more traditional cultures. The larger nations (Brazil_ Mexico_ Argentina9
India) became more interested in space activities a_ their technoi_qical
C capabilities expanded and as they saw some potential for its econom,capplications. Of course, the Great Space War set all such ambitions
back for awhile, but they were reemerging as the quarter was ending. _ "
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In an important sense the Space War was to become a boon to _uture
,, space programs for two reasons. First, it was to lead to an effective
International treaty that banned deployment of destruct;ve weapons in
space. Second, little of the subsequent funds for space development
would need to be siphoned into costly military hardware--the debris
of the former investment would be orbiting the earth for a long time.
During the next quarter most of that debris was collected and placed
into special orbiting museums as permanent reminders of that notorious i
,_ day--and has furnished some of the more fascinating points of interest "
for subsequent space tours. _.
= .
C. 2035-2076
Aftermath of the Space War
I The all in to the United Lunar ;
"_ AuthoritytreatY(see below)restrictingbecameeffectiveWeap°nsin 2041,spacetwelveyears after the _
il Great War. But its effect was anticipated well before then, as none of
, t:,e belligerents had moved to replace their prior systems. The public's t
attitudes--as reflected by the actions of political leaders--had become all
too clear. Indeed, the spill-over to other military systems and ideological -2-:
concepts led to a gradual withering away of the former arsenals. During
the last 40 years the perceived need for elaborate forces for of, ense and
_ defense under the umbrella of various deterrence concepts faded until ._
only relatively rudimentary capabilities now remain--just minimal "light i
cover" systems which can keep the military R&D establishments active
in the event that unanticipated political developments arise that could il
make renewed strategic milita;-y forces desirable once again. Currently,
the need for the light cover and even the R&D is being questioned. !;
.i
The United Lunar Authority '"
.
George Lincoln was an unusual genius who became entranced with _
the idea of the development of space and space colonization as a vital i
part of the manifest destiny of humanity. At a critical historical -_
moment he found himself in a positio_ to move both men and nations in
that direction. _ was largely due to him that in the year 2011 the "'
Lunar Treaty was signed in which the U.S., the Soviet Union, China,
West Germany, the U.K., France and Japan, as well as {,ater) many other "_
powers, joined together in a pledge to create a truly international lunar ._
facility which would be available, under reasonable terms, for use by
all nations and authorized persons. By 2027 the lunar facili ty included =_
an observatory with two major telescopes (one of Soviet and one of American
design) and many smaller instruments, a scientific laboratory, an exploration
and engineering facility, several launching platforms, two electromagnetic
accelerators, h_bitats with facilities for storing supplies to be used
b_ all parties, and so on. UnFortunately, after 2020, as relations J
among nations began to deteriorate tensions arose which focused considerable t,
attentio, upon the wartime role of space satellites, ultimately leading 1
-p
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to the Great War of 2029. Fortunately, however, the United Lunar Authority(ULA), which was nominally under the direction and the authorizat_o_
i _. of a special multi-national organization, was able to preserve _ts
international character.
In the years of its existence before the Great Space War ULA personnel
T- had dev loped an ex raordinary sense of unity nd so n f lt separated[ from national considerations. Their attitudes became quite different _"
| from the nationalistic ones which characterized most people and _-_u G o_;
- _ earth. It was the;r _e_se of detachment From earth-bound politics and
- | the _-cr-growing bonds of _ onx_on lunar culture that led them to develop
anong themselves a one-for-all and ai,-for-one ett_tude. Ft._"-_"more,
the selection of personnel to be compatible with tha_ lunar culture
was strongly affected by George Lincoln. _os, _unarians became infusedor imbued, partly by desire and partly by their i terdependen e the
Lunar environment, with Lincoln's sense of mission and "religious" zeal
_. for unity. They soon lost any Former sense of identit,cation with thenational rivalries on earth (except as these were c_eary constructive _
for the developments in space).
[_ By'20_ theU_hadevolved intoapositionwhere itwas trusted
L by all national groups for controlling lunar issues of most concern.
Some of these issues were very important to the survival and continuatio_
of both military and non-military operations on the moon. Although _
a partial separation of selected lunar activities did occu as a result
of pressures from earth towards "national izat!on" of these activities !' i
[- (that is, physical separation of facilities for separate national purposes),
on the whole the attempts of earth authorities to extend this process it
were effectively resisted. (Before mid-century the earth authorities,
to their astonishment, had learned that a genuine international body
was operating all the facilities on the moon.)
- i
{-" Societal Chan_es i
Perhaps most important For general world progress and political
stability was the elimination of grinding poverty, which up until this
(-- century had characterized most of the world's population throughout
[- recorded history. That poverty had also been closely associated with
poor health, Illiteracy, extreme corruption, callous urban societies,
I incompetent goven,_ments, and repressive authoritarian societies--in
L dseds, if not al_ys in form. Nearly all of these conditions disappeared
during this century. What vestiges remain are very unlikely to survive
to the year 2100. Today almost every child is born wanted, and hasa guarantee of appropriate nutrition and health care. Moreovery prior
genetic screening essentially guarantees that each new arrival will
be free of serious mental or physical defects at birth. It is hard 1
to conceive of a plausible scenario leading once again to Illiterate isubcultures. Also violent crimes have become quite rare, having had
a negative growth (averaging -9_ annually for the last 40 years). Although
I II g II I I li i . Jill. ' II III
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corruption has not been eliminated it has been greatly reduced and does -1
not exist anywhere in any of its former virulent forms.
p _.
_ By former (i.e., late 20th century) standards ours is a far more I
wealthy and egalitarian world. The average income in the world tod_y -_i is almost 10 t!mes that of a century ago. Perhaps more important is
the fact that the former very poor countries have an average per capita "l
i income that is at least 40 times that of 1975. Moreover, it is still .Jt
the poorest countries whose econ.,lies are expected to grow most rapidly
'_ in the future, an almost inevitable consequence of the societal changes -,
i of the last _5 years and an outcome about which there is little disagreementl
l among our experts. "
i
,! Technolocjical and Economic Progress4
j When we leave the social ano political areas it is possible to -:
• characterize the progress in the more technical areas much more quantitatively. !}
Indeed, wherever appropriate _heories and initial data exist most problems
can now be expressed in a lan_ age which computers understand, and one
or more solutions L-ually can b adily ge er ted--or at least the
i! cost of prod_cin 9 a solution can be determined. Thus, to produce ultra- "
pure diamond fibers, or develop _ f: ion engine with 92 percent efficiency,
or determine the chemical comp_ition oF coal tc .1 percent accuracy
for the top 300 comF_,=ents, or predict next montil's precipitation within ..
; 2 percent--these are straightforward problems with straightforward solutions.
I Today it is taken for granted that improving technology characterizes ;-I
I nearly the entire world and that on balance it will lead to surprising '1
i and desirable outcomes--helped by the growing fraction of the population i
i e,_gaged in those activities. -. ii
Our "colonies" in the different regions of space specialize in the
various technologies which make them most valuable. The lunar and asteroid
colonies are furnishing materials for space processing industries. The _l i
La Grange point colonies build large space structures: habitats, exploration ._
vehicles, propulsion systems, communications networks and electric power
systems. Orbiting factories produce thousands of products and components -]
for both earth and space uses. These include satellites, electronic .t
instruments, ultra-pure crystals, computer "chips," cryogenic alloys,
meoical specialties, metallic hydrogen, space foods, alassy metal foils,
foams, whiskers, and so forth. The huge space depots provide refueling ,!
and maintenance services for spacecraft as well as facilities for travelers. --
Tourism has become one of our most rapidly growing space :ndustries, "_
especially during the last several years when the cost of the minimum ..t
(2-day) LEO tour fell to $]5,000. Indeed, there is a shortage of touring
facilities which, because of government regulations, are unlikely to _i
be expanded rapidly enough to meet de:and for some time to come.
The GWP today is about $210 trillion; roughly half of that comes
"ifrom the countries with large commitments to space: the U.S. whose
- _-, ..:."_ adl_41_i;_" f_ _= _" ,"-. -
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space program is integrated with those of Japan, Germany, Brazil, France
and others; China; and the U.S.S.R. and its eestern European associates.
These three countries and their collaborators represent about $120 trillion
[_ of the c_rrent GWP. Their respective annual space budgets are roughly$200 billion, $400 billion, and $200 billion. In addition, from the U.S.
group about $400 billion annually comes from private investment--mostly
_. profits from tourism and space industries being plowed back. Thus,about I percent of the GWPof the countries actively involved in space
development is being allocated for space purposes. This allocation is
high by historical standards but is not expected to diminish.
!
!
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PART II: THE NEXT I00 YEARS (2076-.2176)
_ I have been asked to make some projections about things to come.Naturally any such projection is likely to be wildly wrong especially
as every space buff like me holds a relatively optimistic view, at lease
secretly. A "typical" optimistic view_ when carried out over a 100-
_ pe:iod at a "nominal" 6-percent growth rate, gives over 8 doublings,
year
or about a 400-fold increase in,overall economic growth! In comparison,
over the last I00 years the GSI experienced only about a 50-fold increase.
i F Moreover, as space development is no longer in its infancy its growth
{ should be slower over the next century. This maturing is fairly evident
now because it is difficult for us to project a huge number of new realms
to conquer without entering into "science fiction"-type developmentsF_
/ tO a large extent.
Much of our limitations in space today was reasonably envisioned
one hundred years ago by sensible forecasters of that time. We have
not exceeded the speed of light nor evolved methods of transporting
people to distant planets by "teleportation," whatever that word is
[ supposed to connote. Of course, we have made some progress which could
{ not have been predicted _qd therefore would astonish scientists who
lived I00 yea.s ago--e.g., the focused magnetic monopole array which
permits the exchange of momentum between orbiting bodies without any
[_ mass expenditures and which has greatly reduced the cost of orbital
transfers. But even in the last century scientists were confident that
many unpredictable developments would occur in this one.
Undoubtedly, if during the past 100 years the people had been
willing to invest more in space science and technology--for example
If to make it an increasingly-funded field rather than an erratically fundedone--its present size and scop could have b en v stly g e er and the
surprises much more numerous and impressive (for an analogy we can compare
i _ a potential 400-fold increase from an average 6 percent growth rate
i l with the 50-fold one actually attained--equivalent to an average growth "
rate of about 4 percent). However, erratic budgets--with all their
inefficiencies--have been much more consonant with historical political
realiti s than the smoothly growing ones which plann rs p efer.
t
Consequently, to make a ,ealistic, rather than idealistic projection
I for the forthcoming lO0 years, and taking into account the maturation
of space exploration and space industries, I would project the growth
in space to be 2 or 3 times that of the economic growth on earth. The
latter is expected to grow at no more than 1 percent per annum on average,
| for reasons which our economists and social scientists have explainedi
L quite well, and about which there is a general consensus. Thus, barring
the unexpected, the GWP should about double over the next century and
*Gross Space Investment (including military expenditures).
_. v • .
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the world's annual investment in space might increase to roughly 8 times
, J
Its present level_-or to about $10 trillion per year.
Taking this number to be reasonable the next task is to project
the manner in which space might be exploited and then to ask what kiiM ".
of specific developments might result. For this purpose let us consider
the topics of: travel, industry, subsidized colonies, exploration 9 -"
and science. Naturally a great amount of overlap exists among these--a !
fa=t which I will ignore. Also I will ignore many otner relevant facets
of expanding space-based services such as weather prediction and control, --
furnished through government agencies or government-related institutions
and that are now not listed as space investments, as well as questions
re_ated to private versus public financing which economists consider
to be quite important.
I begin with travel and tourism a5 the most rapidly growing aspect
of space. A hundred years from now I believe that essentially everyone
on earth will tour space at least once during his lifetime and that
about a l-month tour in cis-lunar space, including about a week on the
lunar surface, would be reasonably representative. After the next 100
years the Space 3oard's projection is that the transportation costs
for a typical tour will fall to about $209000 and I allow another $209000 ,
for other costs. $40,000 per person and roughly 100 million tourists _
ann.Jally comes to $4 trillion, or 40 percent of the assumed total annual
space expenditures in year 2176. .t
Of the $6 trillion balance my consultants and I have agreed that T] ' i
an appropriate division among the four remaining sectors would be industry, .
60 percent; subsidized colcnies, 20 percent; and exploration and science,
each _0 percent. These percentages are unlikely to be in error by a --
factor of 2 although the $6 trillion total is a soft number which could l
easily be wrong by up to a factor of 5, perhaps more. "'
An annual investment of $3.6 trillion in space industries would be -_ "
about 7 percent of the world's annual industrial investment projected for ..
2176. The projected space investment would be even greater if much of
the electric power needs on earth had to come from space-based installations_ --
as many people (in the old days) thought would be necessary. But electric
power generated in space is expected to produce instruments, components,
and materials in space for use mainly by other space industries (including .:
transport) and for the end products consumed in space by space tourists,
I technicians colonists, explorers, and scientists. Secondly, space industriesj will continue to concentrate on products and processes which are useful on
I earth and which otherwise would be unavailable, or too expensive if made "T
on earth. At present thls second category is about I0 times greater than .:
the first; but the first is expected to expand more rapidly as tourism
increases and as space colonies becomes increasingly self-sufflcient, -,
in the full sense of the term. Thus I foresee a gradual shift in emphasis .,
over time toward production in space for consumption and investment in ""
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space, while the overall demand for space products and services increases
substantially more rapidly than does the G#P.
The expenditures on subsidized colonies refer primarily to the costs
for establishing and maintaining new colonies in space prior to the time
that they become self-sustaining. This outward-bound process is expected
to be an unending one as long as space exploration proceeds and the
colonization that follows--whether in orbit or on planetary surfaces--is
considered desirable. To date we have subsidized such colonies on and
around Mars, around Venus, and in the asteroid belt--in addition to those
. in cis-lunar space and, of course, on the moon's surface, most of which
are now self-sustaining. The estimate that twice the cost of the exploration
will be required for subsequent colonization subsidies is roughly consistent
with the experience of the past 50 years and no important arguments have
appeared that challenge this estimate seriously. Of course, our past
experience makes the projection only plausible, not "correct".
In addition, the recent experiments with retirement communities
suggest that life in space might become a desirable r_cirement mode
for many senior citizens who are not too attached to their routines
on earth. At present the estimated costs for retirement in space are
relatively high_ although not beyond the means of the wealthiest segments
of the population. But these costs are expected to fall substantially
and possibly come within the means of average retired citizens in perhaps i
50 to 75 years--although many analysts are dubious about the accuracy
of this projection as it depends upon a considerable extrapolation of
past trends. Of course, such colonies might also be subsidized. However,
our projected expenditures only assume that some subsidies would be , {
required during their formative stages. Social experiments of this
kind may occur over a few decades, and possibly even for more than the
full hundred years of this projection. In any event, I have not allowed _
; that potential development, whose cost and/or desirability is quite
uncertain, to significantly affect my projected budget for subsidized
I colonies (20 percent of the total space budget). ".
J
I must admit right off that the separation of space exploration and
space science, although conceptually easy, soon becomes difficult upon
! examining the subjects in detail. Some scientists claim it is analogous
to splitting an animal in half--that each discipline is so dependent
on the other that budgetary separation makes little sense. Perhaps
they will forgive my crude "surgery" as I proceed with the artificial
splitting for sake of this discussion.
I Up until now a large variety of automated probes and instrumented
s vehicles of various types, which I group together as different kinds
of robots, have been sent to inspect every planet in the solar system and
theT-r-sa-tellites. The information obtained has given us a remarkably
improved picture of the solar system and we will continue to get more
information from these marvelous robots. The manned orbital explorations
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°l of Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn which have taken place so far have been
j pilot projects rather than full-scale scientific assaults on the exploration
missions. Of course, Jupiter itself is especially difficult because its _.
Intense radiation fields prevent a close approach by humans. But this year
j the U.S. expects tc put the first permanent manned installation on the ;
surface of Mercury as one of its Tricentennial celebrations. Manned surface
stations are boing planned for the smaller moons of the outer planets: -i
those of Jupiter in 5 years, and of Saturn perhaps l0 years later if the ..
Jupiter mission is successful. The Interplanetary Exploration Society
_| (IPES) believes that within 30 years we will find the first humans (temporarily) --
i on Pluto and, within 50 years, a permanent station on that planet.
However, as the me,_lbers of IPES agree, the ultimate mission of
their organization is an expedition to one of the nearby stars. I believe
there is little prospect of launching such an expedition during the
next 100 years, however, unless some very unexpected and startling break-
throughs occur which could make such a journey appear feasible. Until now
we do not know if even one of the 48 interstellar probes which were
launched during this century will reach its destination sufficiently intact
to return a message that it has arrived. At least 5 of the first 6 have
failed in transit--their messages are overdue and they were all functioning
• for at least a year after their launchings. However, there seems to
be no shortage of predictions and detailed descriptions of potentially
successful voyages--or of preliminary designs of interstellar vehicles
which might be launched with anywhere from 4 to I0,000 people during J
this or the next ¢emtury, depending upon various assumptions about future
technologica_ progress. T} '
In a relatively pure sense space science and technology have
accomplished an astonishing set of "miracles" during this century--the
-I
full appreciation of which has, as usual, been limited to that portion _
of society which devotes the time required to understand the changes
which have ccurred. For example, the study of the sun has evolved
to the point where scientists can now confidently predict a year or _ ""
II
more in advance, with accurate timing, the number and sizes of "sunspots, -.
those great solar flares which in prior decades were a major threat
to manned activities because of their potential for sudden unexpected -;
showers of destructive radiation. Now the threat is uf minor concern
since future flares are routinely predicted--and available at least 6
months in advance--in the Solar Science Data Base. In addition, the ..
"small" fluctuations of the solar constant h&ve been accurately modeled.
This is also important because the accuracy of these predictions gives us -"
confidence, not only in the life cycle of the sun, but in our understanding
: of the interior processes in all stars for which the required basic ";
data is available, Such data is now available for over 100,000 stars ._
of our galaxy,
To observers of planets in distant solar systems astronomical progress _i
has been a source of great satisfaction. The planets which have been
counted, weighed, and had their orbits measured, now number over 1500
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for the nearest 800 hundred stars. Three of these planets show promisingc nditions for the existence of life and naturally have become the preferred
obJectives of sone of the interstellar probes.
I _, That the Former mystery about the existence of black holes has been
' cleared up is old news of course. But that their sizes and distribution
are now almost completely catalogued for this galaxy is a matter of
I great scientific importance. With this information in combination withother data, the new cosmology has shown conclusively that a portion of
the universe must have existed prior to the Big Bang. To many cosmologists
f recent this result came as a great surprise. Another scientific conclusion
i' _ that now appears to be certain is that at least 5 percent of the galaxies
are made up of anti-matter. In particular_ our nearest galactic neighbor,
L' ( Andromeda, is one of the anti-matter ones and therefore intrinsically
_; | forbids human presence. The theory of formation and preservation of
_[ the anti-matter galaxies was cne of the vita_ keys of the new cosmology.
#
In addition to these space spectaculars other developments of this
century--which by now cannot be separated from spa -= science--have led
to brilliant technological achievements in the maintenance of human
" [ health--in adapting to the space environment as well as to the stresses( found on the earth's surface. Thanks in part to this progress, the 20th
1. century (and prior) concepts involving fears of death are now much more
"_ I than a lingering memory. Death today is almost always a natural, pleasant i
"i _ and usually voluntar_ experience which occurs when the time is ripe. _ i
4t
A full catalogue of achievements over the last hundred years would I i
take volumes just to record those of greatest importance. In every field ,
! of basic science there has been at least one fundamental revolution in _ i
understanding. In applied sciences there have been thousands of break-
throughs which have led to weather c rol, inexpensive energy, pristineenvironments, supermat rials, and now che era of superrobots--without j
which there might be little time left For politicking and complaints. _
[- ,One of the interesting experiences for children today is that of
visiting the reconstructed Bicentennial village in which the way of '_'
llfe of our great grandparents is accurately replicated. Children almost
I always find it _stonishing in their first visit, Noisy gasoline engines,vacuum cleaners, pot-holed roads, record players_ oil-burning furnaces,
incandescent lamps, trash cans, fire stations_ and movie theatres are
al1 novel--and to them astonishingly "primitive."
I have been dwelling upon past progress_ but what of the future?
t In pure science we simply cannot even guess_ it is the discovery of
I-i that which before was not known. However, in applied science or technology
we can make some guesses. Here a e a few=
Genetics: a complete unraveling and understanding of the life
i L process of hu,nanbeings. That is, fr_ the DNA sequence a complete
1.J
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' prescription of any stage of the arowth process which occurs through
sequential cell divisions and specialization.
Pb
i i
Materials: The ultimate materials for use in functional design to
achieve optimum strength, flexibility, geometry, and corrosion resistance
! will be achieved in 10,000 or more materials. Also materials superconductive
at the maximum temperature which i theoretically possible (260 K) will
be created. !
,!
r Computers: The theoretical limit to operational speed and information -;
j4 transfer_ unlimited ultra-high-density memory, reliability greater than
that from external "freak" accidents, and automatic programming through
simple voice commands will all be achieved. ';
I
Robots: Which can do anything mechanical that a man does first !
and wants the robot to repeat--and more• Intelligent robots will be -, _
created that can quickly learn to perform "thinking" tasks in most of
the ways in which humans can--but much more rapidly. .. t
Space development: Large colonies (with 5000 to 100,000 people)
will be able to travel anywhere in the solar system and will be self-
*i sufficient for at least 20 year_, perhaps indefinitely. Cost of space itransportation will fall by a factor of 10 or more. A_ 1east 100 million
people will have "permanent" homes in space colonies• _!
| a_
. One of the sot,o-political consequences of the above developments is J
that human beings in _pace colonies_ whether in orbit or on a planetary i t
surface such as the moon or Mars, probably will become politically -
independent of societie_ on earth--that is, they will become "sovereign" _
in the same sense that nations on earth are. Most sociologists today _ _-
believe that this is an inevitable result in space--just as it has been _
( on earth. I can only assume that those natives will be friendly--if we are•
" l
.#
°=
Q •
!i ,
1985022650-137
_. [ 135 •
• F Chapter Vli,
CONCLUSIONS
[_ One of the purposes of this report is to assess the likelihood
of favorable long-term developments in space and contrast them to the
F likelihood of relatively unfavorable ones. For that task the study firstestablishes a long-term basic context--or surprise free earth-centered
context. The importance of context should be quite clear. Unless the
environment from which the space program is to emerge inherently permitsoptimistic developments then there can be none. While this is an obvious
point it is more important then it might at first seem. That is because
a relatively large (and up to recently, growing! group of people have
in the industrialized nations the last 15-2. who_merged during yearshave become convinced that the earth's physical resources are inadequate
to sustain even modest rates o£ economic growth let alone a significant
expansion of recent growth. The nature of and values of this group,or these groups_ is described in Appendix A.
_. However, research by :he Hudson Institute D and others_ since theearly and mid-1970s has led to the ronclusion that any ]in, its to future
growth in the world are unlikely to oe set by shortages of physical
resources. Legitimate concerns about the prospects for t_ng-term growth
E should rather be focussed various which productivity mightupon _tays
i n
be constrained by changing social values, management styles or competence ]
of governments. Of course, other developments made possible by unexpected !
j- technical breakthroughs or even sheer "luck" might also affect therates _Y economic growth.
- Consequently, it is appropriate to assume that if there are anyfuture constraints on space ventures they will not be meaningfully i
related to any limits in the amounts of the earth's physical resources.
Accepting that conclusior, the discussion in the latter half of Chapter i.|
|| _| li shows that the long-term potential for successful developments inspace depend upon a number of less-tangible factors, a few of which
are reviewed below for their imiications about successful space futures.
Technolo_ly
From a review of th_ technological prospects in various fields it
:| is difficult to avoid the conclusion that future technological progress
is likely to continue to be rapid until it is constrained by political
or social factors. Technical or economic difficulties are unlikely
to limit this progress significantly. Indeed_ there are good grounds
to support the claim that technological progress in the years ahead,
l however it might reasonably be measured, is likely to proceed faster• than it has during the iact few decades. This is _ exceedingly important
trend_ which stems from technological changes whicf, are able to focus
innovation ever more strongly upon what is popularly by known as h___h
!X
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: tech. In the outlook For space development that is exactly what is _;
t needed to support the technical aspects of space ventures.
i -Although it is reasonable to assume that technology will progress _ouite rapidly in he future, for a space advocate it would also he
'_ desirable if a certain amount of technological "luck" occurred. An
[' example v_ould be the unexpectedly rapid development of efficient launch iI vehicles which would enable transportation costs from thc earth's surface "' '
_ to LEO to drop rapidly. A second desirable area of progress, one which ,
will be required eventually, is a practical solution to closed-cycle -"
.! agriculture within space stations, space vehicles or Lunar colonies. ._
LI still another area in which technological problems will eventually• ..
be relatively crucial is that related to the health aspects of prolonged
travel in space. The primary concern in this regard are the pote,.tial ' :
problems which might be associated with months or years spent in a
micro-gravity environment. Problems of these and other types will
be intensively examined for many years to come. There appears to be •
a relatively good likelihood that adequate solutions will De found
for them within a reasonable time. However, it is obvious that finding
those solutions at l o_ cost or relatively early in t,,,,e cannot be counted
on. They are intrinsic imponderables that only time and effort will ,'
I resolve and For which "luck" becomes quite important. " i
Another class of future evenEs which may either enhance or degrade
ii _he reliability of space ventures are related to their economics. _. , it As wc know, while the space environment has many resources which can
•, provide _mportant advantages (see Chapter II) nevertheless it also .. i
_i has certain intrinsic costs or disadvantages. Also important to the
future of commercial space ventures will be the need to compete with -]
I new earth-bound technologies. For example, in recent years t_e tremendous .'_.
potential of COMSATS has been seriously affected by the commercial
. development of glass fibers for telecommunications. That development -, -, ,
does not completely offset the future _ee_ for COMSATS but it will i
have a considerable effect upon their ,ate of expansion over the long-term. '
In particular, there appears to be four areas in whi:h economic success
can contribute to the growth of commercial space ventures. These are ";
(a) COMSATS (b) ERSATS (Earth Resource Satellites) (c) space travel and ..
tourism, and (d) space industrialization, which is now just barely into
the required R&D. Spac_ industrialization is in the embryonic stage. "_
Various prognostications for its future range from mildly interesting ._
to extraordinarily successful. At this time its future over the next
50 to 100 years must be regarded as essentially opaque. ._
However, one of the more likely success stories for commerce in .!
space i._expected to come from travel and tourism. The likelihood
that costs will decline over time, coupled with a growing worldwide
affluence, constitutes a natural combination of circumstances that will _ ,-
favor the growth of space travel and space tourism. The proJections
]
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_ given in this report indicate that even in relatively pessimisticscenarios space travel will be a major long-term growth industry which
in turn should contribute to the development of other space ventures.
[_ Of course other economic aspects of space may be determined bybits of luck. For example, whether or not water exists on the moon
in reasonable quantities, permitting it in principle to be mined for
I use by lunar colonies is, from a long term poin_ of view, a very important
I. matter. Without getting into technological details it is clear that
the availability of water in particular, or of a local source of hydrogen,
more generally, would be a vital element for both human _onsumptionand many lunar industrial processes. The need to provide water and/or
hydrogen from the earth could severely limit the creation or expansion
of colonies on the moon and other planetary bodies, as well as orbiting
colonies in space.
Social and Societal Considerations
In these areas, not only for analysis of space futures but for
i the analysis of social and political futures of almost any region onearth, there are intrinsic difficulties in making accurate forecasts.
It seems, therefore, more useful simply to state that scenarios which
envisage not only scientific_ technological and economic uses of space
_ but also an expanding extraterrestrial population occupying preferredregions of space on behalf of their nations, of the international community, |
or on behalf of themselves_ must assume the existence of enthuasiastic i
support from special interest groups and/or national governments.O ring past decades: a d very likely for the near-term future, the
primary support for space ventures has come from the resources of national
• governments. Consequently the attitud_ of those governments--presumably
r reflecting the desires of the people of their respective countries--are
and will be crucial, i
In the developed nations a growing interest in space exploration
and commercial development has appeared in recent years. As technology
makes space relatively more accessible and lowers the cost of space
ventures_ governmental interest in its utilitarian services as well
as in some of the existing possibilities related to space colonies
and manned exploration of the outer planets should continue to grow.
Whether the recent growth of public interest in space ventures is a
t passing fad is open to conjecture. It is tempting, however, to conclude
that it will be a relatively permanent trend, at least as long as great
' _i_asters in space are avoided and a stream of space "spectaculars"
continues to flow into view as in the past.
,, A second aspect to the social or societal considerations is related
to the development of an acceptable m!nimum of space cooperation among
nations_ several aspects of which are discussed in _hapter II. There
is considerable evidence that the growing interest in space among nations
...... _ _r_--G',_,_._ ._, --_ -_
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coupled with the relatively large costs of some space ventures (large -'
launch vehicles, space stations, colonies, etc.) tend to induce greater
levels of cooperation among, at least, relatively friendly countries. "_
Even the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been more or less cooperative in !_e
selected aspects of space exploration, and they appear likely to continue
i at Ieast that mild level of cooperation for years or decades to come. It --
is a]_o possible that the mild cooperation could, over time, change
.p into relatively close and extensive cooperation. If that occurs it
' could give a major boost to projects such as a large lunar colony or
| a space station on Mars. !
. e
Finally, one of the important long range considerations, if colonies
in orbit or on planetary surfaces are to become feasible, is related
to a larger issue which might be termed the quality-of-life in these
colonies. In this matter it is difficult to justify high copfidence
in the outcome as it requires visualizing, or attempting to visualize, -
practical solutions to complex social problems which might not occur
for several decades or more. Of course the early problems associated
with life ;n "colonies" are likely to be those connected with L.E.O.
space stations in which only a few to several people are in residence
at any time. Later during this century or early in the next one similar
problems are likely to be faced by the residents in lunar bases which
may be occupied by only a few or perhaps several people. Then after J
I a longer period of time, say 40 to 50 years From now, these space stations LJ
I may have been expanded to accomodate several hundred people, or more_ ' "
x Each situation must be expected to pose the usual problems of a social
organization, as well as the unusual ones related to living with people
in relatively close quarters in a novel environment remote from home
and traditions. Even the comfort of knowing that the principal social
problems would occur during the early years of such colonization cannot -i
4 be given with assurance. ,_
1.
Whilc some of the aspects of life in space colonies are dealt -"
with in our scenarios, and have also been e×Jmined in papers and scenarios
by other writers, it is quite beyond any reasonable conjecture at
, this time to expect to establish an overall perspective on the social ._
dynamics in space which can be termed reliable. Certainly in this
respect the possible range of outcomes gives rein to both optimistic
and pessimistic preferences. Only the real future is apt to be of
much use in deciding among them. "]
.J
In all of our scenarios, social values become a dominant force which
determines a relatively pessimistic or optimistic outcome. In particular, -_
it is important to see these outcomes as reactions of populations to !
*See, for example, Living on the Moon--an article by Philip Harris _i '
based on socialogical research by B.J. Bluth and others; The Futurist,
April 1985. %
• ii .
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_, growing affluence. While there are in which gr_aing
many ways
affluence could cause values to change, the scenarios emphasize two
major possibilitles.
rj In the Pessimistic Scenario, increasing affluence primarily is
used to (a) solve the problems of poverty (b) reduce risk to health
and safety and (c) provide relatively egalitarian societies that becomei more and more averse to technological and economic progress becausethese involve risks which are unacceptable. As a result, concepts
of rapid progress, glory, exploring new worlds, ultimate destiny, etc.,
become potential threats, much as the 18th century landed aristocracy
. in Europe may have seen threats in the industrial revolution.
The Optimistic Scenario emerges from a completely different perspective.
;_ It represents an insatiable desire For and confidence in the abilitya
of humans and their institutions to solve both technological and social
t problems and to phase into a ne_ era in which freedom from poverty
and insecurity releases a cornucopia of creativity, enhanced by cooperation.
Thus it postulates that mankind's future no longer need be driven by
the Fears of poverty and insecureity. Rather, that during the coming
I decades a flood of economic and technological progress, coupled with
common sense, enables new kinds of humanism and humanitarianism to
spread rapidly throughout most societies. The lust for personal power
and wealth become tra[;scended as societies Find tnat their con_i,on goals
can better be obtained through striving for excellence and wisdom based
upon education, progress, and the wealth which these make possible.
Over time, each person becomes much more productive, and the available
number of trained well-educated people become far greater than at present.
-- Consequently, the world's per capita income expands rapidly.
i
__ Space development worldwide, even in pessimistic scenarios can
. become impressive over a century and astonishing cver two centuries.
This can be understood in an economic sense by observing that space
1 investments reach 10 to 50 times the current levels and that a given -,
i investment buys much more in the future as a resuit of ongcing progress.
Still, in the Pessimistic Scenarios the world is similar to the present one.
l In the Optimistic Scenario, rapid progress occurs in every Field
subject to change, especially in education, science and applied technology.
Also it results in effective approaches to interpersonal and intercultural
relations. In that scenario the space frontier becomes a major symbol ofi
human destiny which in turn becomes ;denrified with increasing knowledge of
and the desire for more direct experience_ with the entire universe--beginning
of course with the solar system.
Each scenario in this study ends successfully. However the nature
and degree of the success and the paths followed over a I00 to 200
year period are enormously d;#ferent. Eventually, perhaps even the
Pessimistic Scenario could reach an outcome similar to that of the
i
' t
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200-year Optimistic Scenario. But it would require major changes in
cultural values and then another century or two to make up for lost time.
Obviously_ aiso, many other scenarios are possib_e. Indeed, in 1
especially tragic ones, human live on earth could be destroyed, more
or less cornpletely_ along with many other animal and plant species.
Such scenarios cannot be ruled out of the range of poss;ble futures_
but they are outside the scope of this project.
It is also impnrtant to i_int out that while history may be one
of our best guides _or the short-term future, it may also be largely J
irrelevant for the l_g term future in space. In Appendix B, for example9
a perspective on space futures is developed based up_ historical parallels.
While illuminating, this history also tends to reflect the prior long
term intra and intercultural struggles which were largely based upon 4
the age-old search for power and wealth. Can mankind progress beyond
such endless struggles which are reminiscent of our jungle heritage? I '
If so, what new perspective replaces the historical ones? Both the
Pessimistic and Optimistic Scenarios provide answers--quite different
ones--to these questions.
To sum up. the long term future in space looks exceedingly bright
e,,en in relatively pessimistic scenarios. The principal driving forces
will be technological progress, commercial and public-oriented satellites, 1 _
space industrialization, space travel and tourism, and eventually space _-|
col_ization. The rate of these developments are to be determined _ '
partly by luck but mostly by social and political dynamics which are 1
largely imponderable. _ :
4
i
4
I
!
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_-" LIST OF ACRONYMS
CCD: charge-coupled device OECD: Organization for EconomicOMSAT: Communications Satellite Cooperation and Development
OFS: Outlook for Space
OPEC: Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries
EFF: efficiency OTV: Orbital Transfer Vehicles
E-M: electro-magnetic
ERTS: Earth Resources Technology QOL: quality of lifeSatellite
ESA: European Space Agency
G: gravity SEASAT: Sea Observation Satellite
GHZ: gigahertz SEP: solar electric power
GNP: Gross National Product SEPS: Solar Electric Power System
GSI: Space Investment Sl: Space
Gross Industrialization
GSO: geosynchronous orbit SHH: Solar Maximum Mission
GSP: Gross Space Product SSPS: Solar Satellite Power System
GWP: Gross World Product SSTO: Single State To OrbitSSUS: Spinning Solid Upper Stage
HEAO: High Energy Astronomical STS: Space Transportation System
[ ObservatoryHLLV: Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle TIROS: Television Infrared Observa-
HYV: high-yield variety tion Satellite
ULA: United Lunar Authority
INTELSAT: International Telecom- VTOL: Vertical Take Off and 1
munications Satellite Vertical Landing i
Organization _ •
Societyyst m
K.E.V.: thousand electron volts !
LANDSAT: Land Satellite
LEO: low-earth orbit I _.
MBPD: million barrels per day
MISS: Made In a Space Station
;:PD: magnetoplasmodynamic
NASA: National Aeronautics and
Space AdministrationNATO: North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
NIMBUS: NASA Improved Meteoro-
logical Satellite
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Appendix A* 'I
THE NEW CLASS
Many futurologistc _nd others who speculate about social trends
have long recognized that for a wealthy country the marginal utility
of successive increments of wealth could decrease quite rapidly. Thusthe idea has been widely accepted that sometime within the next hundred
years the desire For increased wealth could decrease to the puint where
it would strongly affect economic growth rates. However, prior to
the late 1960s almost nobody expected t,,!s effect to be feit in theqear future, although many now believe that it is well underway. In
particular, it has shown up in changed attitudes which strongly support
a set of New Emphases which are listed below:
RECENT NEW EMPHASES
- (ALL LEADING TO "SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH")
I. RISK AVERSION
F
. 2. LOCALISM i.
3. COMFORT, SAFETY, LEISURE AND HEALTH
4. PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY
3. LOSS OF NERVE, WILL, OPTIMISM, CONFIDENCE, AND MORALE i
t
6. PUBLIC WELFARF AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (INCLUDING EQUALITY
OF RESULT)
7. HAPPINESS AND HEDONISM
r 8. GENERAL ANTI-TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
( ANTI-MIDDLE-CLASS ATTITUDES (E.G., "SMALL IS BETTER"
AND "LIMITS-TO-GROWTH" MOVEMENTS)
I 9. VALUES -.
MANY MODERN FAMILY
lO. GENERAL DE-EMPHASIS OF (OR EVEN HOSTILITY TO) THE
THIRTEEN TRADITIONAL LEVERS
ll. INCREASING SOCIAL CONTROL AND "OVERALL PLANNING" OF
THE ECONOMYOF THE "WRONGf' SORT
( 12. ADVERSARY REGULATORYATTITUDES
13. INNER SPACE (OMPHALOSKEPSIS)AND/OR CONCERN WITH SELFr
I GENERALLY, PERHAPS EVENANEMPHASISONMYSTICOR
t. TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES
li' *This Appendix draws on previously published material by B. Bruce-
Briggs and Herman Kahn.
f
iw" ..... .. .. _lb.=__ * -_ -. . .
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If a new ideology represented by the values given in this list
should become pervasive, it could effectively impede advancing technology
in general and space development in particular. Therefore, it is worth -"
discussing some of the forces that give rise to the above New Emphases.
First, and perhaps most important, as the me,nbership of the upper-
middle class increases, and as the availability of cheap and inexpensive
services decreases, the upper-middle class gradually discovers that its _*
pleasures, privileges and purposes, as well as its quality of life and
even its standard of living, became more and more threatened. Recent
books have discussed these social phenomena in some detail, although .,
often from a somewhat confused perspective. That is, the issue is
usually discussed as if the perspective and interests of the upper- -:
middle class were the same as those of average citizens. Little recog-
nition is given to the fact that a middle-class individual who moves
into the upper-middle class generally feels a substantial improvement 7
in his standard of living and his quality oF life, even if those already f
in the upper-middle class feel they have lost s_ething. _'
Within the upper-middle class resides an active sub-group which
seems to constitute--intellectually, politically, and polemically--a
cutting edge of this phenomenon and which has been labeled the New
Class. These are people whose status and occupation not only derive -,
from possession of considerable education, but who earn their living J,
thereby--i.e., by the use of language and analytical skills. The New
Class encompasses a large part of academia, the media_ most 'Jpublic _ *
interest" groups, and many philanthropic, public service, and social
service organizations--all of which not only have grown in size since -|
197_ but gained considerable influence and power in the industrial ,,
Wes_erncountriesand in Japan, Whilethereareprobablymanyllgray T] '"
areas" in these categories, that has also been true of previously
recognized classes. It is equally difficult to delineate "aristocracy,"
"bourgeoisie," and "proletariat '_with great precision; each of these -_ "
classes contains important sub-classes as well as a flux of new arrivals
and dropouts. "'
_9
Initial analysis suggests that the New Class can be defined in
terms of (a) relatively large or potentially large amount of formal .,
education, including students, (b) professional status in occupations
with an emphasis on the "soft" sciences and arts, (c) high (but not the "_
highest) income, usually from non-market sources (goverment or non- ..
profit salaries, grant_, and contracts), and (d) relative youthfulness.
The last is important; because the New Class has been "emerging" its "T
attributes should be most obvious among the young. In this connection,
Karl Marx's insight that a class does not exist unless it has self- "_
awareness is illuminating. This kind of consciousness has appeared
only recently among members of the New Class. Some intellectuals and -T
bureaucrats have always behaved like the New Class, but perhaps cnly 6i "
within the past decade have their numbers been sufficient to achieve
the critical mass required to break out of subordination to other groups _
and establish their own identity.
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_._ A case can be made that the New Class largely controls or dominatesthe following groups and institutions: (a) the humanities and social
science faculties of almc;t all prest:ge and many state universities,
professional schools, and teachers colleges; (b) most of the nationalmedia rganizations--the pr stigious daily newspaper , much of the
periodical press, the book publishing industry, the commercial television
networks, recording, films, and most educational media; (c) the fine
(d) the establishment foundations and other non-profit eleemosynaryarts;institutions concerned with inf]uencing public opinion; (e) research
organizations; (f) a good part of congressional staff; (g) the federal
,r
social welfare bureaucracy; and (h) the government regulatory apparatus.
.i
Furthermore, New Class values and sensibilities have successfully
penetrated: natural science faculties; business schools; rank and
file school teachers; state and local government bureaucracies; the
clergy; advertising; trade union staffs; salaried professionals of
many kinds; and even parts of business corporations, especially in 1
_i l public relations, long-range planning, and internal education programs.
These disparate groups have the following characteristics in common:
they are in staff (as contrasted to "line" or substantive) positions_ t
•n. and they produce or deal in ideas or words, holding their jobs because
j._ of analytical and literary skills usually obtained through formal education. :
Thus the chief executive officers of these organizations generally
I- would not belong to the New Class. i
Many analysts _oncerned with the future of the advanced nations '
believe that these "brain workers" could become even more important
"| in the next century and _lay central roles in infiuenc'ng the general '
milieu in which space _.ro_ects will be undertaken. A series of more
or less self-explanatory charts are included to give the interested i
r reader a synoptic overview of the characteristics and issues currently
_ associated with the N_'v Class.
iI "" i
!
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1 ISSUES -,_
i A. ORIGINS OF PRIVILEGED RADICALISM -',,
! ADVERSARY CULTURE •m
f LIBERAL ETHOSf
.I
J B. CONCERN WITH COMPETENCE OF SOCIETY_ ECONOMY, AND
GOVE RNMENT _
i
i
J C. WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT BRAIN WORKERS WILL BE ""
' DOMINANT CLASS OF FUTURE _,
"I
BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA OF THE NEW CLASS .,
I. NEED TO DEFINE AND EXPLAIN GROUPS WiTH "POWER t_;THOUT -'
PROPERTY"
2. TERM "NEW CLASS" EMPLOYED IN 1956 BY MILOVAN DJILAS ..
TO LABEL COMMUNIST RULERS i
_o
0
, 3. TERM FIRST APPLIED TO U.S. BY DAVID T. BAZELON IN I967 ._
] 4. TERM USED IN "RIGHT" SENSE BY D.P. MOYNIHAN AND NORMAN J
PODHORETZ IN 1972. CIRCULATED BY IRVING KRISTOL. .!.
],
TWO DEFINITIONS OF THE NEW CLASS
'' I
"LEFTI' "RIGHT" ! 1
.J
INCLUDE_ ALMOST ALL RESPONSIBLE EXCLUDES "LINE _'OFFICIALS
WHITE COLLAR WORKERS, INCLUDING AND PRACTICAL BRAIN WORKERS
ENGINEERS AND CORPORATE AND INCLUDES PUBLIC SECTOR 4.
NANAGERS. ENTREPRENEURS
'i
.} _
• , o
o
..,,-w_.. '..-r _..-_ _ _,,,,_i.' III Ir "'_ :..... , ;
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[ Business and "l'he New Class' '
By lavm_; KImm,_. A Preference for Fantasy -"J •Evury_me wants to be loved, and st M. Nor, It must be said, are their teachers Board o/ Co:ltributors
ways comes as a shock to discover th,_t In a much better condition. The average
there are people who dl,llke you for what college processor of history, sociology, lit-
you really are rather thnn f,_v w.hqi they stature, political science, sometimes won There are people '=Out
think are. thd_-e,I, m_t ot economics, le ',at as Inclined to prefer fan- there" who lind it
mistakenly you conve.
•us desperately resist such a conclualrtn. We tasy ever reellty. On every college c,,tmpus
keep h:slsting, to ourselves and others,, one can h_r it said casually by faculty 11'a.17t to believe the .... *
that thoce people out there who nre .,,eying membors tht, t the drug companies pro about business because they
nasty thlnga about us are merely lll.ln- busy suppre._,In8 cures for cancer or ar-termed, or $Iegulded, or haw I,,,en se- thrltLt or whatever; or that multinational /laVe certain adverse i1:(_5.
duced by mi_hlevous prol_ngt,uda _m the ¢orpo_tlon_ "really" make or unmake lions toward the businezs
part of a han_lful at Irredeemably perverse American foreign policy; or that "big bust.
f aplrdJI. And we remain confident, In our neu" actually welcomes a depression be- COll_nJui]ity to begin with.heart of heart& that if they only under- cause It creates a "reserve army of the us- They dislike business [or
stood us better, they would certaInly dis- employed" from which tt can recruit more
like us less., docile workers, whaf it is, not/or w_,at they
- In this respect businessmen are n:, lot- So there IJ certalmy room for all kinds mistakenly think it is.
man--and are as capable of self-deception of educational endeavors on ._e ._ar_ of the-- s anyone else. On any sing e (lay, all buslne_ commu_ty, and I .,o not wish to
over the country, ther_ are gatherings of be Interpreted as In =my wpy discouraging IJ. These people constitute what one may
corporate executives In which bewilder- them. The fact that they se :m so relatively simply call. for lack of a better name, "the
- r, le,lt _r_ vex,_tlon [S expressed nt the ell- Ineffectual_/a not n.ec.ellsLrlix _ argum.£nt • new class."mate of hostility toward huslnes] to be agahmt them. Educ,ttlou !_ _t be,t a slow This "new class" Is not easily definedfound In Washington. or in the medip, or _n and ted'-__m process, and that kind of cdu- fbut me; be vogttoly described. It consi_'.s
academia-or even, incredibly, among cation which trice to count,:ract a mu:_slvc, of a g,x,_.lly proportion of those o011ege.
their own children. And. quickly _,no,Jgh. origlnal mlseducatJon'is even slower and educated people whine skdls and vocaUons
the Idea Is nora th'_t something ought *c. be more tedious. Too many businessmen con-' proliferate in a "po_t-L, tduetrlai society" :done to create a bett r unde_.'_ton,h_g ruse education w=th advert[sinK, and el-: (tous-_anlel BelI'_ convenient term). We
fend, of course, al,preetatlon) of "the lrec mo_t uncm_sclo,Jsly Impose the short time. are t,dklng about scientist, teachers and [
enterprise system.',' A telev;:,ion s_rte._ o_t horizon of the letter on the former. The educaUonsl administrators, J0u_allst= and
[ economics and bu_lness for the high ,mlt o! Ume appn_prlate to the proce_ of others in the communicaUons lnduslflets,
schools? Space advert[sing in tile print education Is not a yea, but a gen,-rathm, p_ychologisL_, social workers, those law-
[ media? Face-to-face e_counters between }laving said this, however, I should like yere and doctors who make their careers '
businessman and college students? Long to pursue the truly Interesting question of in me expanding public sector, city plan. ; i
and serious luncheons with the editors of _rhu so re,my l:_telllgent pet.pie mnnag..' to nora. the staffs of the larger foundations, ;'
/ major newspapers and new_mogazine'J? In entertain so many absurd ideas about ace- ",s upper levels vf the govern,nent bureau-
the end, many of these Ideas come to frul- nom_es In general and business in r,3rtictl, cracy, etc., etc. It Is, by amy, a quite na-
tion. at sub_tantlal costs in r_oney and lar. In truth, one can properly put that merous cta_.; it Is on Indispensable class
tir .-but with depressingly small effect, question In a much stronger form: Why do' for our kind of society; It is a dtspropor.
[ Now, I do not wl_h to seem tn t,e _mth,r. ._o many _ntclhgent p_ople seem de_er, tlmatel, i'o:vcrtu2 cla=_; It L_ also an am-
! eatlmatln_' the degree of Ig_or,mce about _,in, d to hohl thus,. Id_'us and to re._,_t any. bltlou_ a_uI frustrated class, t
business and economics which dc,P_ In fact correction of thorn7 S:_eh determh,atlon Kevin Phillips calls thia el_s "the me-
exist In the United States today. It 1_ In- there must be, because mere error and lg- _tl_crm y.'" m his new 'book o_ tn_t title. ._
i deed amazing that, in a soclet_r m which norance are not of themselves so otxlurste. Tho,,gi_ the txmk hrm re,my shrewd ol_JC_ _'business plays so crucial aroh,, so re:my When they are, it Is I_ually because they vatlon_, the tern; he cJ=ooses seems to m¢
people come to understand _o little about st nl_o nro an Integral ptrt o/ an Ideolog,, to be unfortunate. It helps prolong what
--and. at the same time, to know so mu_h which serves som_. deeper passion or {nter- might be called the "Agnew Ulusion"-t.,:.,
about It which Isn't so. We haw, for In- eat. that n,uch of our troubles derive from the
t stance, man_q_ed to produce a generatlnn And the more stick, Lively one studies fact that a small =rod seh'-select_,d .'_p,
of young people which, for all _e educe- "the problem, the clearer It becomes that whose opinions are -mrcpresenta'dvtof the
American people, haw usurped control oftlon lavished on It, knows less about ttm .What Is commonly called a "bias" or an,
world of work--even the world of their "nn;mus" against business is really a by. our m,.dla and use their strategic po_ltlorJ
I fathers' work--than any previous genera- pi'oduet of a larcer purposiveness. There to launch nn assault on our traditions ,rid
, Lion in AmericLn hlsto,'y. They ! m:a,*ze _trc peolHo "ot,L il:,,l'c" who find it convc- In._lilull,ms. Such a pOlmll.,.t parse .clive is
essll) disregard common obese'alton, ap- nh,nt Io believe the worst about bushless mi._h',d:ng lind uttln;at,.ly ,olf.d,.,feMlng.
peat" to be rsdic_.ll:., deficient In that fee- b,.cm:._o they .have certnJn adverse Inten- Memhers of the new class do no, "control"
ult7 we call common sense. Irons t,_wsrd the business comm,J=_ity to the medlar, they art, the medla--J,k,t as
br.,m wllh. They dlMike bu:;ineas for what
It Is, not for what lhey mistakenly think It
!
C, :2,.
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Utcy ,ire, our educational I;ystem. uur |,uh- , rtti,m, and ill a hund,,'d oth,.r v,ay:.._ttJre, ist:L s.q Ln lrtrltaln, oven if they sometlme._
:le health lu_d welfare s)._tems, _nd r_uell ,w_,r, it mr,st be said Ihtxt the "id_...di.,r,," look anti sound like it. They have long' -?
-.lie. },van If the president of C_$ or the t,t lisle "tic'# old q"- " tl=n¢|f:hht =dl ,¢.._l,,,ct] wanted their "plat3 IP the sun," they are
publl_h,.r of 'Ilme wen, tn ,leclde tnmorrow _elf servia K, _ n,_t. for t'.;'_t reason main. :n the prcces._ o[ =elzing and _ons._lidnt,T_K . -t
theft George Wnll&cc w_suld be the Idel_l _ere. It really I_ trite th._t a ¢lvH;zatio:w It-lm.I now they have to .o a.qslmilated
Preiddent. it would have practically no el- ,,h:tped predominantly by f= Ir,'¢ m,=.rkct- Into the '.y_tem (eveu as the system wtlr
-.u
feet air what Is broadcast or puhhshcd, t,y the preferences _.nd app_'tite._ ,: ordl- hays t') chmlge to assimilate them). It will ,
Thole execUUves have as much control nnry men and women-h-n n "q_mlity of be n clew a" J painful b_lnese, but need ._
over "their" bureaucracies _e the _'cre- hfe" that is likely t(_ b,- regarded rq it,.-cl not end In calamity.
t.,ry of HEW has over hls. or as the aver. them wl'olly admirable by the better-edu- A Xood pert of thls proeeu of a3r, imlI,-
age college president has over his faculty, c_ted o]a.'_ee. To be sure. these cln_e_ ties will be the educaUon of this "new
What do_s th_ "new class" want and could try to Improve things hy elevating elan" in the ecru=lit!e, of busines.q and '
why should It be so holUle to the b_stnes,, sued refining the preferences of eli tli_'_e economlc_v--_mt :heir eo_verslon to "&ec _
community? Well, one should understand ordlna. 7 people: That, supposedly, le the enterprL_"--_o thn_ they can exercise'
that the members of this class are "ideal- Uberal and democratic way. But It h so their power responsibly. It wl]l be an ira- ..,
L;;;_," tn the ]ge0s =ease of that term-- much easier to mobllLte the ac_.h'e iayer._ me.-.se educatlonld thsk, in which the bust-
I._,., they are not much Interested In of publlc oplnlon behlnd such issues ne on- n_s community cert_Jnly can play n.n Ira. • .,_
n'._ney, but are keenly Interested In power, vlronmentaP.m, ecology, corununer pro- portent role. But before it can play this
_:ower for what? Well, the power to shape tcctton, _nd economl¢, ptannlng-, to glve the -
our eJvillzaUon-a power which, In a capl- I;over_mental bureaucracy the power t,) role. I,_t..4,es, h.t.,s first to under=rand the'
new =uciolugic,.I and l,OllUcld rtallty wlth- ,'
tailor syetem, is _mppoaed to reside In the i reg_late and coerce, and eventually to in whh'h it Is n(_w ,q,enttlng. That, to,), Is
free market. The "new cla_" wanis to see "Do'dUoi_e" the ,'conomic deci*lon-maklng _#
much of thle power redlsh'_b,ated to Ir_v- pro_- _. And this Is, of course, exactly' an educaUonal task nf no mnalJ proportlons.
ernment, where they will then have a what has been happening, o.
major say in how it I: exercL_ed. There can be little doubt that If those Mr. Kr|._tn] i# Ifcn_. L_c# Pre/c.t_or o/ i
From the very beginnings of cap=tel- new Imperialistic Impul_ea on the part of Uvb,=,c V,hre¢ ,,t New York U_lt, er.dty nml ..,
Ism, there hlul always existed ,, small "the publlc sector" {i.e., the poiltle_l see- ¢o-_(_,for of tke qd_rlrrljl Y&e Pubhc/,liar-
group of men and women who disnpprow.d tar) are unrestr_Ined, we s_ll reave to- est. Ire is _d_o a mc_,he.r o/ far Xn,_rnnl'_ _'
of the pervas/vo l.'ffluenc_ of the free mar- .ward some version _ _tste eapltellem In Bo, rd at Contribufur.s, [f,._ di_tiaouLsAed ""
k,'t on the civlll=atioa in which we llve. widch the citlsen's bldivldual liberty would p),)[c_or_ who contribute 1_riodic arfi¢l_ '.
• One used to call-th_a grodp "thb _Intellec-" be rendered ever mo,-_ Insecure. l_ut It In rcfleCtinO n broa_ r,mge o[ _cws. _,
tunis," and they are the ancesto=s of our ,aperient not to have nny lilu.,dona ab_,it __
o_'n "new cla._s," very 'ew of whom are hew much can be done to cope wlth _i.-. "" i
tntelletttutla but eli of whom In]writ the at- situation. The "new'class" is here, It is"
Utude_ toward c_pltalism t.h._t have flour- firmly established In Its ow:_ societ_I see-" The Wai ] Street Journal, a1
ished Rmcn_ intellectuals far more th,'m a tars, and It is :_t g_ing to go av,ay. It is May 19, 1975. Reprinted
century-and-a-lair. Thl._ atUtude _nay ,_t'. bile, therefore, to talk about retundn_ to a
eur_tely be.c_dled "eliUst"-thou_h peep'- "free enterprise" system Ln which govern- with perrni ss ion of The i
who nre convinced they lncarn;tte "the ment will pity the modest role It u_ed to. WaI I Street Journal'_-_ -_ "
public Interest." _ distinct from nil the "I1_e Idea of such a counter-reformitt_on is Dew Jones & Company, Inc. "|
private lntereits era free society, are ,at utopian. P.,on_.idReagan wan a two.term (1975) AII rights
likely to think ot themselves In _uo.h a w_ty. governor" at California, and whatever _is " .. _
It is b_IcaIly =usplc'oua of, and he-tile to, accomp_tehment_ the restoraUrn of "free reserved. .
the market precisely because the market enterprise" wM not one of them. Were ne _|
is m vulgaHy ;emocretic--one duller, onP to becoma a two-term President, he (and
vote. A 'vilt:mUon shaped by m_rket we) would find that, aP.er the Ideologlcel
transactions is a clvllizattlen responsive to ',._moke lutd cleared, not all that much had" "] -.
the eom,_mn appetites, preferences, and changed. '
ImpiraUoM _ common people. _,e "new " ; i
clam"-Intellisent, educated, e.ergetlc_ NOt Hopeless,But...
ha= IItUo reR)ect for iuch a commonplace Not that the situation is impeless--it's'
clHllzaUon. It wishes to see Its "ldeftls" Just that -_e has to recognize the limlte,t. ""
more e/fectuti than the market 'is likely to rnnge of _,a po._ib_e. It is possible, I think,
I_rmlt U'_em to be. And so It tr_es always at least to preserve a substantial and vlg" * '
to supersede econ_mlcs by polities-an r_c. orous private sector--not only a business.
U71ty In which It h, moat competent, slnc¢ sector, but _tsc a non-governmental not- - •
It, as the relents and the Implicit nuthorlty for-profit sector-in the United States. This
to shape public opinJon on all ht."ser tssu,_s, re._t hRpl_en, not beca_mo of the ._e]f.evtdent . _
virtual of b_lncs.% but becotzq,"of the poe-
Its Own Gravedigger. ° found appeal of Individual liberty to ill
8o there Is a sen.qu In which capitalism " Americans, and because of the cqueJly " *'
r.ay yet ttL,'n outto be Its own t .wedl_-. preferred distrust of big government by _Jl ' "
,,er, since it Is capitalism that creat_,_ thlq America.no. Tn this appeal o_d this dl._trtr_t - •
"new elMs"--through economic growth, even mcmbe,'s of the "new elt_s" share,
a/fluonce, mass Idgher ed,retloo, the pro- to one degree or another. It I._ our good for. -1
Ilteratlnn of new technolol_ies of co,nrr.unI, tune tlmt they are not doetrtnatre ,_clal-
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IHE NEW CLASS
(P()SSESSES KNOWLEDGE. LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND FORMAL EDUCATIONRATHER THAN PRI_IILEGED FAMILY, PROPERTY, OR ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL SKILLS)
ESPECIALLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY THE HUMANITIES
ACADEMICS,
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND VERY RARELY ENGINEERS AND
GEOLOGI STS
I- TEACHERS_ ESPECIALLY NON-SCIENTISTS
I
SOCIAL WELFARE BUREAUCRATS
SOCIAL WELFARE BUREAUCRATS
GOVERNMrNT UNIONS &
PROFESSIONALS, ESPECIALLY SALARIED
[
NATIONAL MEDIA
I
: t ADVERTI SING : ;
i i ;
FOUNDATIONS _ ;
I
RESEARCH ORGANI ZAT IONS i
i GOVERNMENTSTAFF 1 :
i
I UNION STAFF
'..
.' { MAINSTREAM PROTESTANT CLERGY
" I MANY CORPORATE PLANNERS AND P.R. TYPES
• PUBLIC SECTOR ENTREPRENEURS
_._,
{ SOME LABELS OF THE NEW CLASS
I NTcLLECTbALS
,_ [: _NTELLI GENTSIA
BRAIN WORKERS
"il i CLERIsyKNOWLEDGEWORK RS
TECHNOSTRUCTURE
EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC ESTATE
MERITOCRACY i
• ,i I I I I II
W
,,' _;..,-b_ ,.,,,_,.;.,,_.:_.._.._m_w_',, "'",,',K.':",-',,_-:'- ;........ :................................,.............:.... _.._._,, ........... .
mr
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ETHNIC ORIGINS OF MOST OF NEW CLASS 1
(GROUPS WITH HIGH REGARD FOR EDUCATION)
l
OLD YANKEE ELITES, ESPECIALLY THE DECLININF- EX-RICH
"MAI NSTREAM" PROTESTANT DENOMI NATIONS ]
CONGREGATI ONALI STS
PRESBYTERI ANS
REFORMED
QUAKERS
UNI TARIANS
EPI SCOPALIANS
NORTHERNMETHODI STS
JEWS, ESPECIALLY KEFORMAND SECULARIZED
HAUTE-EMBOURGEO!SED ROMAN CATHOLI CS
E.G. JESUITS
?
IF THERE IS AN EMER_:NG NEW CLASS j
IT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED BY"
I
HIGH FORMAL EDUCATION
RESPECTABLE SOCIAL ORIGINS _ .."PROFESSIONAL" OCCLIPATIONAL STATUS ; -_
HIGH (BUT NOT HIGHEST) INCOME _j i
NON -MARKET INCOME ' ,
GOVERNMENT SALARY i
NON-PROF IT SALARY
CONTRACTS AND GRANTS
RELATIVE YOUTH
]
1
t
1 '
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_' E KEY NEW CLASS INSTITUTIONS
' UNIVERSITIES
i [ RESEARCH INSTITUTES
GOVERNMENT STAFFS
PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBYS
OTHER NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
-[ MEDIA CONGLOMERATES
![, SOME "NEW CLASS" ORGANIZATIONS
ACLU1 ADALEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS "
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES( 'COMMON CAUSENADERITES
CONSUMERS UNION
I SIERKA CLUBFORD fOUNDATION i
!
! i
NE_ CLASS ALLIES AND CO-BELLIGERENTS
DECADENT OLD RICH i
MORE RADICAL TRADE UNIONS i
i OLD LEFT !NEW LEFT REMNANTS
MILITANT FEMINISTS ". '
t
ORGANIZAED MINORITY GROUPS i
BLACKSOTHER NON-WHITES
PSEUDO-ETHNICS
(LEFT) PSUEDO-POPULISTS"TRENDIES"
THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IN GENERAL
{
I
i'
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A PARADIGM OF UPPER-ttlDDLE-CLASS LIFESTYLES ]
TRADITIONAL EARLY INDUSTRIAL MATURE INDUSTRIAL
MODEST STATUS HIGH STATUS NO SPECIAL STATUS
"1'
l OR 2 SERVANTS 2-5 SERVANTS I OR NO SERVANTS -_
CRUDE SERVANTS SKILLED SERVANTS INSOLENT SERVANTS "{
EXPENSIVE GOODS CHEAP GOODS SHODDY GOODS
FEW SERV ICES _ta,NY SERVl CES SERV ICE "R IP-OFFS"
NO CARS, LITTLE OR CARS, OPEN ROADS, LONG DISTANCE COMMUT-
NO COMMUTING EASY PARKING ING, TRAFFIC JAMS
URBAN NEIG_IBORHOODS SUBURBS SUBURBAN SPRAWL
UNNOTICED _OLLUTION LESS POLLUTION POLLUTION SENSITIVITY
L I H ITED TR_,VEL TOURI SM TOURI ST POLLUTI ON
"_t ' i
" i •
• i
I
1
.. _.,,_iV-Tlm_t.-_-g= _ ....--,_---,-----,._-----_:..... _ _ , i
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I
NEW CLASS AGENDA
' F EXPANSION OF SIZE OF GOVERNMENT|J
" EXPANSION OF POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
[ HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE SALARIES.,
EXPANDED RESEARCH BUDGETS
EXPANDED EDUCATI ON
I- CREDENTIALI SM
"ACADEMIC FREEDOM"
i "CIVIL LIBERTIES"
EGALITARIAN ISM
I BLOCKING ECONOMIC GROWTH
OTHER ATTACKS ON RIVAL ELITES
l
t
I '
[
[
i i i! i i i , .
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NEW CLASS IDEOLOGY •
_p
I. PERSONAL SELF-FULFILLMENT, HAPPINESS, COMFORT, FUN, ._
FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE
2. LIFE MAXIMIZATION, RISK AVOID,_NCE '
NEAR PACIFISM J ,
HEALTH
SAFETY
ANTI-CREATIVE DESTRUCTION "'
3. I'NATURISM" ""
ECOLOGYAND ENVIRONMENTALISM _, ,
ANTI-INDUSTrIALIZATION
_ ANTI-V_CHINERY "I
-_i ANTI-TECHNOLOGY _,
f
i 4. ANTI-ORGANIZATIONANTI-CORPORATION °_
--i ANTI-NATION-STATE _
-' LOCALISM l!
.q SMALL IS BETTER "_ i
L;I "J
: 5. ANTI-TRADITIONS AND TABOOS iREI. IGION --
--_ SEX
FAMILY "
SOCIAL RULES
' ADVERSARY CULTURE _ ,
6. INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE STANDARD _.
I
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- NEW CLASS AGENDA
EXPANSION OF SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
EXPANSION OF POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE SA_RIES
EXPANDED RESEARCH BUDGETS
EXPANDED EDUCATION
CREDENTIALISM
"ACADEMIC FREEDOM"
_i; "CIVIL LIBERTIES" I
EGALITARIANISM
BLOCKING ECONOMIC GROWTH
i
OTHER ATTACKS ON RIVAL ELITES ,
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Appendix B
_ HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR SPACE DEVELOFMENT
I 2084: SPACE AND SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
For the examination of space and society in the twenty-first
century the year 2084 has been selected as the target date. Any selected
year is arbitrary; 2084 was chosen because it will be about a century fromthe product on of this report, and use of the literary connotation--it
is by reference to George Orwell's 198____44.
I The preliminary treatment of the subject is to treat "society" and
"space" as independent invariables; This is merely a hypothesis, not
a conclusion, and will be modified in the detailed examination, This
is done consciously, partially because of some skepticism of overblown
claims often made for the effects of technology on society. Although I
it is true that "technology" (collectively) has had an extraordinary !
I effect on "society" (collectively), at least during the last few centuries,yet it is, as will be argued, exceedingly difficult to see very many
examples of individual technologies having extraordinary effects on
i society collectively and certainly not rapidly. ,
To be sure, the hypothesis may itself be excessively influenced by
. recent history whereby technological change has clearly been gravely
I restrained, retarded and diverted by social pressures expressed throughpolitics. The best example is, of course, the American space program--the
technology has been available to for example, begin preparations for
a manned mission to Mars, for example, yet the social support and therefore • !
the funding were not present. This kind of choice often is a complex i
and difficult matter that will be expanded upon subsequently. For now
1 forecasts for society and space will be made separately and the integration _
done later in this section. ,.
A. Society i
By "society" is meant the total system of human relations of an I
l era. In the absence of knowledge of extra-terrestrial societies, it• is a global society that is being cont mplated. This con ept seems
banal, except that it is necessary to point out that a global society
has only recePtly been achieved. Only in the last generation can itF-
| truly be said that all human beings on this earth interact with one
t_
another in some way. (Perhaps a few hundred tribesmen in the Amazon
are holdouts, but they will not last long.)
[ ' ,To discuss, much less to understand, contemporary global society
in a satisfactory manner is simply impossible, beyond human capabilities, i
[_ Agreement cannot even be achieved upon what are key parameters. So it iis necessary to recognize human limitations and simplify extraordinarily.
But this does not limit the oppcrtunities to improve our general under- I "
standing. To use an analogy from art, no one can reproduce any existing
i human being, yet the artist with a few lin_s of graphite on a sheet
.... "" -._ _1_ _." t. -= _ -.,
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of processed lumber can depict what is clearly a recognizable person. _
Because it is recognizable, it is discussable and understandable.
A method used at the Hudson Institute to limn possible,and useful future I
societies is the study of "alternative world futures." Herman Kahn 3
has admirably outlined the objectives of this tool:
I. To stimulate and stretch the imagination.
2. To clarify, define, name, expound, and aro,_e major issues. "_
_ 3. To design and study alternative policy "packages" and contexts.
_w
4. To create propaedeutic and heuristic expositions_ methodologies, i
paradigms and frameworks. _
5. To improve intellectual conwnunication and cooperation,
particularly by the use of historical analogies, scenarios, --
. metaphors, analytic models, precise concepts, and suitable "
_: language. "'
•:i 6. To increase the ability to identify new patterns and crises ._ !
_I and understand their significance. {
IE_t This methodology has been used in various ways over the years. ..
! Experience has taught us that it is wise to employ a small number of i
sets of alternative futures for very simple, practical reasons. If ._
-I a single Future is presented, that is taken as a Forecast, which is i
not the intention. If two alternative futures are presented, this _
:._ sets up the terms for a two-sided and contentious debate (although _j;.,
-, we have occasionally created two such futures for exactly that purpose);
if three are selected, then the normal response is to take the midd]e
one as the "medium" and the most likely. Four futures eliminates that _
problem, but reintroduce the disputes about the middle two. Five futures =. i
• has the same problem as three plus the additional disadvantage of excessive
elaboration; and six or more futures bogs one down in unmanageable _. !
materials. Clea_ly, four alternative futures is preferred if there l
- is no most-likely scenario. Nonetheless, so far irlour research we .
have found it sufficient to make do with three (or as we shall see _ i,
three and a half) global social futures.
It should be clearly understood that these are imaginative constructs.
' Ti_ev are not "scientific" calculations, as the word is commonly understood "_
in the late twentieth century. Nonetheless, they are not fiction (even .8
L; science fiction) because they rest firmly upon three fairly substantial
_I empirical legs. The alternative future worlds must be= 1_ '
i 1. Consistent with what is known of scientific "laws" as understood
- today (but it would be most surprising if those laws were not modified I[I _ 'in the next 100 years), l
i 2. Consistent with established patterns of human behavior, i
' Granted, this is a somewhat shaky leg because there is by no means I i
i widespread agreement about what consititutes established human behavior... I ""
For example, marxists and other utopians argue that certain aspects !
1 '
•Herman Kahn, The Alternative World Futures Approach. HI-787-RR. I
2l November 1966. I _j'__j_
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I_ of human action, especially less pleasant ones, are not inherent inthe human race, but are a necessary output of certain economic
and social institutions. We can partially handle this objection by
reference to our third leg:
3. Not unrecognizably different from the world of today. This
leg is kept in place by the relatively short timeframe of the exercise.
On the record, a century is not sufficient time to fundamentally modify
human behavior. This argument is made by analogy. The year 2084 is as _
distant as is the year 1884. Certainly, there have been many changes in
science and in society since the year 1884, but it is not unrecognizably
l different. We could travel 1884 feel home
t_ and quite at the_ e, at
least in its advanced e_unc,mies and among its upper clacses. And while
this is necessarily conjecture, it is not difficult to imagine that
I many people from 1884 could come to 1984 and fit in rather nicely indeed. ;Certain things would amaze them, but people are extraordinarily adaptable.
A piece or supporting, but not conclusive, evidence of this speculation
I is that very primitive people, people who effectively live in 1584,can be brought in from the bushes, and manage to do commendably well
in our society; they will not be theoretical physicists, but can live t
and do useful work among us. To reiterate_ we should consider that ,:
i from 1984, but not inconceivably different.
2084 will be different
Clearly the _hird leg of the triad of support implies that the i
( alternative future worlds will be related in some way to our own, and
• ( this is a correct assumption. They are derivations of the present !
world and therefore are in a sense forecast or p_ojected from our world. _
( But the projection is not m_de in any mechanical way. They are rather
_ more of an a priori nature than of a projection. Always with 1984 !
in our minds, we will draw up alternative future worlds of 2084_ being
careful (we hop_) to make those worlds internally consistent and _
reflective of the three basic principles of construction mentioned
above, but nevertheless these are intellectual constructions primarily.
We have labeled these worlds with Greek letters which are keyed _ ito the proper names of writers whose works have contributed to suggesting i
these worlds to us:
i 1. Kaae_p.a.. Kappa is from Kahn9 Herman Kahn, who was the leader in
• developing the methodology employed here and who with his associates
(including these writers) 6eveloped and elaborated a fairly consistent
( and plausible vision of the future of mankind. This is perhaps most
familiarly e_pressed in what Kahn called "The Long-Term Multifold Trend" '
(Table B-l).-i f
_ The use of the Multifold Trend will be elaborated in our description
• of the Kappa world. It may be useful to note at this time that certain
I tendencies will be held to be of great importance in the twenty-first
t The first widely available versio f this was in Kahn and AnthonyJ. Weiner, The Year 2000 (New York: 19_7_, P.7. Our version is from
Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come (New York: 1972), pp. 8-9. i_
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Table B-I
J
THE LONG-TERM MULTIFOLD TREND OF WESTERN CULTURE
-m
I. Increasingly sensate (empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, _
pragmatic, manipulative, explicitly rational, utilitarian, contractual,
_b
epicurean, hedonistic, etc.) cultures
-j
2. Bourgeois, bureaucratic, and meritocratic elites
3. Centralization and concentration of economic and political power _,
4. Accumulation of scientific and technical knowledge ..
5. Institutionalization of technological change, especially research, _>
development, innovation, and diffusion
6. Increasing military capability _.
7. Westernization, modernization, and industrialization --
8. Increasing affluence and (recently) leisure
9. Population growth ,_
I0. Urbanization, recently suburbanization and "urban sprawl"--soon
the growth of megalopoli "_
J
II. Decreasing importance of primary and (recently) secondary and
tertiary occupations; increasing importance of tertiary and (recently) _ ". ,!
quarternary occupations !
12. Increasing literacy _d education and (recently) the "knowledge _,
industry" and increasing role of intellectuals
_m
13. Innovative and manipulative social e-qineering--i.e., rationality
increasingly epplied to social, polit, al, cultural, and economic "J
worlds as well as to shaping and exploiting the material world-
increasing problem of ritualistic, incomplete, or pseudo rationality
14. Increasing universality of the multifold trend
15. Increasing tempo of change in all of the above
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"increasing universality
. century. To reverse the order, consider No. 14,
of the multifold trend." We expect that in another century what i
generally called the industrial revolution will have been completed;
• r- that is, all of humanity will have access to the system and nea ly all
= | countries will by historical standards be substantially richer--although,
_J if the attitudes of the prosperous in today's world are any measure,
they will be less than satisfied with their prosperity. This trend
.: ( is also reflected in No. 7. On the question of increasing affluence/ (No. 8) we will make rough estimates of world and major national economic
products. These can be astoundingly high figures, even assuming moderately
l growth rates, probably factors of l0 to 50 greater chan current GNP forI most nations. Indeed, our projections will show enormous numbers even
though we forecast a slowing down of growth rates, especially in the
advanced nations. (The reasons for the slowing down are twofold-first
*. i technical, in that before long the very high early growth rates of
L been a transition from an agricultural to an indus.trial society can
no longer swell the world growth figures. We note that much of this
I change has statistically misleading, as the conventions of GNP accountingtend to disregard the product of subsistence and household eco-_mies.
As families move into an exchange economy a greater fraction o their
i output appears in the national income accounts. But probably h,_reimportant _s a drag on economic grcwth will be e perception of a declining
marginal utility of prosperity. The rich have, on average,,less need
for the next increment of production than have the unrich.)
I No. 6, "Increasing military capability," is of obvious concern
_ to space futures, as are numbers ',and 5 before it.
_i _ In its larger framework the Kappa world will lcx_kvery much like
:_ that of today. This picture is more than merely a "conservative" forecast.
r It reflects the evident fact that Western civilization seems to be ;
-_ i running out of new ideas for economic, social, and political organization. !
" The late twentieth century has shown very l_ttle that is "ne_' outside t
of certain important technological areas. The dominant themes have
( been disillusionment with many of the progra_ls and nostrums of the 4
1 past, to use Daniel Bell's phrase, "an end to ideology," and a succession
of revivals of old ideas, spuriously labeled by their promoters as
' ( "new"--most of these are better labeled "neo-," a new version of ....
I ( Thus, the Kappa world will assume the survival of the nation-state,
i but with considerable international and subnational organizations.I Indeed, the most probable p_litical forecast will be a very slow evolution
} toward something more resembling the Middle Ages than the Nineteenth
' Century. Instead of a world system of discrete sovereign nation-states
rather like the 3reek image of the atom, there will be a devolution
( of some powers of the nation-states upward to international organizations
_ and downward toward subnational bodies. The EEC is an excellent example
i *This slowing growth hypothesis is developed in det=il In Kahn,
William Brown, and L. Martel. The Next 200 Years (New York: 1976).
. _ ......... _ ,,__.:- _. _ _.--,--
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of what we mean. Another is the Arab league. Various international
space corporate bodies may soon offer other examples. All manner _f
structures of international cooperation can be expected. Another variant
15 the present relations between NASA and foreign space programs whereby
there is a single-nation-dominant cooperative venture. Nonetheless,
despite these changes, we would be very surprised indeed to see the
nation-state seriously modified from its dominant locus of power and
the loyalty of its inhabitants.
2. Delta. The Delta world takes its name from the scientific popularizer
Rene Dubos, who in our judgment is not only a good thinker in his own
right, but can stand as a representative of many writers, and more
{mportant many more individuals_ who have an optimistic view of a future
informed by technological knowledge and secular idealism. Such people $
view the nation-state and traditional loyalties as erimitiv_ and atavistic
and look forward to--not in any _-r +Dot utopian sense--human e,'olution
toward higher spheres of ethics and b_lavior. Although it is !mporta;_t
to be skeptical about such ferecas_s--in part because it seems to u_iversalize _ ,
the internal values of an elite university era research institute--nevertheless
we see it as very much within the realm of human possibility and note
that many very serious people in powerful places of influence are working
diligently tn _.u ,L_ _nievement. Such people, we believe, make up
the bulk , the intellectual staff of the Western arms control movement. -.
They are not subversives, fools, or crazies; they are informed by a
desire to work toward _ world without war and a world not ruled by
threats of brute force. -_ '
i
The Delta world is also consistent with the long-term multifold
trend outlined above, but puts more emphasis on certain aspects of
it--in particular the first five items on the list. This world is "_
to some degree a technocracy, to some degree a world dominated by the _,
views of irreligious _cientists as fii_t seriously outlined by August
I Comte and the other Positivist disciples of Saint-Simon in the early -_ "
nineteenth century in France.
We have to speculate on whether or not this world will be richer
_D
than the Kappa world. On one hand it ought not to be as rich because
this society should care less about money and material possessions. But
on the other hand, the heightened role of the scientist and tech ician and
lesser amounts of money spent on armaments might more than counteract the
first factor. Considerably more thought needs to be given to this matter.
J
I 3. Bet.__.aa.Thi_ world is nameJ after James Burnham, the American political
., figure who amalgamated and popularized the works of Marx, trotsky,
1 and the hard-minded reactionary social scientists of the tur,lof the
'] century (whom Burnham labeled "the Machiavellians"). His most famous
work was The Managerial Revolution, whici,, appropriately, was a primary
source for G_ _ Orwell'_ 1984. The Beta world is a world of continued _
discord and s fe. In the 8eta world we expect that No. 6 "Increasing
military capability" and No. 13 "innovative anu mar. lpulative social
engineering" would be dom.nant. As forecast by Burnham in The Managerial J
1
]985022650-]66
.l
i[.[
_ Revolution, all societies are increasingly dominated by the hierarchies
:'_! L cf "managers" answerable _=ostly to themselves and in continuous struggle
with managers of other institutions For material goods, power, and
[ prestige--but power most of all. This is a world which is not unfamiliarto us, and especially to those who frequent the precin ts f great
,- international capitals and of other large institutions. This is not
the world of Orweil's 1534--we do not expect a system as ongoing and
i competent as his nightmare. This _s a world in which most peopl_ continue
_ atout their business relat;ng themselves to their private lives much
as they do today, yet it is a!so a world in which there is a marked
l withdrawal from public life, a decline in the idea of citizenship,
i _ and a heightening of cynicism. It is also a wor _,'of great organizations
that choke out (.rdominate those around them. Whether it is nominally
i "socialist" or not, in a con_iderable sense makes no difference_ the
_ managers can disregard "the people" just as easily as some can now
:_ disregard the "shareholders".
F
i
L
•! i In a considerable sense, the Beta world differs from the Kappa
" world in the opposite direction from, and roughly in a mirror image
-_ -
. of, the Delta world. Both worlds are "materiaiistic" but the Beta
_ i world is more cynical, selfish, and goods-oriented _s contrasted with
t the increased emphasis on a more "idealistic," although equ_l_y selfish
Delta t_orld.
F• |
': , 3½. Gamma. Gamma is for Gibbon, _dward Gibbon, historian _'-Tne Decline }
and Fall of the Roman Empire. This _ ment;on but do not expect to
elaborate in detail, for reasons which will soon become evident. The t
I Gamma world #I is that of Decline and, according to the schema of the
great macrohistorians such as Speng'er _nd Toynbe._, a "universal state"
or '_ci_ _iz_tion-wide empire" is a mark of decline, because a world
i ir__erium (contmar,d) cannot be effectively operated by the United States
and certainly not by any other liberal democratic state, the organizaing
authority for the world imperium must be the Soviet leadership (the
( best candidate), Chinese leadership, perhaps Japan, or some other power
I which has not yet appeared; although this last seems most unlikely. !
Gamma world #2 is that of Fall, the collapse of civil!_ation,
( the reduction of the world society to a litter of poor, beastly tribes
in the model of the Dark Ages of Europe following the collapse of the
Roman Empire in the west. Such is a ,easonable outcome of a major
I multi-combatant thermonuclear war.
Both of these worlds (3eta and G_mma) have very interesting space-
related implications. Scenarios for achievement of the Fall world
i proliferation, relative decay of the
derive easily from nuclear the
United States and other stablizing powers, and the ready availability
of cheap, reasonably reliable long-range weapons.
The decline wcrld of a world imperium also is made more likely by
certain developments in space technology. The pr!ncip_l problem of
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: operating a very large tyranny is that the rulers must create an expensive .i
and untrustworthy security apparatus which e-entuaTrT-wi#! turn on
them. Space-based intelligence and weapons systems make it possible -_
to police the world with a small number of technicians. Reconnaissance .I
satellites can detect almost any sort of serious hostile activity,
and space-based directed energy or other precision weapons can easily
execute surgical, general or random reprisals against dissident sections. !
There would be less need for "spooks," praetorian guards, or any other -J
potentially disruptive security forces.
We do not elaborate further on the Gamma worlds because they are not _,
policy-relevant to the American space program. To say the least, NASA
ought not to b_ concerned with speculations about the destruction of -.
. techno:_gy or the supercession of the American republic. We expect that ;
: the three worlds outlined earlier will provide some of the alternatives "'
b
: useful for analysis of the prospects for space developments, i
_ B. Space
Of course, "space" is used in its popular meaning--human and/or .,
" automated activit!es in orbit around this earth or beyond. Initially,
we maJe a single "surprise-free" projection of the potentials for space -. !
: up to the year 2076. Drawing on our previous work, updating and modifying _
it where necessary and appropriate, our surprise-free projection for "J
space capabilities and activities on the Moderate Scenario is roughly
consistent with the Kappa world. This forecast init;ally reflects _#
technical achievability, but necessarily is heavily modified by the -, i
needs and goals of society, so the projection for space becomes integrated
with that of society; that is, we attempt an informed speculation of, -_
what society will permit and expect of space. J
!
L
C. Space and Society _, ,
In addition, while initially constructing our materials as independent
variables, then letting soc!ety drive space, the possibilities for space "_
driving society will also be examined--for space activities feeding back _.
to earth society and modifying it. Here the method must be speculation,
but it also can be informed in a useful way by historical analogy. -!
The metaphor "frontier" is often used for space, so we look next
; at the effects of _revious frontiers, both territorial and technological. ..
The richest material, we expect, will derive from examination of the
expansion of Europe across the seas in the early modern age. Of great -'
significance to this study is the theories of the Texas historian Walter
Prescott Webb who posited that there was in the early modern period
up to about 1900 a "Great Frontier" whose existence, wealth, and spirit .1
i greatly influenced the "Metropolis" of Europe. Other frontiers will
' also be identified and examined, but it is doubtful if any of them ?_
will be as relevant to our purposes as Webb's Great Frontier. _
] 985022650-168
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The second body of historical analogy usefvl to our purposes isthat of technology. And the most promising are the fr ntiers whereby
transportation technology permitted the better exploitation of a previously
difficult or impossible medium. Related to the Great Frontier is thedevelopment of effective intercontinental sailing ships which allowedthe exploitation of the ocean medium. Also worth at least a look is
the railroad which had almost equally revolutionary effects upon land
media which were difficult of access because of their inherent qualties(deserts, mountains, steppes) or mere transcontinental distances.
More familiar to us is the exploitation of the air frontier.Within the emory of me: now alive, machinery has been devised which
permits the conquest of the atmosphere_ a major industry has been built
up, and profound changes have been achieved in the world. This is
t especially interesting to space because
relevant and those in activities
of the interrelationship of personnel and of institutions into what
has been labeled "aerospace" (but whether this near unity is likely
to be continued is an interesting question of futures research). '
From this combination of analytical exercies--alternative future
( worlds, surprise-free projections, and historical analogy, it should
be possible to produce a rich body of material regarding space and
society in the twenty-first century that should help to stimulate the
thinking of responsible officials in the late twentieth century.i ,
i '
i '" {
f _
f
L
-[
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_l This section is an attempt to improve the understanding of the
i potential effect of space exploitation upon earth's society by employing
i_ analogy. Our concept is to take literally the metaphor
historical
of space as a "frontier," examining the effects of the prev;ous physical
end technological frontiers upon their societies. The approach is
prompted by the idea of the great Texas historian Walter Prescott Webb;his The Great Frontier (Austin, Tex., 1952) expanded the "frontier
hypothesis" Of the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner to all
I F of modern history. In addition to the Turner concept that the Frontier
/ experience substantially modified European civilization in its transfer
to America, Webb argued that the overseas frontier of Europe in the
early modern age made fundamental ci_anges on European society itself.
{ ""_ Webb's work in many ways falls short of the highest standards of 'historiography because he was not thoroughly informed about European
society and was rather carried away by his enthusiasm for the Frontier
- { thesis; nevertheless, the concept and the terminology is relevant to/ the central concerns of a space frontier.
( To Webb, the term "frontier" is not used in its European sense
"_ ( of a clear-cut legal boundary between separate jurisdictions, but as
i_ i a zone to some degree accessible to and used by men, which is adjacent
both to the already settled versions and to the unoccupied wilderness
beyond. The frontier, therefore, is a moving concept. A second Webbian !
term is "the Metropolis," by which he means the original settlement.
i Of course r the analogy in space exploration is the Earth as ffctropolis
and those nearer portions of extraterrestrial space which are being
• [ used by mankind in some way as the frontier. Beyond the space frontier
_! is of course the wilderness, which can be called "deep space." recognizing" r that this is a concept which ill gr dually recede from E rth as this ;
i ( space frontier advances.
A flaw in Webb is his limiting of the frontier discussion to overseas ,
{ land activities. It is weii to keep in mind tha, _il the beginning "
_ of the modern age, circa 1500 A.D., Europe (as i _ just coming to i
i be called--the previous label was "Christendom") h_ 4 land frontier
i|I { tO the east which was largely a military frontier against the steppe
and a clearly military frontier to the south against the highly organized
. and formidable forces of Islam. (We might recall that Columbus's first
i expedition set sail the same year as th_ liquidation of the last Moslem
outpos, in Spain.) But to the west was a sea fronti-F A. The Sea Frontier
To Medieval man the Atlantic seemed as difficult an obstacle asA
i [ was the air in the nineteenth century and space in the early tewntieth
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i century. To be sure, the Vikings, using very primitive sea-going
! technology, succeeded in reaching Iceland, Greenland, and even effecting
a short-lived lodgement on the North American continent. This was aI
, dead end, for reasons which are not entirely clear. However, it a-d _
i ruthless pirates whose greed and fighting spirit sent them east to M Jscovy,
Constantinople, and Persia; south to England, France, and around Gibraltar
I into the Mediterranean; as well as west across the Atlantic. Advances
on all of these axes halted at approximately the same time, about the
i year 1000, which was also approximately the time that these pagans,!
were converted to Christianity. The point here is that technology,
however important, is not the only factor involved. There was no retrograde
movement in Scandinavian shipbuiiding and navigation technique. Something
happened to the will of these "gangs" which made them halt their viking.
It is ,_11 estab_ed that there was a climatic change_ at least a
little later on in the Middle Ages, which made sailing the North Atlantic
a more difficult exercise. That change so demoralized the economic
life of Iceland that these proud people had to become a sort of Puerto
Rico to Denmark. Also it essentially wiped out the Greenland colony. "_
Be that as it may, the abortive trans-Atlantic effort was followed
by a successful one a half-millennium later. The late Middle Ages .,
saw an incremental evolutionary development of blue-water shipbuilding
techniques relying upon increasingly complex use of sails as well as -_
the gradual improvement of hull design through generations of empirical _ ,
experimentation. In addition, a series of minor but cumulatively important
breakthroughs in navigation permitted credible at-sea location and
direction finding--of course, the basis of the navigational technology
was one of the first practical exploitations of space: the calculation
of the position of the ship relative to the stars. Another breakthrough
was the exploitation Ofoceans_amagnetic merelyphenomenon:across the compass, to North _l__llI
Within a generation on either side of 1500 A.D. a transocean breakout
, from Europe occurred. The Atlantic barrier had collapsed. The sea
f,-ontier jumped across not the Atlantic |
and South America, but also southward around Africa to "the Indies." The
key "missions"--the Sputniks and Apollos of that era--were Christopher
Columbus's passage of the Atlantic in 1492 and Vasco Da Gama's voyage to
India in 1946. Both of these had been prepared by a series of preliminary
missions. Portugal was the leader in promoting transoceanic exploration.
- It is striking, especially considering the enormous differences between T
those societies and our own, how similar _as the institutional mechanism
for sea exploration to that of space. There was a complex interplay between
General remarks are based on wide reading in primary and secondary
so_ es of the priod. Reference was made to these works for this paper:_ "
Morl.on, Admiral of _he 0tear _ea (Boston. 1942) ; Morison, The European J
Discovery of America (Boston, 1971 & 2_); A.L. ,,owse, The Expansion -- i
of Elizabethan England (New York, 1955). A superb summary is J.H.
Parry, Th___eA,e of Reconnaissance (New York, 1964). Atlantic. ] iw_i
.... _,,_,-q_,-_'_l "_,...............
,' .__ ,_r_l_P_:" "_r___ _. "_ _ -_" : ......._ .................. "
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the expedition promoters, syndicates of profit-motivated investors, and thegovernm nts of that time. There was, if y u like, a sea-industrial-complex,
or a sea-trade industry. Furthermore, a minor p_int but one which is
impossible to resist noting: Italian captains played the same _ole
around 1500 as German rocket scientists around 1950--and in both
cases,
a generation of national specialists was quickly replaced by native talent.
Now, what did these sea venturers want and what did they expectfrom their efforts? W may assume that to some degree they were motivated
by mere curiosity and adventure, although this was not in those days
F considered to be a legitimate ambition and has not, to our knowledge
! been so reported. To obtain the necessary support for their venture,
they n eded mor serious r asons. The first was money. One f the
major ambitions for overseas trade was the observation of the enormous
i prices that could be obtained for transoceanic goods in Europe. The
vaunted spices and silks of the East sold in Europe for extraordinarily
high prices because of the high transportation costs, considerable
risks of the Levantine route_ and the large numbers of middlemen.Anyone who could find a low-cost rout to the Indies could cou t on
picking up huge windfall profits from exploiting these price differentials.
I The second motive, although related, was also money--but for a :
very different reason, for what we would now call "national security."
In those days, money played the role in war similar to what technologydoes today. In the modern world w take it for granted that the money I
will be abailable at least to pay the troops and provide them with
basic equipment--such was not the case in the early modern age. The i
_| _ idea of nationalism had hardly emerged and a soldier or a sailor considered[ himself to be a working man who had every right to be paid. Those
mi]itary workers had considerable experience in the unreliability of
governments to meet the obligations to their forces. Troops and shipsF
. | had to be paid and paid for in specie--in gold and silver. No specie_
then no troops, no ships, no guns.
The early sea frontiersmen were extraordinarily fortunate. The ,'discovery of the route to India paid off immediately., Vasco Da Gama's i
voyage is reported to have returned 600 percent on the investment.
I Exploitation of the India route made Portugal, previously a minor countryon the edge of Europe_ a world power. Eventually the Portuguese were
displaced by the Dutch, who also prospered on the India trade.
F"
To the rest, the windfall di not come immediately. The initial
' English and French expeditions had no positive results. Columbus's
voyages were a disappointment and the conquest of the Caribbean returned
little to Spain. But Cortez and his followers hit a mother-lode ofgold and silver in Mexic , and this was Followed up almost immediatelv
by Pizzarols strike at Peru. Specie beyond belief was collected.
[ ,,
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These rapid windfalls from the sea frontier stimulated further _i
efforts for generations to come. The success of finding the southeast
passage to the Indies led generations of explorers to seek a northwest -"
passage across America to China and Japan. The wonderful success of .j
the Mexican and Peruvian expeditions prompted generations of explorers
to seek other El Dorados in the Americas and in Africa. That these
further efforts came to naught is of less interest than the importance
of the initial strikes in keeping the process going. For instance, _"
had the Vikings hit something so extraordinary in North America_ perhaps
! their momentum would have been maintained.
The point here is that this experience suggests that one of the
most attractive possibilities for the space frontier would be to shortly
locate such an immediate "windful" of a direct and immediate return
on something which is of vital interest to at least the dominant classes "
of the metropolitan earth society, it is fair to comment that so far
a windfall on this scale has not been achieved. For instance, the
utility of military reconaissance in space is obviously desirable but "|
is not yet of the needed level--it may be roughly equivalent to the
utility that oceangoing ship technology had in the design of warships -_
' for combat in European waters--desirable, but not decisive. The same _,
1 can be said of space-located communications--nice but not a windfall.
Ii What it might become is necessarily conjectural--one cannot plan for --a windfall. However, following the analogy of the India route and _J
: the American expeditions a space windfall could take the form of something
; of extraordinary value finding in space. Or, perhaps by an ability
to perform some new processes in space sorae things of very great value | •c"
, to earth might be made much below their earthbound costs. An asteroid
of precious metals is a simple example. More likely are process possibilities
must be noted that the Scandinavian Vikings were extraordinarily vigorous
F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life= 1400-1800 (New York, 1973)_ ._
which would be extraordinarily expensive or impossible down-here.
For example hormones and other biologicals that can prevent or cure
most of the major diseases. ! '.
_J
A "windfall" can be defined in economic terms as a drop in cost of
several orders of magnitude. Such a cost cut can have marvelous ripple
effects. For example, suppose pure diamonds of any desired size or -.
shape could be made cheaply in space. Many manufacturing processes on
earth could be revolutionized to society's benefit. Or if pure crystals ""
for advarlced computer chips can be made reliably and inexpensively ._
it could revolutionize (once more) the computer industry. Many other
possibilities exist and even now may be in the minds of inventors. ..
What were the short term effects of the sea frontier upon the -"
Metropolis? The _fferts on the military balance in Europe were precisely
what the promoters of exploration had hoped for--an extraordinary shift ""
of power towards the sea-entrepreneurial s_ates. Portugal and Spain ._t
i amassed immense wealth which they invested in armies, navies, and seemingly _g
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"_i ([" interminable wars. Spain in particular was transformed from a secondary
power on the corner of Europe to the European superpower which projected
its might to the Netherlands, to Germany, and up to the shores of England.
j Unfortunately for the Iberian states, they had no thought of investing
the money, lacking _heories of development such as those which motivated
t most countries which recently obtained an oil-profit windfall. The
Iberian countries shortly went into decline, as their aggressive ambitions
I outstripped even the extraordinary means provided for them by India
_ trade or the mines of Mexico and Peru. The wealth was dissipated to
Dutch shipbuilders and to Italian, German, and Belgian mercenaries
I and their hangers-on.
, The rapid influx of money into Europe had extraordinary and
unanticipated effects upon the economy. An enormous inflation was
t i set off by the augmentation to the money supply. Many theorists of
"_ _ the relationshi? between economics and culture (most notably Lord Keynes)
'_ believed that this "monetary illusion" of steadily increasing prices
- [ created a sense of enthusiasm and a positive vision of the future which
| was a major factor in the conversion from the medieval to the modern "
age. This is a reminder of the obvious--that the opening of a new
._ ( frontier is bound to have untoward and incalculable consequences.
( The next consequence of the opening of the sea frontier was to i
bring into Europe things which were not known before. The Americas !f in particular contributed exotic fauna and flora. The Europeans first
_; _ treated these as curiosities, but gradually learned to adapt and use
them for their own purposes. Tea and silks from the East had long
i { been known, but their extraordinarily high prices had made them luxurygoods; now the price dropped and made them available to the middle
_ classes. From America came corn (maize), potatoes, and, of course,
r tobacco. These new products revolutionized the consumption patterns
! of Europeans, but of course very slowly.
After the exploration/conquest phase came the colonization of
• _ the frontier. People came to live there. At First the inhabitants
" i were only temporary sojourners, intending short-term residence merely
to make fast money to bring back to the Metropolis to spend. This
i was a risky matter. As late as the early nineteenth century an ambitious
I man could go out to India to make his fortune with less than a 50-50
chance of surviving the trip and the tropical diseases, but life was
risky at home as well. We still see this pattern existing today in
the mining and oil fields in land frontiers the Arcticcamps along
I and, for Europeans at least, in the tropics of Sou-'} America, Central
Africa, and the East Indies. H_gh wages have to t. paid to draw people
i to unpleasant and faraway places and those wages can only be justifiedeconomic lly by some activity which is more profitable there than elsewhere.
h
[_ In American history, the most striking example is the short butglamorous career of the mountain men who trapped for furs, especially "
i
Iq o
, '. .
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beaver, ,in the Rocky Mountains and Pacific Northwest in the early nineteenth
century. The characteristics of these men is worth noting--they tended
to be fierce individualists, rather less-than-satisfied with the boredom --
of more settled places. They were also young. The careers of _uc.,
men are inherently tragic, because the frontier will always catch up
with them and because they age and become more sedate (as test pilots
becoming businessmen). And--here is a caution for space exploration--the
market may change. The mountain men were wiped out by a change in _,
European fashion from the beaver hat to the silk hat. Whaling was
sort of a frontier activity attracting much the same sort of men, but -- ,
that business was killed by the discovery of coal distillation and
--k
the replacement of whale oil by kerosene for home lighting. But the
possibility of obsolescence by fashion change or technological innovation _.
is a risk of any business in the frontier or in the metropolis.
The next stage in the occupation of a frontier is the beginning
of permanent colonization. Why would people take a great deal of time,
money, and risk crossing a dangerous ocean to start a new life in an ._
unoccupied land? For most of them, the principal motivation was a
simple desire to improve themselves, by the standards of the metropolis; --
that is, they sought to replicate on the frontier the life of the privileged ..
classes back home. Many of these colonists, especially those in the
Iberian colonies, were younger sons of the upper classes who lacked _. t
economic opportunity at home and therefore had relatively little to
risk from trying to become grandees abroad. However, a landed gentleman _'
required plentiful ill-paid and vassal labor. This was available in
the peasants of Europe, but why should they cross the ocean to remain
near-serfs in an unfamiliar country? The colonists solved the problem .,
by reducing the native population of Indians to serfdom, and where
there were no Indians, or where the Indians were so primitive and proud -I
so that they would rather die than work, the native population was ._
liquidated and replaced by African slaves imported for that purpose.
This paragraph may seem a little irrelevant to issues of space colonization,
but it is not: it teaches us that people will not go into space in I -.
order to wash _quipment and scrub floors. Some other institutional or _,
technical means of doing the dirty work in space must be established. Robots
are the most obvious candidates. Perhaps alien life or genetically-created ""
forms that could be trained is anoth_ .....
The attempt to replicate the social life of the metropolis on °
the frontier had mixed results. The necessary modifications of social
life to accommodate the conditions of the new world have been the favorite
stuff of the frontier historians. Things never worked out exactly
as they did in Europe. But on the other hand, apart from the changes
necessary to accommodate to a revised servile class, the new conditions
were usually not all that different either. Our contention is that
frontier theory exaggerates the changes. Yes, the language modified ]
*David Lavender, Bent's Fort (Garden City, N.Y., 1954). ]
3.!
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slightly in that American English is different from European English,ditto French and Span sh and Portuguese. Of course, the complexity
o_ social life and institutions of Europe was simplified as these were
transplanted across the ocean. Yet, the colonists held the same standardsas those of the metropolis, and by those standards saw themselves as
inferior to their equivalents in the metropolis. This perception was
more than shared by the ruling classes of the metropolis who saw the
colonials as uncouth provincials. These perceptions were correct.Colonial society was narrow, almost cultureless and unproductive except
in a strictly material sense. It was centuries before the transocean
colonies of Europe produced metropolitan-class scientists, writers,performers, or artists. "Who reads an American book?" asked an English
critic in the early nineteenth century, just before the first great
generation of American writers appeared. Nevertheless, * _ question
I_ properly applied a exceptions to _rcviousquite
with few minor t"
two and a half centuries of overseas English coloniza_ _.
[ Conversely, Lhere seems to have been little effect of the newworld upon the imagination of the metropolis. Th_s is necessarily
indeterminate, but where are any concrete examples whereby experience
I of the frontier or the existence of the frontier had an effect uponEuropean culture or science? American scholars have delved into this
subject at considerable length and come up with such trivia as the
setting of Shakespeare's The Tempest in an imaginary Bermuda, but mostly
_. { bits and pieces of references of that sort. Now, it may be that there !
was an opening up of the mind caused by the knowledge of a great unknown _
external world which helped to upset the medieval world view and caused
i the opening of the modern scientific world view. This cannot he proved
or disproved and the curt treatment of this subject in no way properly
reflects on its possible importance. St!ll, other factors were clearly
- I involved. We recall that the Protestant Reformation opened in the
generation after Columbus and Vasco [!a Gama, but it seems incredible
to make any sort of intellectual or socio-psychological link. The period
i which we called the Renaissance, of course, evolved in northern Italy,I
;i ] at the very center of the highly developed and prosperous Mediterranean _, world, far from any frontier.
i We should not ignore two other important groups which found theirway to the frontier. Th se were from opposite ends of the spectrum
of human character. U.S. history in particular glorifies a handful
i of individuals who came across the ocean for essentially ideologicalreasons--to create pure religious communities untainted by the corruptions
and repressions of the old world. They had a conscious vision of building
a new world. The importance of these small groups cannot be underestlmated9
J_ but it must be remembered that they were a minority of the colonistseven in their own settlements. Space would seem to offer extraordinary
opportunities for small groups who wished to get away from it all and
to establish something truly new. Still, we should recall that thereare till plenty of places on this earth wh re this can be done with
a great deal less expense and difficulty.
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A second minority group that came to the frontier was criminals. "
Actually, the line between the explorers/conquerors and criminals is
a very fine line indeed. Many of these fellows spent considerable
time under the supervision of the law in the old world, partial:y for
being general troublemakers. (Cadillac, the founder of Detroit, lived
longer in the Bastille than in the city that he named.) Many of the --
frontiersmen were on the run.
T
And worse, the frontier was looked upon by the metrorolis as a _.
dumping ground for its criminal elements. Hundreds of thousands of
convicts and political prisoners were shipped from England to America, -'
and when this human duPp was closed by the American Revolution, to
Australia. The Soviet Union is still using this technique on its Siberian -
frontier. Space as a place for troublemakers to flee and/or to escape _.
the bounds of civilization and/or as a site for penal colonies is not
likely to be an attractive prospect to space promoters, hut is not •
beyond the realm of possibility either.
Let us turn now to the later development of the overseas frontier: _
First, the fundamental transportation technology evolved but slowly.
Navigation technology and technique was developed incrementally until " i
the point at which it could truly be described as "scientific." The
vehicle--the sailing ship--similarly evolved, becoming larger in size,
more rapid in speed, and more elaborate. But it was necessarily limited .
by speed of the wind and the strength of materials. Still, it must
be remarked that a full-rigged sailing ship of th_ early nineteenth _i
century was probably the most complicated piece of machinery that man
has ever operated and perhaps ever will. It was dangerous and complex "'
and required extraordinarily close coordination and superb skill_.
Not until steam power substituted for sail did the enormous transocean
migrations become possible in the late nineteenth century, resulting -:
in the restrictlon of immigration to the United States and other transocean
settlements. And, of course, the twentieth century saw long-distance _I " '
air travel which not only permitted swift immigration but an equally _! _ _'
swift return to the home country, i
It may be reasonable to speculate upon the long-term effects of
this analogy to space exploration. This is of course not to claim
that any such things will happen, but they might. The analogue of
the sailing ship era is the rocket age. We could expect a considerable
period of improving yet fundamentally inefficient space travel by rocket
for some period of time, for centuries if the transocean analogy were
perfect. Then an improved technology, one which was not previously
conceived of, would give much greater speeds and cheaper costs--and
we are not here thinking of the hypothetical "hyperdrive" (the faster- "
th_n-light travel of the science fiction writers) but something that ..
would, say, increase propulsion efficienty by an order cf magnitude, '_
and reduce costs by about the same ratio. Concurrently with the develop- _
ment of improved transportation technology would be the achievement ""
_b
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of a true independence of the space colonies, but in a system in whichthey were in close and intimate relations with the metropolis on earth
as the transocean settlements are to Europe.
The economic function of the colonies evolved but very slowly. But
on the whole they were highly specialized and intended p_rely to provide
specialized goods to the metropolis. They had to have an extraordinary
advantage in some factor of production in order to thrive. The price of
labor was always much higher in the colonies because of the cost of bringing
it across the Atlantic as we_l as the risks and general unattractiveness
_, of colonial life for working people compared with their familiar hauntsin the Metropolis. The factors of pr duction n which the colonies
_[ exceeded the Metropolis were either their undeveloped and therefore fertile
i soil and/or special climatic conditions which offered opportunities to
_ grow cotton, sugar, cocoa, indigo, and other specialty goods. (Note
that they were usually tropical goods unavailable in Europe.)
iT
{ Another Factor forcing the economic specialization of the colonies
[ was the mercantilist theory then enforced by the European states which
controlled and protected the colonies. As noted earlier, the early .
i modern equivalent of technology was money, and the purpose of economicpolicy was to accumulat gold bullion in order to hire forces in wartime i
and thereby to expand one's territory. Having a nearly self-sufficient
empire meant that one need nct export bullion in order to gain necessarygoods. Related to the national security i tent of the metropolita
' countries was the desire to secure necessary raw materials for the !
_ar machine itself, in particular iron and "naval stores"--tree trunks
' l- for masts, hemp for ropes, and the like,
_ Although it is arguable which influences were the most important
in shaping the economic life of the colonies--'natural" economics orstate olicies--a strong case can be made that the state p licies were
a poor second, Nonetheless, the Fact is that co]onies were an bnbalanced
and to a ce:tain degree artificial economy necessarily reliant upon
the mother in the It is be _cted that thiscountry Metropolis.
to ex
will be at least the initial condition of a,y it, 3pace or trans-space
colony. Prosperous co!on!_ls might want to return "home" to enjoy
the ful! spectrum of socia, cultural, and economic life.
It took quite some time in colonial development before a colony
i developed a social life of its own which could compete successfullywith the mother country in the Metropolis. For the United States this
occurred about 1800, for Canada about ]850 and lacer for the rest of
the British colonies. It was not until quite late in the Nineteenth
century that the Spanish and Portuguese colonies o_ Latin America achieved
a similar relationship relative to their mother countries. Quebec
has not and probably never will achieve parity with the mother country
of France. The principal determinants are the mo_ basic ones: gross .economi power and size of popula:io .
- _ ........ n,l I II i ., _ --
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Although the colonies were intended to be specialized units supplying
the metropolis with specific products, they gradually became filled
with rather ordinary people. We know little about these people except -.
that they must have begun with exceptional traits to cross _ dangerous
ocean in order to enjoy a less civilized way of life. Most of them
became subsistence farmers. They operated self-contained economic _.
units feeJing themselves and exchanging a small surplus for a few outside
goods. In other words they lived pretty much as the peasants of the -,
old world had. A much smaller group similar to some in Europe were
the craftsmen and various other artisans who served the merchants,
the planters, and the "peasants". Over time these ordinary occupations
expanded until they constituted a market in and of themselves. It
was roughly at this time that the colonies really became separate economic --
and therefore cultural units from the mother countries. It w_s the
development of the ordinary occupations and economic independence that
permitted the settlements to be mere colonies no longer. And9 of course,
the greater economic independence led to political independence.
The colonies themselves evolved from their situation as economic
and social appendages of the metropolis and reached a state of development
whereby they could be said to be wholly independent units, no longer _,
relying upon the Metropolis for their economic cultural life. Partially
this happened because they reached greater economies of scale, as no_ed -
earlier, but probably also because of their social maturity and because
of the senility of the mctropolis of Europe. ""
Just above we avoided the question of why these people traveled _ ,
overseas to live very much the way they would heve lived in Europe. -=
It seems fairly obvious that for most of them the attraction was something
available overseas that was not available to them at home--land? Land -i
ownership meant high prestige and full citizenship in the Metropolis ._
and was unavailable to the bulk of the populace. Because we live in
a post-agricultural society, we cannot appreciate how attractive was -.
the opportunity of land ownership to our forebears; even though this ] _-
still has a vestigial survival in our country in the t_ste for the :" i
owned home as being much preferred to the rented home. It may be
useful to speculate on what might substitute for land ownership _n
attracting ordinary ,,_ople to build in-space or trans-space colonies. _
What will people value that would draw them away from the home planet?
Obviously, money--but money also motivated our ancestors, and it seems -
that money can only be counted on to draw people into distant places on
the mining-camp model--to make the quick buck and then return home. So_.¢- ""
thing else, it seems, must be provided in order to get them to stay on a _.
permanent basis. What was it that land provided to our ancestors? It
seems that it offered three advantages--full citizenship7 prestige, and
, "i
Even without the tax aovantages. In Canada, almost the same -'
tendencies appear_ even though there are no tax advantages to home '"
"1
ownership over repting. _i
_i
\
.1
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independence. Under all modern systems, and it is difficult to think ofit changi g, citizenship is sol,lething wnich comes automatically by virtue
of one's birth. In modern societies no possession or award provides the
equivalent of the pre3tige which lana offered in the early modern _e,
i must leave that aside, although it be possible that social
SO we may
conditions will change enough so that a special alternative could appear. '"
_i We must look to the last attribute of land as a possible motivating ,driver--independence, Perhaps people can gain a _ense of individual
liberty in a trans-space environment that is _navailable back in the
- homeland° This brings us back to the personality type discussedearlier--the sor" of person who is not entirely happy with the
restrictions of civilization. We return to the free-booter and the
test pilot. It is probable that soace colonies, however well regulated
(" for survival, will not hJve the enormous complex web of regulations
[ and restrictions that is found on Earth and, for that reason, may be
more productive, despite whatever environmental o, material drawbacks
space settlements m3y have.
B. The Steppe Frontier '_1 ,
We thought to develop here the Steppe frontier of Europe in the '
same manner as the sea frontier, but found that the possible analogies i
to space were so thin that the analytical apparatus did not justifythe e_fort necessary to spin out the ideas. However, one point does ,
come from the _bortive analysis: that the Steppe--that is, the Eurasian ;'
Steppe ranging From the Ukraine to the Pacific--which was a barrier
only because it was occupied by nomad horsemen who could not be dislodged
until rapid-fire firearms became available tc the adjoining states, was
not ever itself fully developed, any more than the use of the sea was.
The _mproved plows of the nineteenth century permitted the cultivation
of the Steppe, but only under colonial conditions. 1his is seen in the •
territory of what is the Soviet Union, but more familiarly in the A _ricarJ _'
steppe--the Great Plains--or the Australian steppe--the Outback--where
people l've in an unusual manner= The Dakota farmer or the Australian
sheepheerder is prosperous and thoroughly integrated into the world's
I political, economic and social system, particularly through moderncommunications and air transit, but cannot be said to live a civilized
life in the traditional sense. However, the life of the people in
these isolated fa,ms and stations offe's a model for life in an unpre-
possessing and harsh environment--families isolated, exploiting theeconomic viability of very large spaces, and in (ommunication with
each other and with the larger world by means of high-tech transportation
| (aircraft) and communications 'short-wave radio). This could be a
i. model for the life of dwellers in space or in trans-space colonies.
The steppe-dweller analogy supqests a stable or declining population
after settlement, the relocation of young people, and retirement ofthe old to the comfnrts and conviviality of the Metropolis.
I
p
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Tn summarize the examination of the frontiers of Europe in tl_e
ear!y modern age as ap analogy for and perhaps a metaphor for space
exp!oration suggests certain possibilities, which could coincide with
reasonable conjectures about space travel and colonization.
A general point remains to be made--the Metropolitan promoters of
ocean transit saw it as a means to achieve their objectives according
to their values, and the success did not change their minds. Insofar
as the rulers and the aware elements of West Europe cared about the Great
Frontier, it was in terms of state power, conquest, wealth, and luxuries. -
But the motives of the actual ocean,crossers di.erged from those of
the Metropolitans, perhaps merely because they were a tiny, mostly
s_If-s_lecced, minority culled from til_population of the Metropolis-
-ri_k-takers, fast-buck artists, trouble-makers and criminals, and
idea,ists/cranks--all _'ho shared the willingness to abandon the familiarity
and security of the metropolis for Something Else.
i £,!
I
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II . COLONIZAIlON--TERRESTRIAL AND EXTRATERRESTRIAL
£
_ This section considers the potential for space ce'onizati_n by
examining the hi_tory--that is, the scientific record--of colonization
on the Earth." Long a cliche of science fiction is the concept of
extraterrestria] colonies in space. Usually for dramatic purposes
. the authors have presumed an environment rather like that of the Earth,
with human-tolerable temperatures and a breatheable atmosphere. Of
course these corditions can be found everywhere, or almost everywhere
-:p on the Earth, ye: the pattern of settlement here has been, to say the
least, uneven, and these terrestrial variations may cast some lightt
on the Dotential for space colonization.
; Let us distinguish between "in-space" and "trans-space" settlements.
the meaning of the first is evident_ the second means settlements across
space on another planetary body. Space is a medium through whi=h people
can travel, but they can also, at least in concept, reside more or
less permanently there. It is by traveling across media that mankind
has settled this 2arth, so let us examine that experience first.
i A. Trans-medium Settlements
• At present, the prevailing scientific belief is that something !
resembling humanity as 'e understand it originated in Africa. This
,_ theory is subject to change without notice upon the discovery of a
new skull somewhere else. The original "range" or limit of settlement
of man was probably fairly limited, as is that of most animals. Early
man needed gatherable foodstuffs, water, means of protection from predatory
" animals, and warmth--all of which were presumably available on theI
African savannah.
!
• Humanity's range was made near-global by three fundamental
inventions--clothing, fire, and weapons--which permitted domi_letion .
J over predators and penetration of colder climes. Of course, the Exquimaux
:| colonized the Arctic with this technology. However, while the possible
range was wideneJ to near-world extent, the next important inventions
i narrowed the preferred range. Husbandry made human life more desirable
in aces where domestic animals flourished, and agriculture required
' conditions of sun, soil, and water which concentrated settlements.
General statements are foundel on wide reading macro-history. For
t"e writing of this paper, reference was made to F. Braudel, The Mediterranean
!_ and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1972); J.-Hawkes,Prehistory and the Beinnin 9 of Civilization (New York, 1963); E. Hunt!ngton,
Mainsprings of Civilizaticq (New York, 1959); A.J. Toynbee, A Study in
History (London, 1934-I_o_; F.J. Turner, The Frontie _ in American History(New York, ]920)_ W.P. Webb, The Great Fro,_ier (Austin, Tax., ]952).
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The dawn of recorded history finds people living nearly everywhere
around the world--intensely settled in a dozen "civilizations" in river
valleys near the Equator, these surrounded by grazing "barbarian" cultures, --
and farther away, mixed primitive agricultural, hunting, and gathering
societies. In the hottest and coldest c;imes were the least advanced
social systems based almost purely on hunting and gathering. _.
Within all of _hese levels of development was constant migration
and colonization, .ostly moving by foot to seek newer and/or better
sites for settlement according to the technologica| standards of the -"
societies. On the . hole, people seldom appear to be interested in
adapting themselves to new environments--although obviously, the ancestors
of the Esquimaux and the desert nomads did so. However, the converse --
is true--people modified the environment to suit them; indeed, it has
been claimed that civilization was stimulated by the need to organize
irrigation for agriclture; the extension of -griculture usually required
the clearing of forests or the modification of grasslands; conversely, -_
predatory grazing nomads, such as the Mongols, would deliberately destroy
agriculture to provide a preferred ecology for their horses and cattle.
What we call the industrial revolution had fundamental effects
on the pattern of settlement on Earth. The initial leaoing-edge was
the exploitation of coal and iron. People moved toward the coal and -.
iron and to the places where they could economically be processed.
,n almost all cases, this movement was toward the North, toward colder ""
climes than were optimum for an agricultural system. So the centers
of civilization, and of power, were in northwest Europe and in the _
heartland of North America, and shortly in northern China and J_pan. -_
The output of the industrial revolution, of course, provided the "_
means to live in these previously marginal places. And today, technology .!
has developed to the point where people can live not only sufficiently
but comfo.'tably anywhere in the world. ".
Today, we are going through a transition toward a society which
has been labeled "post-industrial." One of its key att,ibut_s is a
decoupling of the conJitions of life from economic necessity. Advanced
i transportation and cclmunications permit people to live far from theplaces of production of basic needs--food, water, and fuel.
But--and here is the key point--while people can live anywhere,
they prefer to live in limited _reas. Throughou_ the world, we are
witnessing _hat many analysts call "the Sun Belt shift"--people are
mov:ng south toward the sun, not just in the U.S., but in Canada, Europe,
the Soviet Union, and Japan. People want to be warm and comfortable. -
With air conditioning available, there is a growing preference for
occasional excessive heat over occasional excessive cold. "_
Stgnificant areas of the world are being slowly depopulated--especial|y
those occupied in the early days of the industrial re"_lution--the
I
, i
tF
I
_ir ....................... .. r-.__- -_. "_ "" -"
1985022650-183
!
8-25
coal-and-iron districts, the trolley-car citisz, the last thrust of
the agricultural frontier in the Canadian Pr_ii,_
and the Australian
Outback. On the other hand, we must note the continued colonization
of Siberia, promoted by enormous government subsidies, and the continued
i colonizat'on of Alaska, driven mostly be a residue of the Americanfr ntier spirit, nd also the rapid growth of th R cky Mountain West
of the U.S.
Out to turn again to the negative_ consider Antarctica. It is only
in this century that men could reach its shores, much less settle there,
yet no one has. The use of the term "negative" above is significant to
the subject at hand, because all of the places under discussion are
extraordinarily better suited for and attractive to human habitation than
are any trans-space sites which will be reachable in the foreseeable Cuture.
Why should anyone live on the Moon when they won't live in Duluth?
The answer is obvious. We cannot expect them to live there for either
of the two most important reasons for preferring Iocation--that is,being born there, or liking to live the . We must hope for something
in the trans-space site that justifies the trouble to travel, the confined r
environment, and the lack of the amenities of civilization. The search
for "something' is eased by the recognition that we need not seek a
universal benefit--the early attraction need only be to a few (a hundredth
of a percent of a world population of six billion is 600,000--no social
data are accurate to a hundredth of a percent--so even an ambitious i
! number of colonizers is well within the margin of error of wor!d population).
! The first something is fame--but only the "point men" get that. , :
The second something is personal satisfaction, which can be continued
so long as the achievement is rare, like climbing a difficult mountain.
The third something is curiosity--part of the motivation of the
tourist and the scientist.
The fourth something is scatus--3nother part of the motivation
for the tourist and the scientist, as well as for the resident of the
i "exclusive" suburb or "up-scale" resort.
Not a something, in our view, is merely getting-away-from-it-all.
Those who want that can do it rather easier on Earth. At least there
i is plenty of air, however cold or rarified, in Antarctica or the Himalayas.And unless some extraordinary technological breakthrough occurs, the
necessities of providing an artificial environment will certainly put
living space at a premium and require a level of intimacy for higherthan that of Earth.
A related not-a-soraething is the monastery/commune. Both of these
are more easily on Earth--although possible
achieved it is f_
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to imagine a space religion that sees Mars as Mount Sinai, requiring _,
the presence of a few of the devout.
--.
Alas, the obvious something that can bring most people to trans-
space colonies is the most vulgar of motives--short-term greed. The
historical analogue tells us that people will go trans-space for money, _.
lots of fast money, so that they can return to Earth to spend it.
Of course, a few might stay on, but most would want to make their poke ..
and go back, perhaps to come out again when their wallets get thin.
This motive also applies to scientists--who are, like everyone, careerist. -" '
So based on existing precedent the question of colonization boils
down to who will pay the colonists and for what?
The obvious analogous Earth _ettlement is the mining camp where
there exists gold, or iron, or oil, or whatever, which has sufficient -.
value to justify the expense of bringing it out from the wiaderness.
Men must be hired co build the facilities to bring it out, and to operate .i
them once in place. Perhaps it is needless to remark that we cannot be
sure that anything exists trans-space that is worth that trouble--indeed, -
given what we now know (granted, not much), it is at best uncertain
that the Moon or Mars or the asteroids or the ._oons of the outer planets
have material or energy worth planting a colony to exploit--but, of -.
course, that estimate may be changed radlcally by further expioration it
and new technologies. "' ;
A rather more promising Earth-model is the military base. This I '
is settled by people whose participation is not entirely voluntary. -.
Some have been conscripted and others have volunteered for the military
services, but not to be based in some particularly god-forsaken post. -_l
Nonetheless, some of the military has long been planted in such unfortunate ._
piaces--sailors go to Little America, airmen go to Thule, Soviet forces
,an Kamchatka. -_ . ;
i"
Depending on the organization of the service, dependents can often :"
be brought along. Military settlement is one of the oldest and successful
means of colonization. It was central to the policy of the Roman Empire.
East Prussia begdn this way. The "Fort this-or-that" names which litter _.
a map of the U.S. show the importance of military settlements in colonizing
North America. "
We can reasonably ask why a military post should be established ""
trans-space--but that is another question to be developed later. We ..
can write here that a military colon! seems, given what little we now
know, the most promising sort of early trans-space settlement with -
the "mining camp" second.
Third would be the scientific f_cility--the observatory, or monitoring
station, or exploration base. But a settlement of this type assumes
that automatic equipment wo_,ld be inadequate for one reason or another. _!
!
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i But there is another side to the colonization coin. The assumptionso far has been that people go to something better. That has been true
in most cases--but an alternative spur to colonization cannot be ignored:
that people migrate to escape something worse. For example, the Central
I European scientists who came to the U.S. in the 1930s were not enamored
with American culture. They were reacting to a sharp deterioration--to
understate considerably--of living conditions in their former abodes.
I The planting of Puritan colonies in America in the early 17th
century was a colonization of the negative type. The English Puritans
were under heavy pressure from the political and ecclesiastical authorities
of the Stuart government. Two factions (which our histories label
"the Pilgrims" and "the Puritans") gave up the struggle and determined
to create proper churches trans-atlantic. They moved too soon, because
I their compatriots at home over-threw the Stuart regime -and many of the
emigrees returned to participate in the fight and to enjoy the victory.
Obviously, the Puritan migration was a boon to what became America;and equally obviously, although the Stu rt government was reli ved
to be rid of those trouble-maker_, the migration reflected a worsening
political climate in England. To apply this analogy to trans-space
colonization _,,oJldrequire speculating on something adverse happening
on Earth or at !east on some part of Earth. Something adverse would i
almost certainly have to be on all earth, because a deterioration in
I some part could be answered by a migration to another part.
We can easily imagine a world-tyranny (in ed, space-based weapon :,
I systems might be a powerful asset to such a reg,,ne). And despite theuse of political examples above, it should not be ignored that environmental
deteriorat;on has probably been the principal spur to negative migration--e.g.,
when the hunting failed, or the crops failed.
i The obvious problem is how to conceive of a world society in grave
political or environmcntal danger finding the resources to devote to
r a space colony or some sub-group needing those resources. If there
I is a plausible forecast of imminent world destruction--by a comet or
a virulent, perhaps man-caused, plague--then it would be good policy
to throw all available resources into an exodus of even a tiny group;o mix the Bibl,ca] metaph r, this is Ark trategy. And, while L
conceivable, is not likely, nor a suitable scenario for planhing purposes.
we about one or two centuries hence, and if we believeIf think
• . that space travel will become so cheap that it may be available to
small nations or sub-groups within large nations, then the negative
i migration scenario is possible.
B. In-medium Settlements
[ ,.
Discussions of Earth colonization take for granted that settlements
must be on terra firma and ignore the possibility that people can live
E ,
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_J in the transportation medium itself. So speculations about living .,
in-space lead us to examine the history of living in on-earth mediums:
In a water colony people live on a boat instead of on dry land.
In human history there are numerous examples of water colonies. In '
the days of the sailing ships, when voyages took months or years, the
sailors effectively were sea residents. In many cities on estuaries
(and most cities had to be on estuaries because they required water for ..
drinking, washing, and sewage) were colonies of people living on boats
more or less permanently tied up--houseboats. This is particularly ":
noticeable in china and can be viewed easily in Hong Kong. This type .i
• of water colony is a function of the crowdedness and desirability of
l the city and presupposes, for whatever reason, a housing shortage. For ..
example, some people lived in the yacht basin in the East Potomac Parkin Washingt n, D.C., imm iately following the Second World War, and -_
a few dozen live in marinas along Manhattan Island today.| --
i
! However, these numbers are infinitesimal and are probably shrinking. .,
The reasons for this are obvious--transportation speed and flexibility
f have improved remarkably. The modern motorized sh_p can make its passage -°
in a few weeks and a sailor can be home regularly. However, the develop-
ment of effective motorized land transportation has permitted the city
"4
.: to spread out on the land, thus eliminating the pressure for people
" to live on the water. This movement away from water colonies brings "i
to mind a set of factors which are negative when considering the possibility _l
of in-space colonies• Keep _n mind that water colonies are much easier
; for people to inhabit than space colonies, yet they are failing. To
be sure, the pluses and minuses are quite different--water colonies ! !
are subject to the continual presence of wa er which has corrosive
effects on wood, metal, and just about everything else. Overall the T]
corrosive effects of space environment are likely to be much milder, ,!
but perhaps somewhat worse in terms of exposure to intense sunlight and
penetrating radiation. The water colonies have the drawback of being ..
dangerous i: that people, especially children, always run the risk of _
drowning, but this is even more pronounced in a space colony where the -"
entire environment outside of the protected area is certain to be fatal.
The water colony has the drawback of limited food supplies--food either "_t
must be carried from shore or one can rely upon fish and seaweed. It .}
remains to be seen what local food sources will become available in
space, but the first approximation is that over the near term there -;
will be none at all.
o •
A closer analogy to a space colony is the air colony. Since the
invention of the balloon, it has been possible for human beings to "_
live in the a,r. Inhabitants of balloon colonies would have many -.
'1
*Although some people live on ships to_Tv. This writer has boarded "
a molasses tanker which shuttled between Vera Cruz and Albany, New York.
York. On it lived a few complete families; the tanker was a floating vilJage. _I _
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E advantages that would not accrue to land inhabitants--they would havea marvelous view, they could move their homes easily, and they would
be away from it all. The obvious method of living in the air would
be in a tethered balloon and it is theoretically possible, with Iong-
I_ standing technology, to conceive of extraordinarily large balloons
nd colonies of balloons. Just as the water colonist could catch fish,
athe air colonist could gather birds and, with suitable netting, pernaps
_, some vegetable matter as well. But no single person, to our knowledge,has e r chos n to live in the air. And the ai_ colonist has one great
advantage over the space colonist in that whatever else he may lack,
he does not lack air to breathe.
The closest Earth-bound equivalent to in-space living is undersea
living. Indeed, many of the parallels are quite close. Because of
buoyancy, the undersea dweller lives_ in some respects, as if he werein a near-zero gravity condition. At moderate depths, he requires a
"space suit, and he must be provided with an air/oxygen supply to survive.
As has been discussed in the imaginative works of Jacques Cousteauand his assoc ate , people could live underwater. Air/oxygen could
be derived from v_ter or from sea-bottom materials without excessive
difficulty. Ample food, both animal and vegetable, is available fromfish and plants. The economic justification for undersea colonies is
easy to contrive--military and resource exploitation. Furthermore, many
people are intensely and personally interested in underwater activity--via
skin-diving and "professional" suited diving for commercial purposes.A handful of enthusiasts are steadily increasing the periods which
people stay underwater--just as times in space increase--yet both activities
are of a te_ting and record-breaking nature. No one shows any signs ,of wanting to permanently live underwater. And t repeat the theme,
living underwater is now much easier than living in space.
summary, considering only record contemporary
In the historical and
trends_ space colonization--either in-space or trans-space--would not
appear to have much attraction for very large numbers of people. Space
i colonization is caught in a paradox--a world society rich enough to _.aff rd large-scale space tr vel is rich enough to provide xtraordinary
comfort and freedom-of-choice on Earth. The _ost promising possibilities
I] of relatively long-term dwelling are the mining camp and the military base.
Nevertheless, this perspective may be time-bound--changing technology
coupled with changing social values may soon force major revisions.[
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